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    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-59733 — rclone `serve restic --private-repos` authorization bypass: `..` in the URL path lets an authenticated user read, overw…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-59733</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; rclone&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Rclone is a command-line program to sync files and directories to and from different cloud storage providers. Prior to 1.74.4, rclone serve restic --private-repos enforces authorization using the routed user path segment while building the backend object key from the raw uncleaned URL path, allowing an authenticated user to include .. in a request such as //..//config and read, overwrite, or delete another user&amp;#39;s private repository on backends that clean path components. This issue is fixed in version 1.74.4.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; rclone&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Rclone is a command-line program to sync files and directories to and from different cloud storage providers. Prior to 1.74.4, rclone serve restic --private-repos enforces authorization using the routed user path segment while building the backend object key from the raw uncleaned URL path, allowing an authenticated user to include .. in a request such as //..//config and read, overwrite, or delete another user&amp;#39;s private repository on backends that clean path components. This issue is fixed in version 1.74.4.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-59733</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-fqj9-69pf-6pjg — rclone `serve restic --private-repos` authorization bypass: `..` in the URL path lets an authenticated user read, overw…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-fqj9-69pf-6pjg</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/rclone/rclone&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`rclone serve restic --private-repos` exists to let one rclone instance host many users&amp;#39; restic backup repositories behind HTTP Basic auth while keeping each user confined to a path prefix of `/&amp;lt;username&amp;gt;/`. The documentation states the flag &amp;#34;can be used to limit users to repositories starting with a path of `/&amp;lt;username&amp;gt;/`&amp;#34;, and the shipped test `TestResticPrivateRepositories` asserts that user `test` may reach `/test/config` but is `403`-blocked from `/other_user/config`. This isolation is the entire security purpose of the flag.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The isolation is enforced by two independent chi middlewares that derive the username and the backend object path from two *different* sources, and the path source is never canonicalized. `checkPrivate` authorizes the request by comparing the routed `{userID}` path segment against the authenticated user, while `WithRemote` builds the backend object key from the raw, un-cleaned URL path. A request such as `GET /&amp;lt;me&amp;gt;/../&amp;lt;victim&amp;gt;/config` keeps the first path segment equal to the attacker&amp;#39;s own username (so `checkPrivate` returns the request as authorized) yet hands the backend the literal remote `me/../victim/config`. On any backend that resolves object paths with POSIX `path.Join`/`path.Clean` semantics — which includes the bundled `memory` backend used in the PoC below, and the widely deployed `sftp` and `ftp` backends — that `..` segment collapses, and the operation is performed against the victim&amp;#39;s object.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Because the same un-cleaned…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/rclone/rclone&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`rclone serve restic --private-repos` exists to let one rclone instance host many users&amp;#39; restic backup repositories behind HTTP Basic auth while keeping each user confined to a path prefix of `/&amp;lt;username&amp;gt;/`. The documentation states the flag &amp;#34;can be used to limit users to repositories starting with a path of `/&amp;lt;username&amp;gt;/`&amp;#34;, and the shipped test `TestResticPrivateRepositories` asserts that user `test` may reach `/test/config` but is `403`-blocked from `/other_user/config`. This isolation is the entire security purpose of the flag.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The isolation is enforced by two independent chi middlewares that derive the username and the backend object path from two *different* sources, and the path source is never canonicalized. `checkPrivate` authorizes the request by comparing the routed `{userID}` path segment against the authenticated user, while `WithRemote` builds the backend object key from the raw, un-cleaned URL path. A request such as `GET /&amp;lt;me&amp;gt;/../&amp;lt;victim&amp;gt;/config` keeps the first path segment equal to the attacker&amp;#39;s own username (so `checkPrivate` returns the request as authorized) yet hands the backend the literal remote `me/../victim/config`. On any backend that resolves object paths with POSIX `path.Join`/`path.Clean` semantics — which includes the bundled `memory` backend used in the PoC below, and the widely deployed `sftp` and `ftp` backends — that `..` segment collapses, and the operation is performed against the victim&amp;#39;s object.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Because the same un-cleaned…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-fqj9-69pf-6pjg</guid>
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