https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Wed, 07 Oct 2026 11:28:12 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-92938 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> patriksimek vm2</p> <p>vm2 versions 3.11.3 through 3.11.6 expose Node.js&#39;s host node:sqlite module to code running in NodeVM when that builtin is permitted, either explicitly or through builtin: [&#39;*&#39;]. The module is wrapped with vm.readonly(), which prevents property assignment but leaves host-authority callables reachable; in addition, the resolver treats any request starting with &#39;node:&#39; as a core-module request and the runtime strips only one &#39;node:&#39; prefix, so a sandbox request for &#39;node:node:sqlite&#39; resolves to the configured node:sqlite entry. Sandboxed code can therefore create an in-memory DatabaseSync with extension loading enabled and call DatabaseSync.loadExtension() on a native library bundled in the untrusted plugin package (path derived from __dirname). SQLite loads the library into the Node.js host process and invokes its native entry point, giving the sandboxed plugin arbitrary native code execution outside the sandbox with the host process&#39;s privileges. The issue is fixed in vm2 3.11.7.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> patriksimek vm2</p> <p>vm2 versions 3.11.3 through 3.11.6 expose Node.js&#39;s host node:sqlite module to code running in NodeVM when that builtin is permitted, either explicitly or through builtin: [&#39;*&#39;]. The module is wrapped with vm.readonly(), which prevents property assignment but leaves host-authority callables reachable; in addition, the resolver treats any request starting with &#39;node:&#39; as a core-module request and the runtime strips only one &#39;node:&#39; prefix, so a sandbox request for &#39;node:node:sqlite&#39; resolves to the configured node:sqlite entry. Sandboxed code can therefore create an in-memory DatabaseSync with extension loading enabled and call DatabaseSync.loadExtension() on a native library bundled in the untrusted plugin package (path derived from __dirname). SQLite loads the library into the Node.js host process and invokes its native entry point, giving the sandboxed plugin arbitrary native code execution outside the sandbox with the host process&#39;s privileges. The issue is fixed in vm2 3.11.7.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-92938 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-6w8r-xxw2-g3hx <p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: vm2</p> <p>### Summary</p> <p>vm2 3.11.6 exposes Node.js&#39;s host `node:sqlite` module to `NodeVM` code when that builtin is allowed explicitly or through `builtin: [&#39;*&#39;]`. The module is wrapped as read-only, but callable methods retain host-process authority. A sandboxed plugin can construct an in-memory database with extension loading enabled and call `DatabaseSync.loadExtension()` on a native library bundled in the plugin directory.</p> <p>SQLite loads the library into the Node.js host process and invokes its native extension entry point. This gives the untrusted plugin arbitrary native code execution outside the sandbox.</p> <p>The exploit needs only the `node:sqlite` builtin and a compatible native library already present in the untrusted plugin package. It does not require `fs`, `process`, `module`, `child_process`, `worker_threads`, `vm`, `inspector`, vm2 nesting, or an existing database file.</p> <p>### Details</p> <p>The vulnerable boundary spans the builtin inventory, resolver, runtime loader, and generic read-only wrapper.</p> <p>On current Node.js versions, the builtin inventory contains the literal name `node:sqlite`. vm2 admits that name when it is explicitly configured or when the wildcard allowlist is expanded:</p> <p>```js const BUILTIN_MODULES = module.builtinModules.filter(/* denylist checks */); ```</p> <p>The resolver then treats every request beginning with `node:` as a core-module request, even if the complete request string is not an allowlist key:</p> <p>```js if (x.startsWith(&#39;node:&#39;) || this.builtins.has(x)) { r…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: vm2</p> <p>### Summary</p> <p>vm2 3.11.6 exposes Node.js&#39;s host `node:sqlite` module to `NodeVM` code when that builtin is allowed explicitly or through `builtin: [&#39;*&#39;]`. The module is wrapped as read-only, but callable methods retain host-process authority. A sandboxed plugin can construct an in-memory database with extension loading enabled and call `DatabaseSync.loadExtension()` on a native library bundled in the plugin directory.</p> <p>SQLite loads the library into the Node.js host process and invokes its native extension entry point. This gives the untrusted plugin arbitrary native code execution outside the sandbox.</p> <p>The exploit needs only the `node:sqlite` builtin and a compatible native library already present in the untrusted plugin package. It does not require `fs`, `process`, `module`, `child_process`, `worker_threads`, `vm`, `inspector`, vm2 nesting, or an existing database file.</p> <p>### Details</p> <p>The vulnerable boundary spans the builtin inventory, resolver, runtime loader, and generic read-only wrapper.</p> <p>On current Node.js versions, the builtin inventory contains the literal name `node:sqlite`. vm2 admits that name when it is explicitly configured or when the wildcard allowlist is expanded:</p> <p>```js const BUILTIN_MODULES = module.builtinModules.filter(/* denylist checks */); ```</p> <p>The resolver then treats every request beginning with `node:` as a core-module request, even if the complete request string is not an allowlist key:</p> <p>```js if (x.startsWith(&#39;node:&#39;) || this.builtins.has(x)) { r…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-6w8r-xxw2-g3hx