https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Fri, 02 Oct 2026 14:14:52 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2026-14925 bdu:2026-14925 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2026-14925 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-372042 EUVD-2026-372042 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-372042 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-93606 <p>vm2 (npm) versions 3.12.0 and earlier contain a sandbox escape in `VM` and `NodeVM`. When an embedder exposes a host API that returns a host-realm Promise, the bridge&#39;s rejection sanitizer (hostPromiseSanitizeReject / makeSanitizedPromiseCallback / normalizeHostPromiseCallbacks in lib/bridge.js) only wraps `then`/`catch` rejection slots that hold a function, and the sandbox-side `Symbol.species`/`.then` neutralization is installed only on the sandbox intrinsic `Promise.prototype`, so it never applies to a host Promise. Code running inside the sandbox can overwrite `p.constructor[Symbol.species]` on the host Promise and then call `p.then()` with no `onRejected` handler; V8 substitutes its internal Thrower, which re-throws the raw host rejection value into a resolve/reject closure captured by the attacker. This delivers an unsanitized, fully functional bridge proxy of the host object to sandboxed code, bypassing handleException and hostPromiseSanitizeReject. If the rejection value is host-pivotable (for example a host `process` object), this results in arbitrary code execution on the host. Fixed in 3.12.1.</p> <p>vm2 (npm) versions 3.12.0 and earlier contain a sandbox escape in `VM` and `NodeVM`. When an embedder exposes a host API that returns a host-realm Promise, the bridge&#39;s rejection sanitizer (hostPromiseSanitizeReject / makeSanitizedPromiseCallback / normalizeHostPromiseCallbacks in lib/bridge.js) only wraps `then`/`catch` rejection slots that hold a function, and the sandbox-side `Symbol.species`/`.then` neutralization is installed only on the sandbox intrinsic `Promise.prototype`, so it never applies to a host Promise. Code running inside the sandbox can overwrite `p.constructor[Symbol.species]` on the host Promise and then call `p.then()` with no `onRejected` handler; V8 substitutes its internal Thrower, which re-throws the raw host rejection value into a resolve/reject closure captured by the attacker. This delivers an unsanitized, fully functional bridge proxy of the host object to sandboxed code, bypassing handleException and hostPromiseSanitizeReject. If the rejection value is host-pivotable (for example a host `process` object), this results in arbitrary code execution on the host. Fixed in 3.12.1.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-93606 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-q84h-7qfg-c6j8 <p>vm2 (npm) versions 3.12.0 and earlier contain a sandbox escape in `VM` and `NodeVM`. When an embedder exposes a host API that returns a host-realm Promise, the bridge&#39;s rejection sanitizer (hostPromiseSanitizeReject / makeSanitizedPromiseCallback / normalizeHostPromiseCallbacks in lib/bridge.js) only wraps `then`/`catch` rejection slots that hold a function, and the sandbox-side `Symbol.species`/`.then` neutralization is installed only on the sandbox intrinsic `Promise.prototype`, so it never applies to a host Promise. Code running inside the sandbox can overwrite `p.constructor[Symbol.species]` on the host Promise and then call `p.then()` with no `onRejected` handler; V8 substitutes its internal Thrower, which re-throws the raw host rejection value into a resolve/reject closure captured by the attacker. This delivers an unsanitized, fully functional bridge proxy of the host object to sandboxed code, bypassing handleException and hostPromiseSanitizeReject. If the rejection value is host-pivotable (for example a host `process` object), this results in arbitrary code execution on the host. Fixed in 3.12.1.</p> <p>vm2 (npm) versions 3.12.0 and earlier contain a sandbox escape in `VM` and `NodeVM`. When an embedder exposes a host API that returns a host-realm Promise, the bridge&#39;s rejection sanitizer (hostPromiseSanitizeReject / makeSanitizedPromiseCallback / normalizeHostPromiseCallbacks in lib/bridge.js) only wraps `then`/`catch` rejection slots that hold a function, and the sandbox-side `Symbol.species`/`.then` neutralization is installed only on the sandbox intrinsic `Promise.prototype`, so it never applies to a host Promise. Code running inside the sandbox can overwrite `p.constructor[Symbol.species]` on the host Promise and then call `p.then()` with no `onRejected` handler; V8 substitutes its internal Thrower, which re-throws the raw host rejection value into a resolve/reject closure captured by the attacker. This delivers an unsanitized, fully functional bridge proxy of the host object to sandboxed code, bypassing handleException and hostPromiseSanitizeReject. If the rejection value is host-pivotable (for example a host `process` object), this results in arbitrary code execution on the host. Fixed in 3.12.1.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-q84h-7qfg-c6j8 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-3189 <p>Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in vm2 ausnutzen, um beliebigen Programmcode auszuführen und um die Integrität zu gefähren.</p> <p>Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in vm2 ausnutzen, um beliebigen Programmcode auszuführen und um die Integrität zu gefähren.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-3189