https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Mon, 05 Oct 2026 23:23:21 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-f4xh-w4cj-qxq8 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: langsmith</p> <p># Summary</p> <p>An attacker who can send an HTTP request to a server running the LangSmith SDK&#39;s `TracingMiddleware` can cause that server to read an arbitrary file from its local filesystem and upload the contents to LangSmith as a trace attachment. Depending on how the distributed trace system is deployed, triggering a read may not require authentication. Retrieving the contents requires read access to the LangSmith workspace the traces are sent to. The net effect is a trust-boundary crossing: a party with workspace trace-read access (for example a low-privilege workspace member, a contractor, or a compromised teammate account) gains the ability to read files from any server running `TracingMiddleware`, a capability outside that workspace&#39;s intended trust boundary.</p> <p># Impact</p> <p>Confidentiality (High): arbitrary read of files accessible to the server process, exposed to anyone with workspace trace-read access.</p> <p># Details</p> <p>Two defects combine. A field supplied through a tracing-propagation header was merged into the run without validation, allowing injection of run attributes including attachments (CWE-346). A type check intended to gate filesystem access did not match the type of the decoded input, so the guard never engaged (CWE-843). As a result, an attacker-named file is opened by the server and uploaded as a trace attachment by the background tracing thread (CWE-22).</p> <p>## Who can exploit this</p> <p>- Anyone reachable by HTTP can trigger the file read. Depending on how the distribute…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: langsmith</p> <p># Summary</p> <p>An attacker who can send an HTTP request to a server running the LangSmith SDK&#39;s `TracingMiddleware` can cause that server to read an arbitrary file from its local filesystem and upload the contents to LangSmith as a trace attachment. Depending on how the distributed trace system is deployed, triggering a read may not require authentication. Retrieving the contents requires read access to the LangSmith workspace the traces are sent to. The net effect is a trust-boundary crossing: a party with workspace trace-read access (for example a low-privilege workspace member, a contractor, or a compromised teammate account) gains the ability to read files from any server running `TracingMiddleware`, a capability outside that workspace&#39;s intended trust boundary.</p> <p># Impact</p> <p>Confidentiality (High): arbitrary read of files accessible to the server process, exposed to anyone with workspace trace-read access.</p> <p># Details</p> <p>Two defects combine. A field supplied through a tracing-propagation header was merged into the run without validation, allowing injection of run attributes including attachments (CWE-346). A type check intended to gate filesystem access did not match the type of the decoded input, so the guard never engaged (CWE-843). As a result, an attacker-named file is opened by the server and uploaded as a trace attachment by the background tracing thread (CWE-22).</p> <p>## Who can exploit this</p> <p>- Anyone reachable by HTTP can trigger the file read. Depending on how the distribute…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-f4xh-w4cj-qxq8