https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Fri, 02 Oct 2026 11:22:33 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-87817 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> gitpython-developers GitPython</p> <p>GitPython before 3.1.60 fails to properly validate the git directory location, allowing attackers to impersonate the git directory using tracked files like gitdir, commondir, and HEAD. Attackers can execute arbitrary code by placing a malicious pre-commit hook in the tracked hooks directory that executes when a victim calls index.commit() on a cloned or opened repository.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> gitpython-developers GitPython</p> <p>GitPython before 3.1.60 fails to properly validate the git directory location, allowing attackers to impersonate the git directory using tracked files like gitdir, commondir, and HEAD. Attackers can execute arbitrary code by placing a malicious pre-commit hook in the tracked hooks directory that executes when a victim calls index.commit() on a cloned or opened repository.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-87817 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-239g-whfq-7xj9 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: gitpython</p> <p>### Summary</p> <p>`Repo.__init__` decides which directory is the git directory by testing candidate paths in an order that considers the real `.git` **last**. Two earlier tests can be satisfied by ordinary tracked files. Git reserves only the literal name `.git`, so `HEAD`, `objects/`, `refs/`, `config`, `gitdir`, `commondir` and `hooks/` at a repository root are all legal tracked content.</p> <p>Consequently, after a victim opens or clones an attacker&#39;s repository, GitPython resolves `git_dir` to the **working-tree root** while real git correctly resolves `&lt;root&gt;/.git`. Everything GitPython then treats as &#34;inside the git directory&#34; is attacker-authored content — including `hooks/`, which it executes.</p> <p>### CVE-2026-87817</p> <p>### Affected code (3.1.59)</p> <p>The discovery loop in `git/repo/base.py` tests, in order:</p> <p>1. `git/repo/base.py:299` — `isfile(curpath/gitdir)` **and** `isfile(curpath/commondir)` **and** `isfile(curpath/HEAD)` 2. `git/repo/base.py:320` — `is_git_dir(curpath)` 3. `git/repo/base.py:341` — `dotgit = osp.join(curpath, &#34;.git&#34;)` ← the real git dir, considered last</p> <p>`is_git_dir` (`git/repo/fun.py:60`) requires only that `objects/` and `refs/` are directories and that `HEAD` is a file; **`HEAD`&#39;s contents are never parsed.** The hook path is resolved from `index.repo.git_dir` (`git/index/fun.py:73`), i.e. the mis-resolved directory.</p> <p>### Proof of concept</p> <p>Requires only `pip install GitPython==3.1.59`. Full script attached as `poc1_rce.py`; it runs entirely in a temp directory an…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: gitpython</p> <p>### Summary</p> <p>`Repo.__init__` decides which directory is the git directory by testing candidate paths in an order that considers the real `.git` **last**. Two earlier tests can be satisfied by ordinary tracked files. Git reserves only the literal name `.git`, so `HEAD`, `objects/`, `refs/`, `config`, `gitdir`, `commondir` and `hooks/` at a repository root are all legal tracked content.</p> <p>Consequently, after a victim opens or clones an attacker&#39;s repository, GitPython resolves `git_dir` to the **working-tree root** while real git correctly resolves `&lt;root&gt;/.git`. Everything GitPython then treats as &#34;inside the git directory&#34; is attacker-authored content — including `hooks/`, which it executes.</p> <p>### CVE-2026-87817</p> <p>### Affected code (3.1.59)</p> <p>The discovery loop in `git/repo/base.py` tests, in order:</p> <p>1. `git/repo/base.py:299` — `isfile(curpath/gitdir)` **and** `isfile(curpath/commondir)` **and** `isfile(curpath/HEAD)` 2. `git/repo/base.py:320` — `is_git_dir(curpath)` 3. `git/repo/base.py:341` — `dotgit = osp.join(curpath, &#34;.git&#34;)` ← the real git dir, considered last</p> <p>`is_git_dir` (`git/repo/fun.py:60`) requires only that `objects/` and `refs/` are directories and that `HEAD` is a file; **`HEAD`&#39;s contents are never parsed.** The hook path is resolved from `index.repo.git_dir` (`git/index/fun.py:73`), i.e. the mis-resolved directory.</p> <p>### Proof of concept</p> <p>Requires only `pip install GitPython==3.1.59`. Full script attached as `poc1_rce.py`; it runs entirely in a temp directory an…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-239g-whfq-7xj9 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-3982 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: gitpython</p> <p>GitPython before 3.1.60 fails to properly validate the git directory location, allowing attackers to impersonate the git directory using tracked files like gitdir, commondir, and HEAD. Attackers can execute arbitrary code by placing a malicious pre-commit hook in the tracked hooks directory that executes when a victim calls index.commit() on a cloned or opened repository.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: gitpython</p> <p>GitPython before 3.1.60 fails to properly validate the git directory location, allowing attackers to impersonate the git directory using tracked files like gitdir, commondir, and HEAD. Attackers can execute arbitrary code by placing a malicious pre-commit hook in the tracked hooks directory that executes when a victim calls index.commit() on a cloned or opened repository.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-3982