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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2026 10:09:41 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>Withdrawn: BELL-CVE-2026-98976 — CVE-2026-98976 does not affect BellSoft software</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-98976</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Withdrawn by the publisher.&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Withdrawn by the publisher.&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-98976</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-392021</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-392021</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-392021</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-392021</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-98976</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-98976</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;namespace: keep the lock on a mount that a propagated copy is moved beneath&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;attach_recursive_mnt() transfers MNT_LOCKED from the top mount to the
mount that is moved beneath it with MOVE_MOUNT_BENEATH. This allows the
owner of a user namespace to replace its locked /proc or its root. The
mount beneath takes on the job of covering the underlying mountpoint
allowing the top mount to be unmounted.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Consider two mount namespaces:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;(H) The host H has a shared mount P with a secret in P/d
(Z) Z is a user namespace made from M. Its copy of P receives
    propagation from the host&amp;#39;s P and its copy of M&amp;#39;s cover on P/d is
    locked Z&amp;#39;s owner must not get to see P/d.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Now (H) mounts X on P/d. This propagates into (Z). The copy of X lands
beneath (Z)&amp;#39;s locked cover. The locked property is transfered from (Z)&amp;#39;s
cover to the copy of X propagated beneath it. The cover is now unlocked.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Now (H) unmounts X again. The copy of X in (Z) gets unmounted and the
covering mount is left unlocked on top of P/d. (Z) can now unmount it:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Z: umount2(P/d)             = EINVAL            /* the cover is locked */
    H: mount X on P/d, umount X                     /* both propagate into Z /*
    Z: umount2(P/d)             = 0                 /* the cover is now unlocked */
    Z: read P/d/secret          = &amp;#34;covered-by-root&amp;#34; /* secret revealed */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;So only transfer the locked property to the mount beneath for mounts the
caller has p…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;namespace: keep the lock on a mount that a propagated copy is moved beneath&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;attach_recursive_mnt() transfers MNT_LOCKED from the top mount to the
mount that is moved beneath it with MOVE_MOUNT_BENEATH. This allows the
owner of a user namespace to replace its locked /proc or its root. The
mount beneath takes on the job of covering the underlying mountpoint
allowing the top mount to be unmounted.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Consider two mount namespaces:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;(H) The host H has a shared mount P with a secret in P/d
(Z) Z is a user namespace made from M. Its copy of P receives
    propagation from the host&amp;#39;s P and its copy of M&amp;#39;s cover on P/d is
    locked Z&amp;#39;s owner must not get to see P/d.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Now (H) mounts X on P/d. This propagates into (Z). The copy of X lands
beneath (Z)&amp;#39;s locked cover. The locked property is transfered from (Z)&amp;#39;s
cover to the copy of X propagated beneath it. The cover is now unlocked.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Now (H) unmounts X again. The copy of X in (Z) gets unmounted and the
covering mount is left unlocked on top of P/d. (Z) can now unmount it:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Z: umount2(P/d)             = EINVAL            /* the cover is locked */
    H: mount X on P/d, umount X                     /* both propagate into Z /*
    Z: umount2(P/d)             = 0                 /* the cover is now unlocked */
    Z: read P/d/secret          = &amp;#34;covered-by-root&amp;#34; /* secret revealed */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;So only transfer the locked property to the mount beneath for mounts the
caller has p…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-98976</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-38fm-jc3c-v2pm</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-38fm-jc3c-v2pm</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;namespace: keep the lock on a mount that a propagated copy is moved beneath&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;attach_recursive_mnt() transfers MNT_LOCKED from the top mount to the
mount that is moved beneath it with MOVE_MOUNT_BENEATH. This allows the
owner of a user namespace to replace its locked /proc or its root. The
mount beneath takes on the job of covering the underlying mountpoint
allowing the top mount to be unmounted.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Consider two mount namespaces:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;(H) The host H has a shared mount P with a secret in P/d
(Z) Z is a user namespace made from M. Its copy of P receives
    propagation from the host&amp;#39;s P and its copy of M&amp;#39;s cover on P/d is
    locked Z&amp;#39;s owner must not get to see P/d.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Now (H) mounts X on P/d. This propagates into (Z). The copy of X lands
beneath (Z)&amp;#39;s locked cover. The locked property is transfered from (Z)&amp;#39;s
cover to the copy of X propagated beneath it. The cover is now unlocked.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Now (H) unmounts X again. The copy of X in (Z) gets unmounted and the
covering mount is left unlocked on top of P/d. (Z) can now unmount it:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Z: umount2(P/d)             = EINVAL            /* the cover is locked */
    H: mount X on P/d, umount X                     /* both propagate into Z /*
    Z: umount2(P/d)             = 0                 /* the cover is now unlocked */
    Z: read P/d/secret          = &amp;#34;covered-by-root&amp;#34; /* secret revealed */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;So only transfer the locked property to the mount beneath for mounts the
caller has p…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;namespace: keep the lock on a mount that a propagated copy is moved beneath&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;attach_recursive_mnt() transfers MNT_LOCKED from the top mount to the
mount that is moved beneath it with MOVE_MOUNT_BENEATH. This allows the
owner of a user namespace to replace its locked /proc or its root. The
mount beneath takes on the job of covering the underlying mountpoint
allowing the top mount to be unmounted.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Consider two mount namespaces:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;(H) The host H has a shared mount P with a secret in P/d
(Z) Z is a user namespace made from M. Its copy of P receives
    propagation from the host&amp;#39;s P and its copy of M&amp;#39;s cover on P/d is
    locked Z&amp;#39;s owner must not get to see P/d.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Now (H) mounts X on P/d. This propagates into (Z). The copy of X lands
beneath (Z)&amp;#39;s locked cover. The locked property is transfered from (Z)&amp;#39;s
cover to the copy of X propagated beneath it. The cover is now unlocked.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Now (H) unmounts X again. The copy of X in (Z) gets unmounted and the
covering mount is left unlocked on top of P/d. (Z) can now unmount it:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Z: umount2(P/d)             = EINVAL            /* the cover is locked */
    H: mount X on P/d, umount X                     /* both propagate into Z /*
    Z: umount2(P/d)             = 0                 /* the cover is now unlocked */
    Z: read P/d/secret          = &amp;#34;covered-by-root&amp;#34; /* secret revealed */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;So only transfer the locked property to the mount beneath for mounts the
caller has p…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-38fm-jc3c-v2pm</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-98976</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-98976</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 105 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: namespace: keep the lock on a mount that a propagated copy is moved beneath attach_recursive_mnt() transfers MNT_LOCKED from the top mount to the mount that is moved beneath it with MOVE_MOUNT_BENEATH. This allows the owner of a user namespace to replace its locked /proc or its root. The mount beneath takes on the job of covering the underlying mountpoint allowing the top mount to be unmounted. Consider two mount namespaces: (H) The host H has a shared mount P with a secret in P/d (Z) Z is a user namespace made from M. Its copy of P receives     propagation from the host&amp;#39;s P and its copy of M&amp;#39;s cover on P/d is     locked Z&amp;#39;s owner must not get to see P/d. Now (H) mounts X on P/d. This propagates into (Z). The copy of X lands beneath (Z)&amp;#39;s locked cover. The locked property is transfered from (Z)&amp;#39;s cover to the copy of X propagated beneath it. The cover is now unlocked. Now (H) unmounts X again. The copy of X in (Z) gets unmounted and the covering mount is left unlocked on top of P/d. (Z) can now unmount it:     Z: umount2(P/d)             = EINVAL            /* the cover is locked */     H: mount X on P/d, umount X                     /* both propagate into Z /*     Z: umount2(P/d)             = 0                 /* the cover is now unlocked */     Z: read P/d/secret          = &amp;#34;covered-by-root&amp;#34; /* secret revealed */ So only transfer the locked property to the mount beneath for mounts the caller has placed. A…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 105 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: namespace: keep the lock on a mount that a propagated copy is moved beneath attach_recursive_mnt() transfers MNT_LOCKED from the top mount to the mount that is moved beneath it with MOVE_MOUNT_BENEATH. This allows the owner of a user namespace to replace its locked /proc or its root. The mount beneath takes on the job of covering the underlying mountpoint allowing the top mount to be unmounted. Consider two mount namespaces: (H) The host H has a shared mount P with a secret in P/d (Z) Z is a user namespace made from M. Its copy of P receives     propagation from the host&amp;#39;s P and its copy of M&amp;#39;s cover on P/d is     locked Z&amp;#39;s owner must not get to see P/d. Now (H) mounts X on P/d. This propagates into (Z). The copy of X lands beneath (Z)&amp;#39;s locked cover. The locked property is transfered from (Z)&amp;#39;s cover to the copy of X propagated beneath it. The cover is now unlocked. Now (H) unmounts X again. The copy of X in (Z) gets unmounted and the covering mount is left unlocked on top of P/d. (Z) can now unmount it:     Z: umount2(P/d)             = EINVAL            /* the cover is locked */     H: mount X on P/d, umount X                     /* both propagate into Z /*     Z: umount2(P/d)             = 0                 /* the cover is now unlocked */     Z: read P/d/secret          = &amp;#34;covered-by-root&amp;#34; /* secret revealed */ So only transfer the locked property to the mount beneath for mounts the caller has placed. A…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-98976</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-4152 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-4152</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen, möglicherweise einen Denial-of-Service-Angriff auszulösen, Daten zu manipulieren oder offenzulegen oder Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen, möglicherweise einen Denial-of-Service-Angriff auszulösen, Daten zu manipulieren oder offenzulegen oder Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-4152</guid>
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