https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Fri, 02 Oct 2026 14:50:41 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-78677 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> gitpython-developers GitPython</p> <p>GitPython before 3.1.59 omits --separate-git-dir from unsafe_git_clone_options, allowing attackers to create arbitrary git directories outside the intended clone destination. Attackers can pass a separate_git_dir parameter to Repo.clone_from() or Repo.clone() to redirect repository metadata to an attacker-controlled filesystem path, enabling arbitrary directory creation and potential hook execution.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> gitpython-developers GitPython</p> <p>GitPython before 3.1.59 omits --separate-git-dir from unsafe_git_clone_options, allowing attackers to create arbitrary git directories outside the intended clone destination. Attackers can pass a separate_git_dir parameter to Repo.clone_from() or Repo.clone() to redirect repository metadata to an attacker-controlled filesystem path, enabling arbitrary directory creation and potential hook execution.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-78677 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-8mcc-hrx5-hvxc <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: GitPython</p> <p>- **CWE:** CWE-73 (External Control of File Name or Path) / CWE-22 (Path Traversal, in the &#34;escapes intended base directory&#34; sense) - **Affected component:** `git/repo/base.py`, `Repo.unsafe_git_clone_options` (class attribute, lines 153-165) and `Repo._clone()` (lines 1477-1520), reached via the public `Repo.clone_from()` (line 1626) and `Repo.clone()` (line 1567) APIs. - **Affected version:** GitPython at HEAD (`9729ed3b948f2bde09f1f188c5311e172212b67e`, 2026-08-05, VERSION `3.1.58`)</p> <p>## Reachability `Repo.clone_from(url, to_path, **kwargs)` (and `Repo.clone()`) forward arbitrary keyword arguments to the underlying `git clone` invocation. Before forwarding, GitPython builds a candidate option list from the kwargs (`Git._option_candidates`) and checks it against a denylist, `Repo.unsafe_git_clone_options`, via `Git.check_unsafe_options()` — *unless* the caller passes `allow_unsafe_options=True`. This denylist mechanism is exactly the guard that the last ~16 published GHSAs against this repo (2026-07-12 → 2026-08-05) have repeatedly found incomplete or bypassable for other options (`--template`, `--upload-pack`, `--config`, `--exec`, `--output`, `--index-output`, `--pathspec-from-file`, etc.).</p> <p>`git clone` also accepts `--separate-git-dir=&lt;path&gt;`, which redirects the repository&#39;s entire `.git` metadata directory to an **arbitrary, caller-controlled filesystem path**, leaving only a gitlink text file (`gitdir: &lt;path&gt;`) at the intended destination. This is the exact same primi…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: GitPython</p> <p>- **CWE:** CWE-73 (External Control of File Name or Path) / CWE-22 (Path Traversal, in the &#34;escapes intended base directory&#34; sense) - **Affected component:** `git/repo/base.py`, `Repo.unsafe_git_clone_options` (class attribute, lines 153-165) and `Repo._clone()` (lines 1477-1520), reached via the public `Repo.clone_from()` (line 1626) and `Repo.clone()` (line 1567) APIs. - **Affected version:** GitPython at HEAD (`9729ed3b948f2bde09f1f188c5311e172212b67e`, 2026-08-05, VERSION `3.1.58`)</p> <p>## Reachability `Repo.clone_from(url, to_path, **kwargs)` (and `Repo.clone()`) forward arbitrary keyword arguments to the underlying `git clone` invocation. Before forwarding, GitPython builds a candidate option list from the kwargs (`Git._option_candidates`) and checks it against a denylist, `Repo.unsafe_git_clone_options`, via `Git.check_unsafe_options()` — *unless* the caller passes `allow_unsafe_options=True`. This denylist mechanism is exactly the guard that the last ~16 published GHSAs against this repo (2026-07-12 → 2026-08-05) have repeatedly found incomplete or bypassable for other options (`--template`, `--upload-pack`, `--config`, `--exec`, `--output`, `--index-output`, `--pathspec-from-file`, etc.).</p> <p>`git clone` also accepts `--separate-git-dir=&lt;path&gt;`, which redirects the repository&#39;s entire `.git` metadata directory to an **arbitrary, caller-controlled filesystem path**, leaving only a gitlink text file (`gitdir: &lt;path&gt;`) at the intended destination. This is the exact same primi…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-8mcc-hrx5-hvxc https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-3787 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: gitpython</p> <p>GitPython before 3.1.59 omits --separate-git-dir from unsafe_git_clone_options, allowing attackers to create arbitrary git directories outside the intended clone destination. Attackers can pass a separate_git_dir parameter to Repo.clone_from() or Repo.clone() to redirect repository metadata to an attacker-controlled filesystem path, enabling arbitrary directory creation and potential hook execution.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: gitpython</p> <p>GitPython before 3.1.59 omits --separate-git-dir from unsafe_git_clone_options, allowing attackers to create arbitrary git directories outside the intended clone destination. Attackers can pass a separate_git_dir parameter to Repo.clone_from() or Repo.clone() to redirect repository metadata to an attacker-controlled filesystem path, enabling arbitrary directory creation and potential hook execution.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-3787