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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 18 Nov 2026 05:47:06 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>RUSTSEC-2026-0505 — NSEC3 owner names not checked against the zone in DNSSEC validation (hickory-proto)</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rustsec-2026-0505</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; crates.io: hickory-proto&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Up to 0.26.0-alpha.1, hickory-proto&amp;#39;s DNSSEC validation matched NSEC3 records to a name only by the hashed first label of the NSEC3 owner name, without checking that the rest of the owner name was the zone in question. A signed NSEC3 record from any zone the attacker controls could therefore be used, by someone who can answer or modify DNS responses, to prove that a name in another zone does not exist.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;From 0.26.0-beta.1 the DNSSEC validation code lives in the hickory-net crate, where this was fixed in hickory-net 0.26.2. No hickory-proto release contains a fix. Users of DNSSEC validation in older hickory-proto releases (directly or through hickory-resolver or hickory-recursor) should move to the 0.26.2 or later releases, which validate through hickory-net.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; crates.io: hickory-proto&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Up to 0.26.0-alpha.1, hickory-proto&amp;#39;s DNSSEC validation matched NSEC3 records to a name only by the hashed first label of the NSEC3 owner name, without checking that the rest of the owner name was the zone in question. A signed NSEC3 record from any zone the attacker controls could therefore be used, by someone who can answer or modify DNS responses, to prove that a name in another zone does not exist.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;From 0.26.0-beta.1 the DNSSEC validation code lives in the hickory-net crate, where this was fixed in hickory-net 0.26.2. No hickory-proto release contains a fix. Users of DNSSEC validation in older hickory-proto releases (directly or through hickory-resolver or hickory-recursor) should move to the 0.26.2 or later releases, which validate through hickory-net.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rustsec-2026-0505</guid>
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