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    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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      <title>CVE-2025-68949 — n8n has a Webhook Node IP Whitelist Bypass via Partial String Matching</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2025-68949</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; n8n-io n8n&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;n8n is an open source workflow automation platform. From 1.36.0 to before 2.2.0, the Webhook node’s IP whitelist validation performed partial string matching instead of exact IP comparison. As a result, an incoming request could be accepted if the source IP address merely contained the configured whitelist entry as a substring. This issue affected instances where workflow editors relied on IP-based access controls to restrict webhook access. Both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses were impacted. An attacker with a non-whitelisted IP could bypass restrictions if their IP shared a partial prefix with a trusted address, undermining the intended security boundary. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.2.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; n8n-io n8n&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;n8n is an open source workflow automation platform. From 1.36.0 to before 2.2.0, the Webhook node’s IP whitelist validation performed partial string matching instead of exact IP comparison. As a result, an incoming request could be accepted if the source IP address merely contained the configured whitelist entry as a substring. This issue affected instances where workflow editors relied on IP-based access controls to restrict webhook access. Both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses were impacted. An attacker with a non-whitelisted IP could bypass restrictions if their IP shared a partial prefix with a trusted address, undermining the intended security boundary. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.2.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2025-68949</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-w96v-gf22-crwp — n8n: Webhook Node IP Whitelist Bypass via Partial String Matching</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-w96v-gf22-crwp</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: n8n&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact
The Webhook node’s IP whitelist validation performed partial string matching instead of exact IP comparison. As a result, an incoming request could be accepted if the source IP address merely contained the configured whitelist entry as a substring.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This issue affected instances where workflow editors relied on IP-based access controls to restrict webhook access. Both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses were impacted. An attacker with a non-whitelisted IP could bypass restrictions if their IP shared a partial prefix with a trusted address, undermining the intended security boundary.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Patches
This issue has been patched in version 2.2.0.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Users are advised to upgrade to v2.2.0 or later, where IP whitelist validation uses strict IP comparison logic rather than partial string matching.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Workarounds
Users unable to upgrade immediately should avoid relying solely on IP whitelisting for webhook security. Recommended mitigations include:
- Adding authentication mechanisms such as shared secrets, HMAC signatures, or API keys.
- Avoiding short or prefix-based whitelist entries.
- Enforcing IP filtering at the network layer (for example, via reverse proxies or firewalls).&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: n8n&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact
The Webhook node’s IP whitelist validation performed partial string matching instead of exact IP comparison. As a result, an incoming request could be accepted if the source IP address merely contained the configured whitelist entry as a substring.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This issue affected instances where workflow editors relied on IP-based access controls to restrict webhook access. Both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses were impacted. An attacker with a non-whitelisted IP could bypass restrictions if their IP shared a partial prefix with a trusted address, undermining the intended security boundary.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Patches
This issue has been patched in version 2.2.0.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Users are advised to upgrade to v2.2.0 or later, where IP whitelist validation uses strict IP comparison logic rather than partial string matching.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Workarounds
Users unable to upgrade immediately should avoid relying solely on IP whitelisting for webhook security. Recommended mitigations include:
- Adding authentication mechanisms such as shared secrets, HMAC signatures, or API keys.
- Avoiding short or prefix-based whitelist entries.
- Enforcing IP filtering at the network layer (for example, via reverse proxies or firewalls).&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-w96v-gf22-crwp</guid>
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