https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Mon, 05 Oct 2026 17:47:03 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2025-49128 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> FasterXML jackson-core</p> <p>Jackson-core contains core low-level incremental (&#34;streaming&#34;) parser and generator abstractions used by Jackson Data Processor. Starting in version 2.0.0 and prior to version 2.13.0, a flaw in jackson-core&#39;s `JsonLocation._appendSourceDesc` method allows up to 500 bytes of unintended memory content to be included in exception messages. When parsing JSON from a byte array with an offset and length, the exception message incorrectly reads from the beginning of the array instead of the logical payload start. This results in possible information disclosure in systems using pooled or reused buffers, like Netty or Vert.x. This issue was silently fixed in jackson-core version 2.13.0, released on September 30, 2021, via PR #652. All users should upgrade to version 2.13.0 or later. If upgrading is not immediately possible, applications can mitigate the issue by disabling exception message exposure to clients to avoid returning parsing exception messages in HTTP responses and/or disabling source inclusion in exceptions to prevent Jackson from embedding any source content in exception messages, avoiding leakage.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> FasterXML jackson-core</p> <p>Jackson-core contains core low-level incremental (&#34;streaming&#34;) parser and generator abstractions used by Jackson Data Processor. Starting in version 2.0.0 and prior to version 2.13.0, a flaw in jackson-core&#39;s `JsonLocation._appendSourceDesc` method allows up to 500 bytes of unintended memory content to be included in exception messages. When parsing JSON from a byte array with an offset and length, the exception message incorrectly reads from the beginning of the array instead of the logical payload start. This results in possible information disclosure in systems using pooled or reused buffers, like Netty or Vert.x. This issue was silently fixed in jackson-core version 2.13.0, released on September 30, 2021, via PR #652. All users should upgrade to version 2.13.0 or later. If upgrading is not immediately possible, applications can mitigate the issue by disabling exception message exposure to clients to avoid returning parsing exception messages in HTTP responses and/or disabling source inclusion in exceptions to prevent Jackson from embedding any source content in exception messages, avoiding leakage.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2025-49128 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-r7wm-3cxj-wff9 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Maven: com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core, Maven: tools.jackson.core:jackson-core</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>The fix released in jackson-core `2.18.6` and `2.21.1` for [GHSA-72hv-8253-57qq](https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-core/security/advisories/GHSA-72hv-8253-57qq) (Number Length Constraint Bypass in Async Parser, published 2026-02-28) is incomplete. The fix commit `b0c428e6` (#1555) wired `validateIntegerLength` into a new `_setIntLength` helper and called it at every place where the integer portion of a number is *decided* (terminator byte arrived, `.` / `e/E` seen, end-of-feed inside a fully-buffered value). It did not call it on the much more attacker-relevant path: &#34;ran out of input while still inside `MINOR_NUMBER_INTEGER_DIGITS`, return `NOT_AVAILABLE` to caller&#34;.</p> <p>As a result, an attacker who streams JSON to a non-blocking parser in many small chunks, without ever sending a terminator byte, can keep the parser inside `MINOR_NUMBER_INTEGER_DIGITS` indefinitely. `_textBuffer.expandCurrentSegment()` grows on every chunk, and `validateIntegerLength` is never invoked. The accumulator is only gated by `maxStringLength` (20 MiB default) — a **~20,000x amplification** of the documented `maxNumberLength` (1000 default).</p> <p>This is the same vulnerability class, same advisory wording (&#34;Memory Exhaustion: Unbounded allocation in TextBuffer from excessively long numbers&#34;), same parser class — just the streaming path the original fix didn&#39;t cover. The fix to the *fraction* path is correct (see `_finishFloatFraction` at line 1834-1837 of `NonBlockingUtf8JsonParserBase.jav…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Maven: com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core, Maven: tools.jackson.core:jackson-core</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>The fix released in jackson-core `2.18.6` and `2.21.1` for [GHSA-72hv-8253-57qq](https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-core/security/advisories/GHSA-72hv-8253-57qq) (Number Length Constraint Bypass in Async Parser, published 2026-02-28) is incomplete. The fix commit `b0c428e6` (#1555) wired `validateIntegerLength` into a new `_setIntLength` helper and called it at every place where the integer portion of a number is *decided* (terminator byte arrived, `.` / `e/E` seen, end-of-feed inside a fully-buffered value). It did not call it on the much more attacker-relevant path: &#34;ran out of input while still inside `MINOR_NUMBER_INTEGER_DIGITS`, return `NOT_AVAILABLE` to caller&#34;.</p> <p>As a result, an attacker who streams JSON to a non-blocking parser in many small chunks, without ever sending a terminator byte, can keep the parser inside `MINOR_NUMBER_INTEGER_DIGITS` indefinitely. `_textBuffer.expandCurrentSegment()` grows on every chunk, and `validateIntegerLength` is never invoked. The accumulator is only gated by `maxStringLength` (20 MiB default) — a **~20,000x amplification** of the documented `maxNumberLength` (1000 default).</p> <p>This is the same vulnerability class, same advisory wording (&#34;Memory Exhaustion: Unbounded allocation in TextBuffer from excessively long numbers&#34;), same parser class — just the streaming path the original fix didn&#39;t cover. The fix to the *fraction* path is correct (see `_finishFloatFraction` at line 1834-1837 of `NonBlockingUtf8JsonParserBase.jav…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-r7wm-3cxj-wff9