https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Thu, 08 Oct 2026 13:34:01 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-32038 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> OpenClaw</p> <p>OpenClaw before 2026.2.24 contains a sandbox network isolation bypass vulnerability that allows trusted operators to join another container&#39;s network namespace. Attackers can configure the docker.network parameter with container:&lt;id&gt; values to reach services in target container namespaces and bypass network hardening controls.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> OpenClaw</p> <p>OpenClaw before 2026.2.24 contains a sandbox network isolation bypass vulnerability that allows trusted operators to join another container&#39;s network namespace. Attackers can configure the docker.network parameter with container:&lt;id&gt; values to reach services in target container namespaces and bypass network hardening controls.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-32038 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-ww6v-v748-x7g9 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: openclaw</p> <p>### Summary In `openclaw@2026.2.23`, sandbox network hardening blocks `network=host` but still allows `network=container:&lt;id&gt;`.</p> <p>This can let a sandbox join another container&#39;s network namespace and reach services available in that namespace.</p> <p>### Preconditions and Trust Model Context This issue requires a trusted-operator configuration path (for example setting `agents.defaults.sandbox.docker.network` in gateway config). It is not an unauthenticated remote exploit by itself.</p> <p>### Details Current validation blocks only `host`, while forwarding other values to Docker create args:</p> <p>- `validateNetworkMode(network)` only rejects values in `BLOCKED_NETWORK_MODES = {&#34;host&#34;}`. - `buildSandboxCreateArgs(...)` validates then forwards `cfg.network` into `--network`. - Browser sandbox helper also treats `container:` as an accepted mode in network preparation.</p> <p>Effective behavior:</p> <p>- `host` -&gt; blocked - `container:&lt;id&gt;` -&gt; accepted and forwarded</p> <p>### Impact Type: sandbox network isolation hardening bypass.</p> <p>Practical impact depends on deployment:</p> <p>- Requires ability to influence trusted sandbox network config. - Higher impact when a target container exposes privileged/internal network reachability.</p> <p>### Remediation Block namespace-join style network modes (including `container:&lt;id&gt;`) for sandbox containers, and keep strict allowlisting for safe network modes.</p> <p>### Patch Status Fixed on `main` in commit `14b6eea6e`: https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/14b6eea6e</p> <p>Follow-up refact…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: openclaw</p> <p>### Summary In `openclaw@2026.2.23`, sandbox network hardening blocks `network=host` but still allows `network=container:&lt;id&gt;`.</p> <p>This can let a sandbox join another container&#39;s network namespace and reach services available in that namespace.</p> <p>### Preconditions and Trust Model Context This issue requires a trusted-operator configuration path (for example setting `agents.defaults.sandbox.docker.network` in gateway config). It is not an unauthenticated remote exploit by itself.</p> <p>### Details Current validation blocks only `host`, while forwarding other values to Docker create args:</p> <p>- `validateNetworkMode(network)` only rejects values in `BLOCKED_NETWORK_MODES = {&#34;host&#34;}`. - `buildSandboxCreateArgs(...)` validates then forwards `cfg.network` into `--network`. - Browser sandbox helper also treats `container:` as an accepted mode in network preparation.</p> <p>Effective behavior:</p> <p>- `host` -&gt; blocked - `container:&lt;id&gt;` -&gt; accepted and forwarded</p> <p>### Impact Type: sandbox network isolation hardening bypass.</p> <p>Practical impact depends on deployment:</p> <p>- Requires ability to influence trusted sandbox network config. - Higher impact when a target container exposes privileged/internal network reachability.</p> <p>### Remediation Block namespace-join style network modes (including `container:&lt;id&gt;`) for sandbox containers, and keep strict allowlisting for safe network modes.</p> <p>### Patch Status Fixed on `main` in commit `14b6eea6e`: https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/14b6eea6e</p> <p>Follow-up refact…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-ww6v-v748-x7g9