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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2026 10:09:27 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>certfr-2026-avi-1473 — De multiples vulnérabilités ont été découvertes dans le noyau Linux de Debian. Elles permettent à un attaquant de provo…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1473</link>
      <description>certfr-2026-avi-1473</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1473</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-396161</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-396161</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-396161</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-396161</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-99077</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-99077</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ipv4: udp: Create exceptions before socket matching&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Currently, when ICMP Fragmentation Needed and Redirect Message packets
are locally delivered and quote a UDP packet, a FIB nexthop exception
(FNHE) is only created if the kernel can match the UDP packet to an
existing socket.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This behavior allows off-path attackers to conduct a side-channel attack
on the FNHE cache in order to discover the ephemeral port used by a
connected UDP socket.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Commit 6457378fe796 (&amp;#34;ipv4: use siphash instead of Jenkins in
fnhe_hashfun()&amp;#34;) and commit 67d6d681e15b (&amp;#34;ipv4: make exception cache
less predictible&amp;#34;) tried to mitigate such attacks by making it harder
for attackers to discover hash collisions in the FNHE cache and by
randomizing the number of exceptions a hash bucket can hold,
respectively. Unfortunately, both of the mitigations can be bypassed.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Instead, mitigate such attacks by always creating a FNHE, even before
trying to find a matching socket. Do that by calling ipv4_update_pmtu()
and ipv4_redirect(), the helpers used when the quoted packet did not
originate from a socket.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This means that guesses (right or wrong) from an off-path attacker will
always result in a FNHE being created or updated in the cache that the
attacker can observe.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Pass an oif of 0, in a similar fashion to icmp_err(). This is also the
oif used by the socket path for sockets that are not bound to a device.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Note that this does not allow attacker…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ipv4: udp: Create exceptions before socket matching&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Currently, when ICMP Fragmentation Needed and Redirect Message packets
are locally delivered and quote a UDP packet, a FIB nexthop exception
(FNHE) is only created if the kernel can match the UDP packet to an
existing socket.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This behavior allows off-path attackers to conduct a side-channel attack
on the FNHE cache in order to discover the ephemeral port used by a
connected UDP socket.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Commit 6457378fe796 (&amp;#34;ipv4: use siphash instead of Jenkins in
fnhe_hashfun()&amp;#34;) and commit 67d6d681e15b (&amp;#34;ipv4: make exception cache
less predictible&amp;#34;) tried to mitigate such attacks by making it harder
for attackers to discover hash collisions in the FNHE cache and by
randomizing the number of exceptions a hash bucket can hold,
respectively. Unfortunately, both of the mitigations can be bypassed.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Instead, mitigate such attacks by always creating a FNHE, even before
trying to find a matching socket. Do that by calling ipv4_update_pmtu()
and ipv4_redirect(), the helpers used when the quoted packet did not
originate from a socket.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This means that guesses (right or wrong) from an off-path attacker will
always result in a FNHE being created or updated in the cache that the
attacker can observe.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Pass an oif of 0, in a similar fashion to icmp_err(). This is also the
oif used by the socket path for sockets that are not bound to a device.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Note that this does not allow attacker…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-99077</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-xqqf-wrfv-j8jm</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-xqqf-wrfv-j8jm</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ipv4: udp: Create exceptions before socket matching&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Currently, when ICMP Fragmentation Needed and Redirect Message packets
are locally delivered and quote a UDP packet, a FIB nexthop exception
(FNHE) is only created if the kernel can match the UDP packet to an
existing socket.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This behavior allows off-path attackers to conduct a side-channel attack
on the FNHE cache in order to discover the ephemeral port used by a
connected UDP socket.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Commit 6457378fe796 (&amp;#34;ipv4: use siphash instead of Jenkins in
fnhe_hashfun()&amp;#34;) and commit 67d6d681e15b (&amp;#34;ipv4: make exception cache
less predictible&amp;#34;) tried to mitigate such attacks by making it harder
for attackers to discover hash collisions in the FNHE cache and by
randomizing the number of exceptions a hash bucket can hold,
respectively. Unfortunately, both of the mitigations can be bypassed.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Instead, mitigate such attacks by always creating a FNHE, even before
trying to find a matching socket. Do that by calling ipv4_update_pmtu()
and ipv4_redirect(), the helpers used when the quoted packet did not
originate from a socket.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This means that guesses (right or wrong) from an off-path attacker will
always result in a FNHE being created or updated in the cache that the
attacker can observe.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Pass an oif of 0, in a similar fashion to icmp_err(). This is also the
oif used by the socket path for sockets that are not bound to a device.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Note that this does not allow attacker…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ipv4: udp: Create exceptions before socket matching&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Currently, when ICMP Fragmentation Needed and Redirect Message packets
are locally delivered and quote a UDP packet, a FIB nexthop exception
(FNHE) is only created if the kernel can match the UDP packet to an
existing socket.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This behavior allows off-path attackers to conduct a side-channel attack
on the FNHE cache in order to discover the ephemeral port used by a
connected UDP socket.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Commit 6457378fe796 (&amp;#34;ipv4: use siphash instead of Jenkins in
fnhe_hashfun()&amp;#34;) and commit 67d6d681e15b (&amp;#34;ipv4: make exception cache
less predictible&amp;#34;) tried to mitigate such attacks by making it harder
for attackers to discover hash collisions in the FNHE cache and by
randomizing the number of exceptions a hash bucket can hold,
respectively. Unfortunately, both of the mitigations can be bypassed.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Instead, mitigate such attacks by always creating a FNHE, even before
trying to find a matching socket. Do that by calling ipv4_update_pmtu()
and ipv4_redirect(), the helpers used when the quoted packet did not
originate from a socket.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This means that guesses (right or wrong) from an off-path attacker will
always result in a FNHE being created or updated in the cache that the
attacker can observe.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Pass an oif of 0, in a similar fashion to icmp_err(). This is also the
oif used by the socket path for sockets that are not bound to a device.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Note that this does not allow attacker…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-xqqf-wrfv-j8jm</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>msrc_CVE-2026-99077 — ipv4: udp: Create exceptions before socket matching</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-99077</link>
      <description>msrc_CVE-2026-99077</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-99077</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>OESA-2026-4810 — kernel security update</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/oesa-2026-4810</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP4: kernel&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.&#13;
&#13;
Security Fix(es):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;wifi: brcmsmac: Fix dma_free_coherent() size&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;dma_alloc_consistent() may change the size to align it. The new size is
saved in alloced.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Change the free size to match the allocation size.(CVE-2026-31661)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;drm/amd/display: Validate GPIO pin LUT table size before iterating&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;[Why&amp;amp;amp;How]
The GPIO pin table parsers in get_gpio_i2c_info() and
bios_parser_get_gpio_pin_info() derive an element count from the VBIOS
table_header.structuresize field, then iterate over gpio_pin[] entries.
However, GET_IMAGE() only validates that the table header itself fits
within the BIOS image. If the VBIOS reports a structuresize larger than
the actual mapped data, the loop reads past the end of the BIOS image,
causing an out-of-bounds read.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix this by calling bios_get_image() to validate that the full claimed
structuresize is accessible within the BIOS image before entering the
loop in both functions.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;(cherry picked from commit ba5e95b43b773ae1bf1f66ee6b31eb774e65afe3)(CVE-2026-64097)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;usbip: vudc: fix NULL deref in vep_dequeue()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;vep_alloc_request() wasn&amp;amp;apos;t initializing vrequest-&amp;amp;gt;udc, so cancellations
on the FunctionFS AIO path were arriving in vep_dequeue without a valid
UDC reference.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Since vrequest-&amp;amp;gt;udc…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP4: kernel&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.&#13;
&#13;
Security Fix(es):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;wifi: brcmsmac: Fix dma_free_coherent() size&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;dma_alloc_consistent() may change the size to align it. The new size is
saved in alloced.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Change the free size to match the allocation size.(CVE-2026-31661)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;drm/amd/display: Validate GPIO pin LUT table size before iterating&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;[Why&amp;amp;amp;How]
The GPIO pin table parsers in get_gpio_i2c_info() and
bios_parser_get_gpio_pin_info() derive an element count from the VBIOS
table_header.structuresize field, then iterate over gpio_pin[] entries.
However, GET_IMAGE() only validates that the table header itself fits
within the BIOS image. If the VBIOS reports a structuresize larger than
the actual mapped data, the loop reads past the end of the BIOS image,
causing an out-of-bounds read.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix this by calling bios_get_image() to validate that the full claimed
structuresize is accessible within the BIOS image before entering the
loop in both functions.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;(cherry picked from commit ba5e95b43b773ae1bf1f66ee6b31eb774e65afe3)(CVE-2026-64097)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;usbip: vudc: fix NULL deref in vep_dequeue()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;vep_alloc_request() wasn&amp;amp;apos;t initializing vrequest-&amp;amp;gt;udc, so cancellations
on the FunctionFS AIO path were arriving in vep_dequeue without a valid
UDC reference.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Since vrequest-&amp;amp;gt;udc…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/oesa-2026-4810</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-99077</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-99077</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 248 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv4: udp: Create exceptions before socket matching Currently, when ICMP Fragmentation Needed and Redirect Message packets are locally delivered and quote a UDP packet, a FIB nexthop exception (FNHE) is only created if the kernel can match the UDP packet to an existing socket. This behavior allows off-path attackers to conduct a side-channel attack on the FNHE cache in order to discover the ephemeral port used by a connected UDP socket. Commit 6457378fe796 (&amp;#34;ipv4: use siphash instead of Jenkins in fnhe_hashfun()&amp;#34;) and commit 67d6d681e15b (&amp;#34;ipv4: make exception cache less predictible&amp;#34;) tried to mitigate such attacks by making it harder for attackers to discover hash collisions in the FNHE cache and by randomizing the number of exceptions a hash bucket can hold, respectively. Unfortunately, both of the mitigations can be bypassed. Instead, mitigate such attacks by always creating a FNHE, even before trying to find a matching socket. Do that by calling ipv4_update_pmtu() and ipv4_redirect(), the helpers used when the quoted packet did not originate from a socket. This means that guesses (right or wrong) from an off-path attacker will always result in a FNHE being created or updated in the cache that the attacker can observe. Pass an oif of 0, in a similar fashion to icmp_err(). This is also the oif used by the socket path for sockets that are not bound to a device. Note that this does not allow attackers to cre…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 248 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv4: udp: Create exceptions before socket matching Currently, when ICMP Fragmentation Needed and Redirect Message packets are locally delivered and quote a UDP packet, a FIB nexthop exception (FNHE) is only created if the kernel can match the UDP packet to an existing socket. This behavior allows off-path attackers to conduct a side-channel attack on the FNHE cache in order to discover the ephemeral port used by a connected UDP socket. Commit 6457378fe796 (&amp;#34;ipv4: use siphash instead of Jenkins in fnhe_hashfun()&amp;#34;) and commit 67d6d681e15b (&amp;#34;ipv4: make exception cache less predictible&amp;#34;) tried to mitigate such attacks by making it harder for attackers to discover hash collisions in the FNHE cache and by randomizing the number of exceptions a hash bucket can hold, respectively. Unfortunately, both of the mitigations can be bypassed. Instead, mitigate such attacks by always creating a FNHE, even before trying to find a matching socket. Do that by calling ipv4_update_pmtu() and ipv4_redirect(), the helpers used when the quoted packet did not originate from a socket. This means that guesses (right or wrong) from an off-path attacker will always result in a FNHE being created or updated in the cache that the attacker can observe. Pass an oif of 0, in a similar fashion to icmp_err(). This is also the oif used by the socket path for sockets that are not bound to a device. Note that this does not allow attackers to cre…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-99077</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-4152 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-4152</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen, möglicherweise einen Denial-of-Service-Angriff auszulösen, Daten zu manipulieren oder offenzulegen oder Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen, möglicherweise einen Denial-of-Service-Angriff auszulösen, Daten zu manipulieren oder offenzulegen oder Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-4152</guid>
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