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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 18 Nov 2026 03:42:49 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BELL-CVE-2026-99235</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-99235</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-99235</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-399116</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-399116</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-399116</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-399116</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-99235</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-99235</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;tracing: Save the event file instead of the compatible histogram&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;create_field_var_hist() creates a histogram on the matched event to
supply a field variable, and records it on the target so it can be torn
down later:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;hist_data = find_compatible_hist(target_hist_data, file);
	...
	/* Save the compatible histogram information */
	var_hist-&amp;gt;hist_data = hist_data;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;hist_data is not the histogram it creates. It is one that was already
there, whose keys the new one copies. The saved pointer has a single
user, unregister_field_var_hists(), which runs when the target is
removed:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;file = hist_data-&amp;gt;field_var_hists[i]-&amp;gt;hist_data-&amp;gt;event_file;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;find_compatible_hist() matches on keys alone, so it can pick one with no
variables of its own. check_var_refs() then returns false and the user
can remove it while the target still points at it:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in event_hist_trigger_free+0x2b2/0x320
 Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880093b90e0 by task init/1&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Freed by task 1:
  kfree+0x154/0x420
  event_hist_trigger_free+0x1d5/0x320
  event_hist_trigger_parse+0x35f3/0x69e0
  trigger_process_regex+0x1a6/0x250&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Save the event file instead. It is all the dereference ever wanted, and
it does not go away when the user removes a trigger.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;tracing: Save the event file instead of the compatible histogram&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;create_field_var_hist() creates a histogram on the matched event to
supply a field variable, and records it on the target so it can be torn
down later:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;hist_data = find_compatible_hist(target_hist_data, file);
	...
	/* Save the compatible histogram information */
	var_hist-&amp;gt;hist_data = hist_data;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;hist_data is not the histogram it creates. It is one that was already
there, whose keys the new one copies. The saved pointer has a single
user, unregister_field_var_hists(), which runs when the target is
removed:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;file = hist_data-&amp;gt;field_var_hists[i]-&amp;gt;hist_data-&amp;gt;event_file;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;find_compatible_hist() matches on keys alone, so it can pick one with no
variables of its own. check_var_refs() then returns false and the user
can remove it while the target still points at it:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in event_hist_trigger_free+0x2b2/0x320
 Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880093b90e0 by task init/1&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Freed by task 1:
  kfree+0x154/0x420
  event_hist_trigger_free+0x1d5/0x320
  event_hist_trigger_parse+0x35f3/0x69e0
  trigger_process_regex+0x1a6/0x250&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Save the event file instead. It is all the dereference ever wanted, and
it does not go away when the user removes a trigger.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-99235</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-26q8-79pw-ggjf</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-26q8-79pw-ggjf</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;tracing: Save the event file instead of the compatible histogram&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;create_field_var_hist() creates a histogram on the matched event to
supply a field variable, and records it on the target so it can be torn
down later:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;hist_data = find_compatible_hist(target_hist_data, file);
	...
	/* Save the compatible histogram information */
	var_hist-&amp;gt;hist_data = hist_data;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;hist_data is not the histogram it creates. It is one that was already
there, whose keys the new one copies. The saved pointer has a single
user, unregister_field_var_hists(), which runs when the target is
removed:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;file = hist_data-&amp;gt;field_var_hists[i]-&amp;gt;hist_data-&amp;gt;event_file;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;find_compatible_hist() matches on keys alone, so it can pick one with no
variables of its own. check_var_refs() then returns false and the user
can remove it while the target still points at it:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in event_hist_trigger_free+0x2b2/0x320
 Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880093b90e0 by task init/1&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Freed by task 1:
  kfree+0x154/0x420
  event_hist_trigger_free+0x1d5/0x320
  event_hist_trigger_parse+0x35f3/0x69e0
  trigger_process_regex+0x1a6/0x250&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Save the event file instead. It is all the dereference ever wanted, and
it does not go away when the user removes a trigger.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;tracing: Save the event file instead of the compatible histogram&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;create_field_var_hist() creates a histogram on the matched event to
supply a field variable, and records it on the target so it can be torn
down later:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;hist_data = find_compatible_hist(target_hist_data, file);
	...
	/* Save the compatible histogram information */
	var_hist-&amp;gt;hist_data = hist_data;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;hist_data is not the histogram it creates. It is one that was already
there, whose keys the new one copies. The saved pointer has a single
user, unregister_field_var_hists(), which runs when the target is
removed:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;file = hist_data-&amp;gt;field_var_hists[i]-&amp;gt;hist_data-&amp;gt;event_file;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;find_compatible_hist() matches on keys alone, so it can pick one with no
variables of its own. check_var_refs() then returns false and the user
can remove it while the target still points at it:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in event_hist_trigger_free+0x2b2/0x320
 Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880093b90e0 by task init/1&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Freed by task 1:
  kfree+0x154/0x420
  event_hist_trigger_free+0x1d5/0x320
  event_hist_trigger_parse+0x35f3/0x69e0
  trigger_process_regex+0x1a6/0x250&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Save the event file instead. It is all the dereference ever wanted, and
it does not go away when the user removes a trigger.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-26q8-79pw-ggjf</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>msrc_CVE-2026-99235 — tracing: Save the event file instead of the compatible histogram</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-99235</link>
      <description>msrc_CVE-2026-99235</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-99235</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>OESA-2026-4810 — kernel security update</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/oesa-2026-4810</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP4: kernel&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.&#13;
&#13;
Security Fix(es):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;wifi: brcmsmac: Fix dma_free_coherent() size&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;dma_alloc_consistent() may change the size to align it. The new size is
saved in alloced.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Change the free size to match the allocation size.(CVE-2026-31661)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;drm/amd/display: Validate GPIO pin LUT table size before iterating&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;[Why&amp;amp;amp;How]
The GPIO pin table parsers in get_gpio_i2c_info() and
bios_parser_get_gpio_pin_info() derive an element count from the VBIOS
table_header.structuresize field, then iterate over gpio_pin[] entries.
However, GET_IMAGE() only validates that the table header itself fits
within the BIOS image. If the VBIOS reports a structuresize larger than
the actual mapped data, the loop reads past the end of the BIOS image,
causing an out-of-bounds read.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix this by calling bios_get_image() to validate that the full claimed
structuresize is accessible within the BIOS image before entering the
loop in both functions.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;(cherry picked from commit ba5e95b43b773ae1bf1f66ee6b31eb774e65afe3)(CVE-2026-64097)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;usbip: vudc: fix NULL deref in vep_dequeue()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;vep_alloc_request() wasn&amp;amp;apos;t initializing vrequest-&amp;amp;gt;udc, so cancellations
on the FunctionFS AIO path were arriving in vep_dequeue without a valid
UDC reference.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Since vrequest-&amp;amp;gt;udc…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP4: kernel&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.&#13;
&#13;
Security Fix(es):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;wifi: brcmsmac: Fix dma_free_coherent() size&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;dma_alloc_consistent() may change the size to align it. The new size is
saved in alloced.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Change the free size to match the allocation size.(CVE-2026-31661)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;drm/amd/display: Validate GPIO pin LUT table size before iterating&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;[Why&amp;amp;amp;How]
The GPIO pin table parsers in get_gpio_i2c_info() and
bios_parser_get_gpio_pin_info() derive an element count from the VBIOS
table_header.structuresize field, then iterate over gpio_pin[] entries.
However, GET_IMAGE() only validates that the table header itself fits
within the BIOS image. If the VBIOS reports a structuresize larger than
the actual mapped data, the loop reads past the end of the BIOS image,
causing an out-of-bounds read.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix this by calling bios_get_image() to validate that the full claimed
structuresize is accessible within the BIOS image before entering the
loop in both functions.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;(cherry picked from commit ba5e95b43b773ae1bf1f66ee6b31eb774e65afe3)(CVE-2026-64097)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;usbip: vudc: fix NULL deref in vep_dequeue()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;vep_alloc_request() wasn&amp;amp;apos;t initializing vrequest-&amp;amp;gt;udc, so cancellations
on the FunctionFS AIO path were arriving in vep_dequeue without a valid
UDC reference.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Since vrequest-&amp;amp;gt;udc…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/oesa-2026-4810</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-99235</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-99235</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.4, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.4, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3 and 230 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tracing: Save the event file instead of the compatible histogram create_field_var_hist() creates a histogram on the matched event to supply a field variable, and records it on the target so it can be torn down later: 	hist_data = find_compatible_hist(target_hist_data, file); 	... 	/* Save the compatible histogram information */ 	var_hist-&amp;gt;hist_data = hist_data; hist_data is not the histogram it creates. It is one that was already there, whose keys the new one copies. The saved pointer has a single user, unregister_field_var_hists(), which runs when the target is removed: 	file = hist_data-&amp;gt;field_var_hists[i]-&amp;gt;hist_data-&amp;gt;event_file; find_compatible_hist() matches on keys alone, so it can pick one with no variables of its own. check_var_refs() then returns false and the user can remove it while the target still points at it:  BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in event_hist_trigger_free+0x2b2/0x320  Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880093b90e0 by task init/1  Freed by task 1:   kfree+0x154/0x420   event_hist_trigger_free+0x1d5/0x320   event_hist_trigger_parse+0x35f3/0x69e0   trigger_process_regex+0x1a6/0x250 Save the event file instead. It is all the dereference ever wanted, and it does not go away when the user removes a trigger.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.4, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.4, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3 and 230 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tracing: Save the event file instead of the compatible histogram create_field_var_hist() creates a histogram on the matched event to supply a field variable, and records it on the target so it can be torn down later: 	hist_data = find_compatible_hist(target_hist_data, file); 	... 	/* Save the compatible histogram information */ 	var_hist-&amp;gt;hist_data = hist_data; hist_data is not the histogram it creates. It is one that was already there, whose keys the new one copies. The saved pointer has a single user, unregister_field_var_hists(), which runs when the target is removed: 	file = hist_data-&amp;gt;field_var_hists[i]-&amp;gt;hist_data-&amp;gt;event_file; find_compatible_hist() matches on keys alone, so it can pick one with no variables of its own. check_var_refs() then returns false and the user can remove it while the target still points at it:  BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in event_hist_trigger_free+0x2b2/0x320  Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880093b90e0 by task init/1  Freed by task 1:   kfree+0x154/0x420   event_hist_trigger_free+0x1d5/0x320   event_hist_trigger_parse+0x35f3/0x69e0   trigger_process_regex+0x1a6/0x250 Save the event file instead. It is all the dereference ever wanted, and it does not go away when the user removes a trigger.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-99235</guid>
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