<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Sun, 22 Nov 2026 16:01:13 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-130008 — sqlite-mcp: Read-only mode bypass via statement chaining and SQL injection in describe_table</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-130008</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; StacklokLabs sqlite-mcp&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;sqlite-mcp is a Model Context Protocol server for SQLite. Prior to 0.1.2, the default read-only mode can be bypassed through execute_query, which accepts a leading SELECT while the SQLite driver executes trailing statements, and through describe_table, which interpolates the caller-controlled table_name into PRAGMA table_info. Either path can issue ATTACH DATABASE, which opens an attached file read-write despite mode=ro and can make the protected database writable, read other SQLite database files, or create a SQLite-format file at a path writable by the server process. Existing non-empty files that are not SQLite databases are refused and left unchanged. The server has no built-in authentication and listens on all interfaces at :8080 by default, so any client that can reach the port can invoke these tools unless an authenticating proxy is in place. This issue is fixed in version 0.1.2.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; StacklokLabs sqlite-mcp&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;sqlite-mcp is a Model Context Protocol server for SQLite. Prior to 0.1.2, the default read-only mode can be bypassed through execute_query, which accepts a leading SELECT while the SQLite driver executes trailing statements, and through describe_table, which interpolates the caller-controlled table_name into PRAGMA table_info. Either path can issue ATTACH DATABASE, which opens an attached file read-write despite mode=ro and can make the protected database writable, read other SQLite database files, or create a SQLite-format file at a path writable by the server process. Existing non-empty files that are not SQLite databases are refused and left unchanged. The server has no built-in authentication and listens on all interfaces at :8080 by default, so any client that can reach the port can invoke these tools unless an authenticating proxy is in place. This issue is fixed in version 0.1.2.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-130008</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
