https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Wed, 07 Oct 2026 18:27:05 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-j425-whc4-4jgc <p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: openclaw</p> <p>### Summary `system.run` env override sanitization allowed dangerous override-only helper-command pivots to reach subprocesses. A caller who could invoke `system.run` with `env` overrides could bypass allowlist/approval intent by steering an allowlisted tool through helper-command or config-loading environment variables such as `GIT_SSH_COMMAND`, editor/pager hooks, and `GIT_CONFIG_*` / `NPM_CONFIG_*`.</p> <p>### Affected Packages / Versions - Package: `openclaw` (npm) - Latest published vulnerable version: `2026.3.2` - Affected range: `&lt;= 2026.3.2` - Patched in: `2026.3.7`</p> <p>### Details Before the fix, `src/infra/host-env-security.ts` blocked only a narrow set of override-only environment variables. Dangerous request-scoped overrides such as `GIT_SSH_COMMAND` and prefix families such as `GIT_CONFIG_*` and `NPM_CONFIG_*` could still survive `sanitizeSystemRunEnvOverrides(...)` / `sanitizeHostExecEnv(...)` and reach the spawned process.</p> <p>That mattered for `system.run` allowlist and approval flows because approval evaluation was tied to the reviewed binary/argv, while the launched process could still inherit attacker-controlled env overrides that changed helper-command execution or config resolution. For allowlisted tools such as `git`, this allowed behavior outside the reviewed command semantics.</p> <p>The fix extends the shared TypeScript and macOS policy to block dangerous override-only exact keys and prefixes while preserving trusted inherited base-environment behavior.</p> <p>### Impact Th…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: openclaw</p> <p>### Summary `system.run` env override sanitization allowed dangerous override-only helper-command pivots to reach subprocesses. A caller who could invoke `system.run` with `env` overrides could bypass allowlist/approval intent by steering an allowlisted tool through helper-command or config-loading environment variables such as `GIT_SSH_COMMAND`, editor/pager hooks, and `GIT_CONFIG_*` / `NPM_CONFIG_*`.</p> <p>### Affected Packages / Versions - Package: `openclaw` (npm) - Latest published vulnerable version: `2026.3.2` - Affected range: `&lt;= 2026.3.2` - Patched in: `2026.3.7`</p> <p>### Details Before the fix, `src/infra/host-env-security.ts` blocked only a narrow set of override-only environment variables. Dangerous request-scoped overrides such as `GIT_SSH_COMMAND` and prefix families such as `GIT_CONFIG_*` and `NPM_CONFIG_*` could still survive `sanitizeSystemRunEnvOverrides(...)` / `sanitizeHostExecEnv(...)` and reach the spawned process.</p> <p>That mattered for `system.run` allowlist and approval flows because approval evaluation was tied to the reviewed binary/argv, while the launched process could still inherit attacker-controlled env overrides that changed helper-command execution or config resolution. For allowlisted tools such as `git`, this allowed behavior outside the reviewed command semantics.</p> <p>The fix extends the shared TypeScript and macOS policy to block dangerous override-only exact keys and prefixes while preserving trusted inherited base-environment behavior.</p> <p>### Impact Th…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-j425-whc4-4jgc