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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 07 Oct 2026 05:20:41 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-33997 — Moby: Off-by-one error in plugin privilege validation</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-33997</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; moby, Red Hat Multicluster Global Hub 1.4.5, Red Hat Multicluster Global Hub 1.6.5, Red Hat multicluster global hub 1.5.3, Red Hat Multicluster Engine for Kubernetes, Red Hat OpenShift Service Mesh 2, Red Hat Advanced Cluster Management for Kubernetes 2, Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4, Red Hat OpenShift Virtualization 4&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Moby is an open source container framework. Prior to version 29.3.1, a security vulnerability has been detected that allows plugins privilege validation to be bypassed during docker plugin install. Due to an error in the daemon&amp;#39;s privilege comparison logic, the daemon may incorrectly accept a privilege set that differs from the one approved by the user. Plugins that request exactly one privilege are also affected, because no comparison is performed at all. This issue has been patched in version 29.3.1.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; moby, Red Hat Multicluster Global Hub 1.4.5, Red Hat Multicluster Global Hub 1.6.5, Red Hat multicluster global hub 1.5.3, Red Hat Multicluster Engine for Kubernetes, Red Hat OpenShift Service Mesh 2, Red Hat Advanced Cluster Management for Kubernetes 2, Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4, Red Hat OpenShift Virtualization 4&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Moby is an open source container framework. Prior to version 29.3.1, a security vulnerability has been detected that allows plugins privilege validation to be bypassed during docker plugin install. Due to an error in the daemon&amp;#39;s privilege comparison logic, the daemon may incorrectly accept a privilege set that differs from the one approved by the user. Plugins that request exactly one privilege are also affected, because no comparison is performed at all. This issue has been patched in version 29.3.1.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-33997</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-47q9-m4ww-924m — Rekor has an OOM Condition due to Unbounded gzip Decompression in Alpine APK Parsing Logic</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-47q9-m4ww-924m</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/sigstore/rekor&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Description&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `Package.Unmarshal()` function in `pkg/types/alpine/apk.go` decompresses the signature and control gzip members of an APK file into in-memory buffers without bounding the total decompressed size. The existing `max_apk_metadata_size` check (default 1MB) is only applied to individual tar entry header sizes after decompression completes, so it does not prevent a decompression bomb from consuming unbounded heap memory.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An attacker can craft a gzip stream that compresses at a ~1000:1 ratio (e.g., 2MB compressed zeros → 2GB decompressed). When submitted as spec.package.content in an Alpine `ProposedEntry`, the server decompresses the full payload into memory during request processing, triggering a fatal Go runtime out-of-memory error or OS OOM-kill that cannot be caught by the server&amp;#39;s recover() middleware.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is reachable via two unauthenticated endpoints:
- POST /api/v1/log/entries (createLogEntry)
- POST /api/v1/log/entries/retrieve (searchLogQuery)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Both invoke `V001Entry.Canonicalize()` → `fetchExternalEntities()` → `apk.Unmarshal(packageData)`, which performs the unbounded decompression.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Workarounds&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;There is no effective workaround. Setting `max_request_body_size` reduces but does not eliminate exposure due to the ~1000:1 compression ratio (a 1MB body limit still allows ~1GB heap allocation). Setting `max_apk_metadata_size` has no effect on this vulnerability since the check is applied after decompression.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/sigstore/rekor&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Description&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `Package.Unmarshal()` function in `pkg/types/alpine/apk.go` decompresses the signature and control gzip members of an APK file into in-memory buffers without bounding the total decompressed size. The existing `max_apk_metadata_size` check (default 1MB) is only applied to individual tar entry header sizes after decompression completes, so it does not prevent a decompression bomb from consuming unbounded heap memory.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An attacker can craft a gzip stream that compresses at a ~1000:1 ratio (e.g., 2MB compressed zeros → 2GB decompressed). When submitted as spec.package.content in an Alpine `ProposedEntry`, the server decompresses the full payload into memory during request processing, triggering a fatal Go runtime out-of-memory error or OS OOM-kill that cannot be caught by the server&amp;#39;s recover() middleware.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is reachable via two unauthenticated endpoints:
- POST /api/v1/log/entries (createLogEntry)
- POST /api/v1/log/entries/retrieve (searchLogQuery)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Both invoke `V001Entry.Canonicalize()` → `fetchExternalEntities()` → `apk.Unmarshal(packageData)`, which performs the unbounded decompression.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Workarounds&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;There is no effective workaround. Setting `max_request_body_size` reduces but does not eliminate exposure due to the ~1000:1 compression ratio (a 1MB body limit still allows ~1GB heap allocation). Setting `max_apk_metadata_size` has no effect on this vulnerability since the check is applied after decompression.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-47q9-m4ww-924m</guid>
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