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    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 09 Oct 2026 05:40:49 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2024-47742 — firmware_loader: Block path traversal</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2024-47742</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;firmware_loader: Block path traversal&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Most firmware names are hardcoded strings, or are constructed from fairly
constrained format strings where the dynamic parts are just some hex
numbers or such.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;However, there are a couple codepaths in the kernel where firmware file
names contain string components that are passed through from a device or
semi-privileged userspace; the ones I could find (not counting interfaces
that require root privileges) are:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- lpfc_sli4_request_firmware_update() seems to construct the firmware
   filename from &amp;#34;ModelName&amp;#34;, a string that was previously parsed out of
   some descriptor (&amp;#34;Vital Product Data&amp;#34;) in lpfc_fill_vpd()
 - nfp_net_fw_find() seems to construct a firmware filename from a model
   name coming from nfp_hwinfo_lookup(pf-&amp;gt;hwinfo, &amp;#34;nffw.partno&amp;#34;), which I
   think parses some descriptor that was read from the device.
   (But this case likely isn&amp;#39;t exploitable because the format string looks
   like &amp;#34;netronome/nic_%s&amp;#34;, and there shouldn&amp;#39;t be any *folders* starting
   with &amp;#34;netronome/nic_&amp;#34;. The previous case was different because there,
   the &amp;#34;%s&amp;#34; is *at the start* of the format string.)
 - module_flash_fw_schedule() is reachable from the
   ETHTOOL_MSG_MODULE_FW_FLASH_ACT netlink command, which is marked as
   GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM (meaning CAP_NET_ADMIN inside a user namespace is
   enough to pass the privilege check), and takes a userspace-provided
   firmware name.…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;firmware_loader: Block path traversal&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Most firmware names are hardcoded strings, or are constructed from fairly
constrained format strings where the dynamic parts are just some hex
numbers or such.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;However, there are a couple codepaths in the kernel where firmware file
names contain string components that are passed through from a device or
semi-privileged userspace; the ones I could find (not counting interfaces
that require root privileges) are:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- lpfc_sli4_request_firmware_update() seems to construct the firmware
   filename from &amp;#34;ModelName&amp;#34;, a string that was previously parsed out of
   some descriptor (&amp;#34;Vital Product Data&amp;#34;) in lpfc_fill_vpd()
 - nfp_net_fw_find() seems to construct a firmware filename from a model
   name coming from nfp_hwinfo_lookup(pf-&amp;gt;hwinfo, &amp;#34;nffw.partno&amp;#34;), which I
   think parses some descriptor that was read from the device.
   (But this case likely isn&amp;#39;t exploitable because the format string looks
   like &amp;#34;netronome/nic_%s&amp;#34;, and there shouldn&amp;#39;t be any *folders* starting
   with &amp;#34;netronome/nic_&amp;#34;. The previous case was different because there,
   the &amp;#34;%s&amp;#34; is *at the start* of the format string.)
 - module_flash_fw_schedule() is reachable from the
   ETHTOOL_MSG_MODULE_FW_FLASH_ACT netlink command, which is marked as
   GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM (meaning CAP_NET_ADMIN inside a user namespace is
   enough to pass the privilege check), and takes a userspace-provided
   firmware name.…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2024-47742</guid>
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