https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Fri, 02 Oct 2026 15:49:10 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-76219 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> gitpython-developers GitPython</p> <p>GitPython versions before 3.1.58 contain an arbitrary file overwrite vulnerability in IndexFile.from_tree, IndexFile.reset, and IndexFile.merge_tree methods that append caller-influenced treeish strings to git read-tree without option validation or argument separation. Attackers can inject the --index-output option to overwrite arbitrary files with a valid git-index blob, destroying existing file content at attacker-controlled writable paths.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> gitpython-developers GitPython</p> <p>GitPython versions before 3.1.58 contain an arbitrary file overwrite vulnerability in IndexFile.from_tree, IndexFile.reset, and IndexFile.merge_tree methods that append caller-influenced treeish strings to git read-tree without option validation or argument separation. Attackers can inject the --index-output option to overwrite arbitrary files with a valid git-index blob, destroying existing file content at attacker-controlled writable paths.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-76219 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-4gmw-gg2m-w46p <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: GitPython</p> <p>## Summary `IndexFile.from_tree`, `IndexFile.reset` (→ from_tree) and `IndexFile.merge_tree` append caller-influenced treeish strings positionally to `git read-tree` with no unsafe-option guard, no `allow_unsafe_options` parameter, and no `--` separator. `git read-tree --index-output=&lt;file&gt;` writes the resulting index to an arbitrary path, and last-occurrence-wins lets an injected `--index-output` override the method&#39;s internal temp path — clobbering an arbitrary file with a valid git-index blob. This is a distinct, never-guarded sink: commit `3af0c251` (GHSA-3f7w-8rr8-f37f) guarded only `checkout_index` and `tag`; `read_tree` was left unprotected (it is among the acknowledged unguarded call sites in that advisory&#39;s sweep but was never reported or fixed).</p> <p>## Root Cause `from_tree` (index/base.py:388), `reset` (delegates to from_tree), and `merge_tree` (index/base.py:291) call `repo.git.read_tree(*arg_list)` with no `check_unsafe_options` and no `--`. The treeish is caller-influenced and positional.</p> <p>## Impact Arbitrary file overwrite / destruction at the privileges of the host process. Content is constrained to a git-index blob (not attacker-chosen, so not RCE), but the target path is fully attacker-controlled — corrupting/truncating configs or destroying files at attacker-chosen writable locations = I:H + A:H (per the skill&#39;s &#34;overwrite-any-path = I:H&#34; rule). Pure VALUE control (positional treeish). Default configuration.</p> <p>## Proof of Concept ```python IndexFile.from_tree(…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: GitPython</p> <p>## Summary `IndexFile.from_tree`, `IndexFile.reset` (→ from_tree) and `IndexFile.merge_tree` append caller-influenced treeish strings positionally to `git read-tree` with no unsafe-option guard, no `allow_unsafe_options` parameter, and no `--` separator. `git read-tree --index-output=&lt;file&gt;` writes the resulting index to an arbitrary path, and last-occurrence-wins lets an injected `--index-output` override the method&#39;s internal temp path — clobbering an arbitrary file with a valid git-index blob. This is a distinct, never-guarded sink: commit `3af0c251` (GHSA-3f7w-8rr8-f37f) guarded only `checkout_index` and `tag`; `read_tree` was left unprotected (it is among the acknowledged unguarded call sites in that advisory&#39;s sweep but was never reported or fixed).</p> <p>## Root Cause `from_tree` (index/base.py:388), `reset` (delegates to from_tree), and `merge_tree` (index/base.py:291) call `repo.git.read_tree(*arg_list)` with no `check_unsafe_options` and no `--`. The treeish is caller-influenced and positional.</p> <p>## Impact Arbitrary file overwrite / destruction at the privileges of the host process. Content is constrained to a git-index blob (not attacker-chosen, so not RCE), but the target path is fully attacker-controlled — corrupting/truncating configs or destroying files at attacker-chosen writable locations = I:H + A:H (per the skill&#39;s &#34;overwrite-any-path = I:H&#34; rule). Pure VALUE control (positional treeish). Default configuration.</p> <p>## Proof of Concept ```python IndexFile.from_tree(…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-4gmw-gg2m-w46p https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-3838 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: gitpython</p> <p>## Summary `IndexFile.from_tree`, `IndexFile.reset` (→ from_tree) and `IndexFile.merge_tree` append caller-influenced treeish strings positionally to `git read-tree` with no unsafe-option guard, no `allow_unsafe_options` parameter, and no `--` separator. `git read-tree --index-output=&lt;file&gt;` writes the resulting index to an arbitrary path, and last-occurrence-wins lets an injected `--index-output` override the method&#39;s internal temp path — clobbering an arbitrary file with a valid git-index blob. This is a distinct, never-guarded sink: commit `3af0c251` (GHSA-3f7w-8rr8-f37f) guarded only `checkout_index` and `tag`; `read_tree` was left unprotected (it is among the acknowledged unguarded call sites in that advisory&#39;s sweep but was never reported or fixed).</p> <p>## Root Cause `from_tree` (index/base.py:388), `reset` (delegates to from_tree), and `merge_tree` (index/base.py:291) call `repo.git.read_tree(*arg_list)` with no `check_unsafe_options` and no `--`. The treeish is caller-influenced and positional.</p> <p>## Impact Arbitrary file overwrite / destruction at the privileges of the host process. Content is constrained to a git-index blob (not attacker-chosen, so not RCE), but the target path is fully attacker-controlled — corrupting/truncating configs or destroying files at attacker-chosen writable locations = I:H + A:H (per the skill&#39;s &#34;overwrite-any-path = I:H&#34; rule). Pure VALUE control (positional treeish). Default configuration.</p> <p>## Proof of Concept ```python IndexFile.from_tree(…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: gitpython</p> <p>## Summary `IndexFile.from_tree`, `IndexFile.reset` (→ from_tree) and `IndexFile.merge_tree` append caller-influenced treeish strings positionally to `git read-tree` with no unsafe-option guard, no `allow_unsafe_options` parameter, and no `--` separator. `git read-tree --index-output=&lt;file&gt;` writes the resulting index to an arbitrary path, and last-occurrence-wins lets an injected `--index-output` override the method&#39;s internal temp path — clobbering an arbitrary file with a valid git-index blob. This is a distinct, never-guarded sink: commit `3af0c251` (GHSA-3f7w-8rr8-f37f) guarded only `checkout_index` and `tag`; `read_tree` was left unprotected (it is among the acknowledged unguarded call sites in that advisory&#39;s sweep but was never reported or fixed).</p> <p>## Root Cause `from_tree` (index/base.py:388), `reset` (delegates to from_tree), and `merge_tree` (index/base.py:291) call `repo.git.read_tree(*arg_list)` with no `check_unsafe_options` and no `--`. The treeish is caller-influenced and positional.</p> <p>## Impact Arbitrary file overwrite / destruction at the privileges of the host process. Content is constrained to a git-index blob (not attacker-chosen, so not RCE), but the target path is fully attacker-controlled — corrupting/truncating configs or destroying files at attacker-chosen writable locations = I:H + A:H (per the skill&#39;s &#34;overwrite-any-path = I:H&#34; rule). Pure VALUE control (positional treeish). Default configuration.</p> <p>## Proof of Concept ```python IndexFile.from_tree(…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-3838