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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 18 Nov 2026 03:04:04 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BELL-CVE-2026-98490</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-98490</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-98490</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>certfr-2026-avi-1375 — De multiples vulnérabilités ont été découvertes dans le noyau Linux de Debian LTS. Certaines d'entre elles permettent à…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1375</link>
      <description>certfr-2026-avi-1375</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1375</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-395981</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-395981</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-395981</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-395981</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-98490</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-98490</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;net: openvswitch: conntrack: fix helper UAF due to extensions realloc&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;While calling the helpers, a raw pointer to the extensions area is
wired into expectations list:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;-&amp;gt; nf_ct_helper()
   -&amp;gt; helper-&amp;gt;help()
    -&amp;gt; nf_ct_expect_related_report()
     -&amp;gt; nf_ct_expect_insert()
      -&amp;gt; hlist_add_head_rcu(&amp;amp;exp-&amp;gt;lnode, &amp;amp;master_help-&amp;gt;expectations)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In case the connection is not confirmed yet, more extensions can be
added afterwards with *_ext_add() calls reallocating the extension
space and leaving the now invalid pointer in the expectations list
that is later accessed while removing the expectation.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Make sure that helpers are called at the end after all the other
extensions are already added.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Note that the helper rejection now leaves the mark and labels set,
but that&amp;#39;s not different from how the NAT was handled before or how
the mark and the labels were handled on confirmation failure.  And
there are no atomicity guarantees provided by the API anyway.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;net: openvswitch: conntrack: fix helper UAF due to extensions realloc&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;While calling the helpers, a raw pointer to the extensions area is
wired into expectations list:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;-&amp;gt; nf_ct_helper()
   -&amp;gt; helper-&amp;gt;help()
    -&amp;gt; nf_ct_expect_related_report()
     -&amp;gt; nf_ct_expect_insert()
      -&amp;gt; hlist_add_head_rcu(&amp;amp;exp-&amp;gt;lnode, &amp;amp;master_help-&amp;gt;expectations)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In case the connection is not confirmed yet, more extensions can be
added afterwards with *_ext_add() calls reallocating the extension
space and leaving the now invalid pointer in the expectations list
that is later accessed while removing the expectation.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Make sure that helpers are called at the end after all the other
extensions are already added.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Note that the helper rejection now leaves the mark and labels set,
but that&amp;#39;s not different from how the NAT was handled before or how
the mark and the labels were handled on confirmation failure.  And
there are no atomicity guarantees provided by the API anyway.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-98490</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-4r7h-j2g8-7vfx</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-4r7h-j2g8-7vfx</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;net: openvswitch: conntrack: fix helper UAF due to extensions realloc&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;While calling the helpers, a raw pointer to the extensions area is
wired into expectations list:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;-&amp;gt; nf_ct_helper()
   -&amp;gt; helper-&amp;gt;help()
    -&amp;gt; nf_ct_expect_related_report()
     -&amp;gt; nf_ct_expect_insert()
      -&amp;gt; hlist_add_head_rcu(&amp;amp;exp-&amp;gt;lnode, &amp;amp;master_help-&amp;gt;expectations)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In case the connection is not confirmed yet, more extensions can be
added afterwards with *_ext_add() calls reallocating the extension
space and leaving the now invalid pointer in the expectations list
that is later accessed while removing the expectation.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Make sure that helpers are called at the end after all the other
extensions are already added.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Note that the helper rejection now leaves the mark and labels set,
but that&amp;#39;s not different from how the NAT was handled before or how
the mark and the labels were handled on confirmation failure.  And
there are no atomicity guarantees provided by the API anyway.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;net: openvswitch: conntrack: fix helper UAF due to extensions realloc&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;While calling the helpers, a raw pointer to the extensions area is
wired into expectations list:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;-&amp;gt; nf_ct_helper()
   -&amp;gt; helper-&amp;gt;help()
    -&amp;gt; nf_ct_expect_related_report()
     -&amp;gt; nf_ct_expect_insert()
      -&amp;gt; hlist_add_head_rcu(&amp;amp;exp-&amp;gt;lnode, &amp;amp;master_help-&amp;gt;expectations)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In case the connection is not confirmed yet, more extensions can be
added afterwards with *_ext_add() calls reallocating the extension
space and leaving the now invalid pointer in the expectations list
that is later accessed while removing the expectation.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Make sure that helpers are called at the end after all the other
extensions are already added.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Note that the helper rejection now leaves the mark and labels set,
but that&amp;#39;s not different from how the NAT was handled before or how
the mark and the labels were handled on confirmation failure.  And
there are no atomicity guarantees provided by the API anyway.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-4r7h-j2g8-7vfx</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>msrc_CVE-2026-98490 — net: openvswitch: conntrack: fix helper UAF due to extensions realloc</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-98490</link>
      <description>msrc_CVE-2026-98490</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-98490</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>OESA-2026-4810 — kernel security update</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/oesa-2026-4810</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP4: kernel&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.&#13;
&#13;
Security Fix(es):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;wifi: brcmsmac: Fix dma_free_coherent() size&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;dma_alloc_consistent() may change the size to align it. The new size is
saved in alloced.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Change the free size to match the allocation size.(CVE-2026-31661)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;drm/amd/display: Validate GPIO pin LUT table size before iterating&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;[Why&amp;amp;amp;How]
The GPIO pin table parsers in get_gpio_i2c_info() and
bios_parser_get_gpio_pin_info() derive an element count from the VBIOS
table_header.structuresize field, then iterate over gpio_pin[] entries.
However, GET_IMAGE() only validates that the table header itself fits
within the BIOS image. If the VBIOS reports a structuresize larger than
the actual mapped data, the loop reads past the end of the BIOS image,
causing an out-of-bounds read.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix this by calling bios_get_image() to validate that the full claimed
structuresize is accessible within the BIOS image before entering the
loop in both functions.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;(cherry picked from commit ba5e95b43b773ae1bf1f66ee6b31eb774e65afe3)(CVE-2026-64097)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;usbip: vudc: fix NULL deref in vep_dequeue()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;vep_alloc_request() wasn&amp;amp;apos;t initializing vrequest-&amp;amp;gt;udc, so cancellations
on the FunctionFS AIO path were arriving in vep_dequeue without a valid
UDC reference.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Since vrequest-&amp;amp;gt;udc…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP4: kernel&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.&#13;
&#13;
Security Fix(es):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;wifi: brcmsmac: Fix dma_free_coherent() size&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;dma_alloc_consistent() may change the size to align it. The new size is
saved in alloced.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Change the free size to match the allocation size.(CVE-2026-31661)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;drm/amd/display: Validate GPIO pin LUT table size before iterating&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;[Why&amp;amp;amp;How]
The GPIO pin table parsers in get_gpio_i2c_info() and
bios_parser_get_gpio_pin_info() derive an element count from the VBIOS
table_header.structuresize field, then iterate over gpio_pin[] entries.
However, GET_IMAGE() only validates that the table header itself fits
within the BIOS image. If the VBIOS reports a structuresize larger than
the actual mapped data, the loop reads past the end of the BIOS image,
causing an out-of-bounds read.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix this by calling bios_get_image() to validate that the full claimed
structuresize is accessible within the BIOS image before entering the
loop in both functions.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;(cherry picked from commit ba5e95b43b773ae1bf1f66ee6b31eb774e65afe3)(CVE-2026-64097)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;usbip: vudc: fix NULL deref in vep_dequeue()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;vep_alloc_request() wasn&amp;amp;apos;t initializing vrequest-&amp;amp;gt;udc, so cancellations
on the FunctionFS AIO path were arriving in vep_dequeue without a valid
UDC reference.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Since vrequest-&amp;amp;gt;udc…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/oesa-2026-4810</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-98490</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-98490</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe, Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge and 247 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: openvswitch: conntrack: fix helper UAF due to extensions realloc While calling the helpers, a raw pointer to the extensions area is wired into expectations list:   -&amp;gt; nf_ct_helper()    -&amp;gt; helper-&amp;gt;help()     -&amp;gt; nf_ct_expect_related_report()      -&amp;gt; nf_ct_expect_insert()       -&amp;gt; hlist_add_head_rcu(&amp;amp;exp-&amp;gt;lnode, &amp;amp;master_help-&amp;gt;expectations) In case the connection is not confirmed yet, more extensions can be added afterwards with *_ext_add() calls reallocating the extension space and leaving the now invalid pointer in the expectations list that is later accessed while removing the expectation. Make sure that helpers are called at the end after all the other extensions are already added. Note that the helper rejection now leaves the mark and labels set, but that&amp;#39;s not different from how the NAT was handled before or how the mark and the labels were handled on confirmation failure.  And there are no atomicity guarantees provided by the API anyway.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe, Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge and 247 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: openvswitch: conntrack: fix helper UAF due to extensions realloc While calling the helpers, a raw pointer to the extensions area is wired into expectations list:   -&amp;gt; nf_ct_helper()    -&amp;gt; helper-&amp;gt;help()     -&amp;gt; nf_ct_expect_related_report()      -&amp;gt; nf_ct_expect_insert()       -&amp;gt; hlist_add_head_rcu(&amp;amp;exp-&amp;gt;lnode, &amp;amp;master_help-&amp;gt;expectations) In case the connection is not confirmed yet, more extensions can be added afterwards with *_ext_add() calls reallocating the extension space and leaving the now invalid pointer in the expectations list that is later accessed while removing the expectation. Make sure that helpers are called at the end after all the other extensions are already added. Note that the helper rejection now leaves the mark and labels set, but that&amp;#39;s not different from how the NAT was handled before or how the mark and the labels were handled on confirmation failure.  And there are no atomicity guarantees provided by the API anyway.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-98490</guid>
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