<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Sat, 03 Oct 2026 16:58:04 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-32302 — OpenClaw: Untrusted web origins can obtain authenticated operator.admin access in trusted-proxy mode</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-32302</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; openclaw&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;OpenClaw is a personal AI assistant. Prior to 2026.3.11, browser-originated WebSocket connections could bypass origin validation when gateway.auth.mode was set to trusted-proxy and the request arrived with proxy headers. A page served from an untrusted origin could connect through a trusted reverse proxy, inherit proxy-authenticated identity, and establish a privileged operator session. This vulnerability is fixed in 2026.3.11.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; openclaw&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;OpenClaw is a personal AI assistant. Prior to 2026.3.11, browser-originated WebSocket connections could bypass origin validation when gateway.auth.mode was set to trusted-proxy and the request arrived with proxy headers. A page served from an untrusted origin could connect through a trusted reverse proxy, inherit proxy-authenticated identity, and establish a privileged operator session. This vulnerability is fixed in 2026.3.11.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-32302</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-5wcw-8jjv-m286 — OpenClaw: Untrusted web origins can obtain authenticated operator.admin access in trusted-proxy mode</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-5wcw-8jjv-m286</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: openclaw&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary
In affected versions of `openclaw`, browser-originated WebSocket connections could bypass origin validation when `gateway.auth.mode` was set to `trusted-proxy` and the request arrived with proxy headers. A page served from an untrusted origin could connect through a trusted reverse proxy, inherit proxy-authenticated identity, and establish a privileged operator session.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact
This issue affects deployments that expose the Gateway behind a trusted reverse proxy and rely on browser origin checks such as `controlUi.allowedOrigins` to restrict browser access. An attacker who can cause a victim browser to load a malicious page that can reach the proxy endpoint could establish a cross-site WebSocket connection and call privileged Gateway methods.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In verified impact, the attacker-origin page was able to request `operator.admin` and successfully call `config.get`, exposing sensitive configuration. Depending on the deployment, the same authenticated operator path could also permit other privileged reads or mutations available to operator-class callers.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected Packages and Versions
- Package: `openclaw` (npm)
- Affected versions: `&amp;lt; 2026.3.11`
- Fixed in: `2026.3.11`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Technical Details
The WebSocket handshake logic treated proxy-delivered requests as exempt from the generic browser origin check whenever an `Origin` header was present alongside proxy headers. In `trusted-proxy` mode, that exemption allowed browser-originated connections to skip the normal orig…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: openclaw&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary
In affected versions of `openclaw`, browser-originated WebSocket connections could bypass origin validation when `gateway.auth.mode` was set to `trusted-proxy` and the request arrived with proxy headers. A page served from an untrusted origin could connect through a trusted reverse proxy, inherit proxy-authenticated identity, and establish a privileged operator session.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact
This issue affects deployments that expose the Gateway behind a trusted reverse proxy and rely on browser origin checks such as `controlUi.allowedOrigins` to restrict browser access. An attacker who can cause a victim browser to load a malicious page that can reach the proxy endpoint could establish a cross-site WebSocket connection and call privileged Gateway methods.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In verified impact, the attacker-origin page was able to request `operator.admin` and successfully call `config.get`, exposing sensitive configuration. Depending on the deployment, the same authenticated operator path could also permit other privileged reads or mutations available to operator-class callers.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected Packages and Versions
- Package: `openclaw` (npm)
- Affected versions: `&amp;lt; 2026.3.11`
- Fixed in: `2026.3.11`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Technical Details
The WebSocket handshake logic treated proxy-delivered requests as exempt from the generic browser origin check whenever an `Origin` header was present alongside proxy headers. In `trusted-proxy` mode, that exemption allowed browser-originated connections to skip the normal orig…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-5wcw-8jjv-m286</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
