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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 07 Oct 2026 13:50:13 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2021-46935 — binder: fix async_free_space accounting for empty parcels</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2021-46935</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;binder: fix async_free_space accounting for empty parcels&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In 4.13, commit 74310e06be4d (&amp;#34;android: binder: Move buffer out of area shared with user space&amp;#34;)
fixed a kernel structure visibility issue. As part of that patch,
sizeof(void *) was used as the buffer size for 0-length data payloads so
the driver could detect abusive clients sending 0-length asynchronous
transactions to a server by enforcing limits on async_free_size.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Unfortunately, on the &amp;#34;free&amp;#34; side, the accounting of async_free_space
did not add the sizeof(void *) back. The result was that up to 8-bytes of
async_free_space were leaked on every async transaction of 8-bytes or
less.  These small transactions are uncommon, so this accounting issue
has gone undetected for several years.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The fix is to use &amp;#34;buffer_size&amp;#34; (the allocated buffer size) instead of
&amp;#34;size&amp;#34; (the logical buffer size) when updating the async_free_space
during the free operation. These are the same except for this
corner case of asynchronous transactions with payloads &amp;lt; 8 bytes.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;binder: fix async_free_space accounting for empty parcels&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In 4.13, commit 74310e06be4d (&amp;#34;android: binder: Move buffer out of area shared with user space&amp;#34;)
fixed a kernel structure visibility issue. As part of that patch,
sizeof(void *) was used as the buffer size for 0-length data payloads so
the driver could detect abusive clients sending 0-length asynchronous
transactions to a server by enforcing limits on async_free_size.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Unfortunately, on the &amp;#34;free&amp;#34; side, the accounting of async_free_space
did not add the sizeof(void *) back. The result was that up to 8-bytes of
async_free_space were leaked on every async transaction of 8-bytes or
less.  These small transactions are uncommon, so this accounting issue
has gone undetected for several years.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The fix is to use &amp;#34;buffer_size&amp;#34; (the allocated buffer size) instead of
&amp;#34;size&amp;#34; (the logical buffer size) when updating the async_free_space
during the free operation. These are the same except for this
corner case of asynchronous transactions with payloads &amp;lt; 8 bytes.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2021-46935</guid>
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