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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 09 Oct 2026 13:37:57 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BELL-CVE-2026-98286</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-98286</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-98286</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-383398</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-383398</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-383398</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-383398</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-98286</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-98286</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;drop_monitor: use timer_shutdown_sync() to prevent timer rearming during teardown&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In drop_monitor teardown paths (net_dm_trace_off_set(),
net_dm_hw_monitor_stop(), and error unwind paths in net_dm_trace_on_set()
and net_dm_hw_monitor_start()), per-CPU timers are stopped using
timer_delete_sync() followed by cancel_work_sync().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;However, there is a circular dependency between send_timer and
dm_alert_work:
1) sched_send_work() (timer callback) schedules dm_alert_work.
2) send_dm_alert() / net_dm_hw_summary_work() calls reset_per_cpu_data()
   or net_dm_hw_reset_per_cpu_data().
3) If memory allocation fails under memory pressure in the reset
   function, it re-arms the timer via mod_timer(&amp;amp;data-&amp;gt;send_timer, ...).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If dm_alert_work is running concurrently while timer_delete_sync()
executes on another CPU, an allocation failure in the worker will
re-arm the timer after timer_delete_sync() has already returned.
Once cancel_work_sync() completes and module_put() is called, the timer
remains active in the timer wheel. If the module is then unloaded, the
timer will fire and execute sched_send_work() in freed memory,
triggering a kernel panic / use-after-free.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Switch from timer_delete_sync() to timer_shutdown_sync(). This guarantees
that any in-flight timer handler has finished and prevents subsequent
re-arming attempts from running workers from succeeding. When monitoring
is restarted later, timer_setup() is invok…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;drop_monitor: use timer_shutdown_sync() to prevent timer rearming during teardown&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In drop_monitor teardown paths (net_dm_trace_off_set(),
net_dm_hw_monitor_stop(), and error unwind paths in net_dm_trace_on_set()
and net_dm_hw_monitor_start()), per-CPU timers are stopped using
timer_delete_sync() followed by cancel_work_sync().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;However, there is a circular dependency between send_timer and
dm_alert_work:
1) sched_send_work() (timer callback) schedules dm_alert_work.
2) send_dm_alert() / net_dm_hw_summary_work() calls reset_per_cpu_data()
   or net_dm_hw_reset_per_cpu_data().
3) If memory allocation fails under memory pressure in the reset
   function, it re-arms the timer via mod_timer(&amp;amp;data-&amp;gt;send_timer, ...).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If dm_alert_work is running concurrently while timer_delete_sync()
executes on another CPU, an allocation failure in the worker will
re-arm the timer after timer_delete_sync() has already returned.
Once cancel_work_sync() completes and module_put() is called, the timer
remains active in the timer wheel. If the module is then unloaded, the
timer will fire and execute sched_send_work() in freed memory,
triggering a kernel panic / use-after-free.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Switch from timer_delete_sync() to timer_shutdown_sync(). This guarantees
that any in-flight timer handler has finished and prevents subsequent
re-arming attempts from running workers from succeeding. When monitoring
is restarted later, timer_setup() is invok…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-98286</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-g656-78v2-2243</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-g656-78v2-2243</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;drop_monitor: use timer_shutdown_sync() to prevent timer rearming during teardown&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In drop_monitor teardown paths (net_dm_trace_off_set(),
net_dm_hw_monitor_stop(), and error unwind paths in net_dm_trace_on_set()
and net_dm_hw_monitor_start()), per-CPU timers are stopped using
timer_delete_sync() followed by cancel_work_sync().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;However, there is a circular dependency between send_timer and
dm_alert_work:
1) sched_send_work() (timer callback) schedules dm_alert_work.
2) send_dm_alert() / net_dm_hw_summary_work() calls reset_per_cpu_data()
   or net_dm_hw_reset_per_cpu_data().
3) If memory allocation fails under memory pressure in the reset
   function, it re-arms the timer via mod_timer(&amp;amp;data-&amp;gt;send_timer, ...).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If dm_alert_work is running concurrently while timer_delete_sync()
executes on another CPU, an allocation failure in the worker will
re-arm the timer after timer_delete_sync() has already returned.
Once cancel_work_sync() completes and module_put() is called, the timer
remains active in the timer wheel. If the module is then unloaded, the
timer will fire and execute sched_send_work() in freed memory,
triggering a kernel panic / use-after-free.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Switch from timer_delete_sync() to timer_shutdown_sync(). This guarantees
that any in-flight timer handler has finished and prevents subsequent
re-arming attempts from running workers from succeeding. When monitoring
is restarted later, timer_setup() is invok…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;drop_monitor: use timer_shutdown_sync() to prevent timer rearming during teardown&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In drop_monitor teardown paths (net_dm_trace_off_set(),
net_dm_hw_monitor_stop(), and error unwind paths in net_dm_trace_on_set()
and net_dm_hw_monitor_start()), per-CPU timers are stopped using
timer_delete_sync() followed by cancel_work_sync().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;However, there is a circular dependency between send_timer and
dm_alert_work:
1) sched_send_work() (timer callback) schedules dm_alert_work.
2) send_dm_alert() / net_dm_hw_summary_work() calls reset_per_cpu_data()
   or net_dm_hw_reset_per_cpu_data().
3) If memory allocation fails under memory pressure in the reset
   function, it re-arms the timer via mod_timer(&amp;amp;data-&amp;gt;send_timer, ...).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If dm_alert_work is running concurrently while timer_delete_sync()
executes on another CPU, an allocation failure in the worker will
re-arm the timer after timer_delete_sync() has already returned.
Once cancel_work_sync() completes and module_put() is called, the timer
remains active in the timer wheel. If the module is then unloaded, the
timer will fire and execute sched_send_work() in freed memory,
triggering a kernel panic / use-after-free.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Switch from timer_delete_sync() to timer_shutdown_sync(). This guarantees
that any in-flight timer handler has finished and prevents subsequent
re-arming attempts from running workers from succeeding. When monitoring
is restarted later, timer_setup() is invok…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-g656-78v2-2243</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>msrc_CVE-2026-98286 — drop_monitor: use timer_shutdown_sync() to prevent timer rearming during teardown</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-98286</link>
      <description>msrc_CVE-2026-98286</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-98286</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-98286</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-98286</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 193 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drop_monitor: use timer_shutdown_sync() to prevent timer rearming during teardown In drop_monitor teardown paths (net_dm_trace_off_set(), net_dm_hw_monitor_stop(), and error unwind paths in net_dm_trace_on_set() and net_dm_hw_monitor_start()), per-CPU timers are stopped using timer_delete_sync() followed by cancel_work_sync(). However, there is a circular dependency between send_timer and dm_alert_work: 1) sched_send_work() (timer callback) schedules dm_alert_work. 2) send_dm_alert() / net_dm_hw_summary_work() calls reset_per_cpu_data()    or net_dm_hw_reset_per_cpu_data(). 3) If memory allocation fails under memory pressure in the reset    function, it re-arms the timer via mod_timer(&amp;amp;data-&amp;gt;send_timer, ...). If dm_alert_work is running concurrently while timer_delete_sync() executes on another CPU, an allocation failure in the worker will re-arm the timer after timer_delete_sync() has already returned. Once cancel_work_sync() completes and module_put() is called, the timer remains active in the timer wheel. If the module is then unloaded, the timer will fire and execute sched_send_work() in freed memory, triggering a kernel panic / use-after-free. Switch from timer_delete_sync() to timer_shutdown_sync(). This guarantees that any in-flight timer handler has finished and prevents subsequent re-arming attempts from running workers from succeeding. When monitoring is restarted later, timer_setup() is invoked, w…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 193 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drop_monitor: use timer_shutdown_sync() to prevent timer rearming during teardown In drop_monitor teardown paths (net_dm_trace_off_set(), net_dm_hw_monitor_stop(), and error unwind paths in net_dm_trace_on_set() and net_dm_hw_monitor_start()), per-CPU timers are stopped using timer_delete_sync() followed by cancel_work_sync(). However, there is a circular dependency between send_timer and dm_alert_work: 1) sched_send_work() (timer callback) schedules dm_alert_work. 2) send_dm_alert() / net_dm_hw_summary_work() calls reset_per_cpu_data()    or net_dm_hw_reset_per_cpu_data(). 3) If memory allocation fails under memory pressure in the reset    function, it re-arms the timer via mod_timer(&amp;amp;data-&amp;gt;send_timer, ...). If dm_alert_work is running concurrently while timer_delete_sync() executes on another CPU, an allocation failure in the worker will re-arm the timer after timer_delete_sync() has already returned. Once cancel_work_sync() completes and module_put() is called, the timer remains active in the timer wheel. If the module is then unloaded, the timer will fire and execute sched_send_work() in freed memory, triggering a kernel panic / use-after-free. Switch from timer_delete_sync() to timer_shutdown_sync(). This guarantees that any in-flight timer handler has finished and prevents subsequent re-arming attempts from running workers from succeeding. When monitoring is restarted later, timer_setup() is invoked, w…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-98286</guid>
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