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    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 05 Oct 2026 09:12:47 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-26320 — OpenClaw macOS deep link confirmation truncation can conceal executed agent message</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-26320</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; openclaw&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;OpenClaw is a personal AI assistant. OpenClaw macOS desktop client registers the `openclaw://` URL scheme. For `openclaw://agent` deep links without an unattended `key`, the app shows a confirmation dialog that previously displayed only the first 240 characters of the message, but executed the full message after the user clicked &amp;#34;Run.&amp;#34; At the time of writing, the OpenClaw macOS desktop client is still in beta. In versions 2026.2.6 through 2026.2.13, an attacker could pad the message with whitespace to push a malicious payload outside the visible preview, increasing the chance a user approves a different message than the one that is actually executed. If a user runs the deep link, the agent may perform actions that can lead to arbitrary command execution depending on the user&amp;#39;s configured tool approvals/allowlists. This is a social-engineering mediated vulnerability: the confirmation prompt could be made to misrepresent the executed message. The issue is fixed in 2026.2.14. Other mitigations include not approve unexpected &amp;#34;Run OpenClaw agent?&amp;#34; prompts triggered while browsing untrusted sites and usingunattended deep links only with a valid `key` for trusted personal automations.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; openclaw&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;OpenClaw is a personal AI assistant. OpenClaw macOS desktop client registers the `openclaw://` URL scheme. For `openclaw://agent` deep links without an unattended `key`, the app shows a confirmation dialog that previously displayed only the first 240 characters of the message, but executed the full message after the user clicked &amp;#34;Run.&amp;#34; At the time of writing, the OpenClaw macOS desktop client is still in beta. In versions 2026.2.6 through 2026.2.13, an attacker could pad the message with whitespace to push a malicious payload outside the visible preview, increasing the chance a user approves a different message than the one that is actually executed. If a user runs the deep link, the agent may perform actions that can lead to arbitrary command execution depending on the user&amp;#39;s configured tool approvals/allowlists. This is a social-engineering mediated vulnerability: the confirmation prompt could be made to misrepresent the executed message. The issue is fixed in 2026.2.14. Other mitigations include not approve unexpected &amp;#34;Run OpenClaw agent?&amp;#34; prompts triggered while browsing untrusted sites and usingunattended deep links only with a valid `key` for trusted personal automations.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-26320</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-7q2j-c4q5-rm27 — OpenClaw macOS deep link confirmation truncation can conceal executed agent message</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-7q2j-c4q5-rm27</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: openclaw&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
OpenClaw macOS desktop client registers the `openclaw://` URL scheme. For `openclaw://agent` deep links without an unattended `key`, the app shows a confirmation dialog that previously displayed only the first 240 characters of the message, but executed the full message after the user clicked &amp;#34;Run&amp;#34;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;At the time of writing, the OpenClaw macOS desktop client is still in beta.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An attacker could pad the message with whitespace to push a malicious payload outside the visible preview, increasing the chance a user approves a different message than the one that is actually executed.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact
If a user runs the deep link, the agent may perform actions that can lead to arbitrary command execution depending on the user&amp;#39;s configured tool approvals/allowlists. This is a social-engineering mediated vulnerability: the confirmation prompt could be made to misrepresent the executed message.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected Versions
- OpenClaw macOS desktop client versions &amp;gt;= 2026.2.6 and &amp;lt;= 2026.2.13.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Fixed Versions
- 2026.2.14.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Mitigations
- Do not approve unexpected &amp;#34;Run OpenClaw agent?&amp;#34; prompts triggered while browsing untrusted sites.
- Use unattended deep links only with a valid `key` for trusted personal automations.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Resolution
Unkeyed deep links now enforce a strict message length limit for confirmation and ignore delivery/routing knobs (`deliver`, `to`, `channel`) unless a valid unattended `key` is provided.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix commit: 28d9dd7a772501ccc3f71457b4adfee79084fe6f&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;---&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix c…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: openclaw&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
OpenClaw macOS desktop client registers the `openclaw://` URL scheme. For `openclaw://agent` deep links without an unattended `key`, the app shows a confirmation dialog that previously displayed only the first 240 characters of the message, but executed the full message after the user clicked &amp;#34;Run&amp;#34;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;At the time of writing, the OpenClaw macOS desktop client is still in beta.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An attacker could pad the message with whitespace to push a malicious payload outside the visible preview, increasing the chance a user approves a different message than the one that is actually executed.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact
If a user runs the deep link, the agent may perform actions that can lead to arbitrary command execution depending on the user&amp;#39;s configured tool approvals/allowlists. This is a social-engineering mediated vulnerability: the confirmation prompt could be made to misrepresent the executed message.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected Versions
- OpenClaw macOS desktop client versions &amp;gt;= 2026.2.6 and &amp;lt;= 2026.2.13.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Fixed Versions
- 2026.2.14.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Mitigations
- Do not approve unexpected &amp;#34;Run OpenClaw agent?&amp;#34; prompts triggered while browsing untrusted sites.
- Use unattended deep links only with a valid `key` for trusted personal automations.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Resolution
Unkeyed deep links now enforce a strict message length limit for confirmation and ignore delivery/routing knobs (`deliver`, `to`, `channel`) unless a valid unattended `key` is provided.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix commit: 28d9dd7a772501ccc3f71457b4adfee79084fe6f&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;---&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix c…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-7q2j-c4q5-rm27</guid>
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