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    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 18 Nov 2026 09:02:14 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-108360 — PhpSpreadsheet: SSRF whitelist bypass via unre-validated HTTP redirect in Drawing::setPath external image loading</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-108360</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PHPOffice PhpSpreadsheet&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;PhpSpreadsheet is a pure PHP library for reading and writing spreadsheet files. Prior to 1.30.7, 2.1.19, 2.4.8, 3.10.8, and 5.10.0, Worksheet\Drawing::setPath validates only the initial external-image URL with setIsWhitelisted when setAllowExternalImages is enabled. The HTTP stream context permits PHP to follow a redirect without applying the callback to the redirected URL, so a permitted image host can redirect the server to an internal address and cause a blind GET request. The response body is not returned to the attacker because the reader validates the downloaded content as an image and removes the temporary file, but internal GET-driven endpoints, network reachability, and cloud metadata endpoints may be reached. This issue is fixed in versions 1.30.7, 2.1.19, 2.4.8, 3.10.8, and 5.10.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PHPOffice PhpSpreadsheet&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;PhpSpreadsheet is a pure PHP library for reading and writing spreadsheet files. Prior to 1.30.7, 2.1.19, 2.4.8, 3.10.8, and 5.10.0, Worksheet\Drawing::setPath validates only the initial external-image URL with setIsWhitelisted when setAllowExternalImages is enabled. The HTTP stream context permits PHP to follow a redirect without applying the callback to the redirected URL, so a permitted image host can redirect the server to an internal address and cause a blind GET request. The response body is not returned to the attacker because the reader validates the downloaded content as an image and removes the temporary file, but internal GET-driven endpoints, network reachability, and cloud metadata endpoints may be reached. This issue is fixed in versions 1.30.7, 2.1.19, 2.4.8, 3.10.8, and 5.10.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-108360</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-2phh-27fw-q4gc — PhpSpreadsheet: SSRF whitelist bypass via unre-validated HTTP redirect in Drawing::setPath external image loading</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-2phh-27fw-q4gc</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: phpoffice/phpspreadsheet&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary
PhpSpreadsheet&amp;#39;s `Worksheet\Drawing::setPath()` validates an external-image URL against an operator-supplied `isWhitelisted` callback **once**, on the initial URL only, then fetches it with `file_get_contents()` using a stream context that does **not** set `follow_location =&amp;gt; 0`. A whitelisted host that returns an HTTP `302 Location:` redirect to an internal target is therefore followed by PHP&amp;#39;s HTTP wrapper (default `follow_location=1`, `max_redirects=20`) with **no re-validation of the redirect hop** — defeating the whitelist and yielding a blind SSRF from the server.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is an unfixed variant of CVE-2026-59931 (GHSA-6hq5-7373-42rg, the WEBSERVICE redirect-whitelist-bypass): the `follow_location =&amp;gt; 0` fix (commit `7ef7b25e`) was applied ONLY to `Calculation/Web/Service.php`; `Worksheet/Drawing.php` was never touched.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Root Cause
`src/PhpSpreadsheet/Worksheet/Drawing.php`:
- Scheme allowlist at `:125` (`/^(http|https|file|ftp|s3):/`) permits `http`/`https` (the redirect-following schemes) and runs on the initial URL only.
- Opt-in gate `if (!$allowExternal)` at `:128` (requires `setAllowExternalImages(true)`; default `false`, `BaseReader.php:55`).
- Whitelist check `if ($isWhitelisted !== null &amp;amp;&amp;amp; !$isWhitelisted($path))` at `:131` — validates the INITIAL URL only; never re-applied after a redirect.
- Stream context built at `:140-152` sets `user_agent` + `header` (+ `ssl.crypto_method` for https) but **omits `follow_location`**. `git grep follow_location` on…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: phpoffice/phpspreadsheet&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary
PhpSpreadsheet&amp;#39;s `Worksheet\Drawing::setPath()` validates an external-image URL against an operator-supplied `isWhitelisted` callback **once**, on the initial URL only, then fetches it with `file_get_contents()` using a stream context that does **not** set `follow_location =&amp;gt; 0`. A whitelisted host that returns an HTTP `302 Location:` redirect to an internal target is therefore followed by PHP&amp;#39;s HTTP wrapper (default `follow_location=1`, `max_redirects=20`) with **no re-validation of the redirect hop** — defeating the whitelist and yielding a blind SSRF from the server.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is an unfixed variant of CVE-2026-59931 (GHSA-6hq5-7373-42rg, the WEBSERVICE redirect-whitelist-bypass): the `follow_location =&amp;gt; 0` fix (commit `7ef7b25e`) was applied ONLY to `Calculation/Web/Service.php`; `Worksheet/Drawing.php` was never touched.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Root Cause
`src/PhpSpreadsheet/Worksheet/Drawing.php`:
- Scheme allowlist at `:125` (`/^(http|https|file|ftp|s3):/`) permits `http`/`https` (the redirect-following schemes) and runs on the initial URL only.
- Opt-in gate `if (!$allowExternal)` at `:128` (requires `setAllowExternalImages(true)`; default `false`, `BaseReader.php:55`).
- Whitelist check `if ($isWhitelisted !== null &amp;amp;&amp;amp; !$isWhitelisted($path))` at `:131` — validates the INITIAL URL only; never re-applied after a redirect.
- Stream context built at `:140-152` sets `user_agent` + `header` (+ `ssl.crypto_method` for https) but **omits `follow_location`**. `git grep follow_location` on…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-2phh-27fw-q4gc</guid>
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