https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Sat, 03 Oct 2026 23:14:44 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-93228 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-93228 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1253 certfr-2026-avi-1253 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1253 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-375551 EUVD-2026-375551 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-375551 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-93228 <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>svcrdma: Reject Write/Reply chunks with segcount 0</p> <p>A peer can send a Write or Reply chunk whose segcount field is zero. xdr_check_write_chunk() only rejects segcount &gt; rc_maxpages, so zero passes the range check, and xdr_inline_decode(stream, 0) returns the current (non-NULL) cursor without advancing. The function returns true and pcl_alloc_write() then links a struct svc_rdma_chunk with ch_segcount == 0 onto rc_write_pcl or rc_reply_pcl.</p> <p>An earlier patch in this series made pcl_for_each_segment() safe for ch_segcount == 0, so this no longer drives the memory walk it used to. Rejecting the malformed frame at the decode boundary is still worthwhile as defense in depth: it keeps degenerate zero-segment chunks off the parsed chunk lists entirely, so any future consumer that walks ch_segments directly cannot observe one, and it makes the zero-floor easy to backport to trees where the macro change is more intrusive. RFC 8166 has no meaning for a Write/Reply chunk that describes no remote buffer, so no legitimate client is affected.</p> <p>xdr_check_reply_chunk() funnels Reply chunks through xdr_check_write_chunk() and inherits the same rejection.</p> <p>pcl_alloc_write() also links each chunk onto the parsed chunk list before filling its segment array. If a future change weakens the segcount-0 rejection, an incomplete chunk is visible to consumers during the fill loop. Reorder so that list_add_tail() follows the segment f…</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>svcrdma: Reject Write/Reply chunks with segcount 0</p> <p>A peer can send a Write or Reply chunk whose segcount field is zero. xdr_check_write_chunk() only rejects segcount &gt; rc_maxpages, so zero passes the range check, and xdr_inline_decode(stream, 0) returns the current (non-NULL) cursor without advancing. The function returns true and pcl_alloc_write() then links a struct svc_rdma_chunk with ch_segcount == 0 onto rc_write_pcl or rc_reply_pcl.</p> <p>An earlier patch in this series made pcl_for_each_segment() safe for ch_segcount == 0, so this no longer drives the memory walk it used to. Rejecting the malformed frame at the decode boundary is still worthwhile as defense in depth: it keeps degenerate zero-segment chunks off the parsed chunk lists entirely, so any future consumer that walks ch_segments directly cannot observe one, and it makes the zero-floor easy to backport to trees where the macro change is more intrusive. RFC 8166 has no meaning for a Write/Reply chunk that describes no remote buffer, so no legitimate client is affected.</p> <p>xdr_check_reply_chunk() funnels Reply chunks through xdr_check_write_chunk() and inherits the same rejection.</p> <p>pcl_alloc_write() also links each chunk onto the parsed chunk list before filling its segment array. If a future change weakens the segcount-0 rejection, an incomplete chunk is visible to consumers during the fill loop. Reorder so that list_add_tail() follows the segment f…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-93228 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-g29j-c673-5ccw <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>svcrdma: Reject Write/Reply chunks with segcount 0</p> <p>A peer can send a Write or Reply chunk whose segcount field is zero. xdr_check_write_chunk() only rejects segcount &gt; rc_maxpages, so zero passes the range check, and xdr_inline_decode(stream, 0) returns the current (non-NULL) cursor without advancing. The function returns true and pcl_alloc_write() then links a struct svc_rdma_chunk with ch_segcount == 0 onto rc_write_pcl or rc_reply_pcl.</p> <p>An earlier patch in this series made pcl_for_each_segment() safe for ch_segcount == 0, so this no longer drives the memory walk it used to. Rejecting the malformed frame at the decode boundary is still worthwhile as defense in depth: it keeps degenerate zero-segment chunks off the parsed chunk lists entirely, so any future consumer that walks ch_segments directly cannot observe one, and it makes the zero-floor easy to backport to trees where the macro change is more intrusive. RFC 8166 has no meaning for a Write/Reply chunk that describes no remote buffer, so no legitimate client is affected.</p> <p>xdr_check_reply_chunk() funnels Reply chunks through xdr_check_write_chunk() and inherits the same rejection.</p> <p>pcl_alloc_write() also links each chunk onto the parsed chunk list before filling its segment array. If a future change weakens the segcount-0 rejection, an incomplete chunk is visible to consumers during the fill loop. Reorder so that list_add_tail() follows the segment f…</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>svcrdma: Reject Write/Reply chunks with segcount 0</p> <p>A peer can send a Write or Reply chunk whose segcount field is zero. xdr_check_write_chunk() only rejects segcount &gt; rc_maxpages, so zero passes the range check, and xdr_inline_decode(stream, 0) returns the current (non-NULL) cursor without advancing. The function returns true and pcl_alloc_write() then links a struct svc_rdma_chunk with ch_segcount == 0 onto rc_write_pcl or rc_reply_pcl.</p> <p>An earlier patch in this series made pcl_for_each_segment() safe for ch_segcount == 0, so this no longer drives the memory walk it used to. Rejecting the malformed frame at the decode boundary is still worthwhile as defense in depth: it keeps degenerate zero-segment chunks off the parsed chunk lists entirely, so any future consumer that walks ch_segments directly cannot observe one, and it makes the zero-floor easy to backport to trees where the macro change is more intrusive. RFC 8166 has no meaning for a Write/Reply chunk that describes no remote buffer, so no legitimate client is affected.</p> <p>xdr_check_reply_chunk() funnels Reply chunks through xdr_check_write_chunk() and inherits the same rejection.</p> <p>pcl_alloc_write() also links each chunk onto the parsed chunk list before filling its segment array. If a future change weakens the segcount-0 rejection, an incomplete chunk is visible to consumers during the fill loop. Reorder so that list_add_tail() follows the segment f…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-g29j-c673-5ccw https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-93228 msrc_CVE-2026-93228 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-93228 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11893-1 <p>kernel-devel-7.2.8-1.1 on GA media</p> <p>kernel-devel-7.2.8-1.1 on GA media</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11893-1 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-93228 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 193 more</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: svcrdma: Reject Write/Reply chunks with segcount 0 A peer can send a Write or Reply chunk whose segcount field is zero. xdr_check_write_chunk() only rejects segcount &gt; rc_maxpages, so zero passes the range check, and xdr_inline_decode(stream, 0) returns the current (non-NULL) cursor without advancing. The function returns true and pcl_alloc_write() then links a struct svc_rdma_chunk with ch_segcount == 0 onto rc_write_pcl or rc_reply_pcl. An earlier patch in this series made pcl_for_each_segment() safe for ch_segcount == 0, so this no longer drives the memory walk it used to. Rejecting the malformed frame at the decode boundary is still worthwhile as defense in depth: it keeps degenerate zero-segment chunks off the parsed chunk lists entirely, so any future consumer that walks ch_segments directly cannot observe one, and it makes the zero-floor easy to backport to trees where the macro change is more intrusive. RFC 8166 has no meaning for a Write/Reply chunk that describes no remote buffer, so no legitimate client is affected. xdr_check_reply_chunk() funnels Reply chunks through xdr_check_write_chunk() and inherits the same rejection. pcl_alloc_write() also links each chunk onto the parsed chunk list before filling its segment array. If a future change weakens the segcount-0 rejection, an incomplete chunk is visible to consumers during the fill loop. Reorder so that list_add_tail() follows the segment fill l…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 193 more</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: svcrdma: Reject Write/Reply chunks with segcount 0 A peer can send a Write or Reply chunk whose segcount field is zero. xdr_check_write_chunk() only rejects segcount &gt; rc_maxpages, so zero passes the range check, and xdr_inline_decode(stream, 0) returns the current (non-NULL) cursor without advancing. The function returns true and pcl_alloc_write() then links a struct svc_rdma_chunk with ch_segcount == 0 onto rc_write_pcl or rc_reply_pcl. An earlier patch in this series made pcl_for_each_segment() safe for ch_segcount == 0, so this no longer drives the memory walk it used to. Rejecting the malformed frame at the decode boundary is still worthwhile as defense in depth: it keeps degenerate zero-segment chunks off the parsed chunk lists entirely, so any future consumer that walks ch_segments directly cannot observe one, and it makes the zero-floor easy to backport to trees where the macro change is more intrusive. RFC 8166 has no meaning for a Write/Reply chunk that describes no remote buffer, so no legitimate client is affected. xdr_check_reply_chunk() funnels Reply chunks through xdr_check_write_chunk() and inherits the same rejection. pcl_alloc_write() also links each chunk onto the parsed chunk list before filling its segment array. If a future change weakens the segcount-0 rejection, an incomplete chunk is visible to consumers during the fill loop. Reorder so that list_add_tail() follows the segment fill l…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-93228 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-3579 <p>Ein lokaler Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen Denial of Service Zustand herbeizuführen oder nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen.</p> <p>Ein lokaler Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen Denial of Service Zustand herbeizuführen oder nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-3579