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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 02 Oct 2026 19:33:04 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BELL-CVE-2026-93201</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-93201</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-93201</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-372221</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-372221</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-372221</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-372221</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-93201</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-93201</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;dm-pcache: validate seg_id fields from persistent memory&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;cache_pos_decode(), cache_key_decode() and the last-kset branches of
cache_replay(), the writeback worker and the GC worker take a cache
segment id from the cache device metadata and index cache-&amp;gt;segments[]
with it without checking it against cache-&amp;gt;n_segs. That metadata is only
CRC-protected with a fixed public seed, so whoever supplies the cache
device on a table load (CAP_SYS_ADMIN) controls the id; an out-of-range
value forms a wild pcache_cache_segment pointer that is dereferenced and
written through -- an out-of-bounds read and write driven by on-disk data.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Add cache_seg_id_valid() and reject an out-of-range id at each decode
site, failing the operation with -EIO instead of indexing past the array.
Bound the id against the initialized-segment count (cache_info.n_segs)
rather than the physical device total. A forged cache_info.n_segs below
seg_num otherwise leaves segments[cache_info.n_segs..seg_num) as zeroed
structs whose data pointer is NULL, so a forged id in that window would
still be dereferenced. A later patch guarantees cache_info.n_segs &amp;lt;=
seg_num, and a driver-created cache sets the two equal, so valid images
are unaffected.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;dm-pcache: validate seg_id fields from persistent memory&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;cache_pos_decode(), cache_key_decode() and the last-kset branches of
cache_replay(), the writeback worker and the GC worker take a cache
segment id from the cache device metadata and index cache-&amp;gt;segments[]
with it without checking it against cache-&amp;gt;n_segs. That metadata is only
CRC-protected with a fixed public seed, so whoever supplies the cache
device on a table load (CAP_SYS_ADMIN) controls the id; an out-of-range
value forms a wild pcache_cache_segment pointer that is dereferenced and
written through -- an out-of-bounds read and write driven by on-disk data.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Add cache_seg_id_valid() and reject an out-of-range id at each decode
site, failing the operation with -EIO instead of indexing past the array.
Bound the id against the initialized-segment count (cache_info.n_segs)
rather than the physical device total. A forged cache_info.n_segs below
seg_num otherwise leaves segments[cache_info.n_segs..seg_num) as zeroed
structs whose data pointer is NULL, so a forged id in that window would
still be dereferenced. A later patch guarantees cache_info.n_segs &amp;lt;=
seg_num, and a driver-created cache sets the two equal, so valid images
are unaffected.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-93201</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-rr92-7pj4-8whf</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-rr92-7pj4-8whf</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;dm-pcache: validate seg_id fields from persistent memory&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;cache_pos_decode(), cache_key_decode() and the last-kset branches of
cache_replay(), the writeback worker and the GC worker take a cache
segment id from the cache device metadata and index cache-&amp;gt;segments[]
with it without checking it against cache-&amp;gt;n_segs. That metadata is only
CRC-protected with a fixed public seed, so whoever supplies the cache
device on a table load (CAP_SYS_ADMIN) controls the id; an out-of-range
value forms a wild pcache_cache_segment pointer that is dereferenced and
written through -- an out-of-bounds read and write driven by on-disk data.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Add cache_seg_id_valid() and reject an out-of-range id at each decode
site, failing the operation with -EIO instead of indexing past the array.
Bound the id against the initialized-segment count (cache_info.n_segs)
rather than the physical device total. A forged cache_info.n_segs below
seg_num otherwise leaves segments[cache_info.n_segs..seg_num) as zeroed
structs whose data pointer is NULL, so a forged id in that window would
still be dereferenced. A later patch guarantees cache_info.n_segs &amp;lt;=
seg_num, and a driver-created cache sets the two equal, so valid images
are unaffected.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;dm-pcache: validate seg_id fields from persistent memory&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;cache_pos_decode(), cache_key_decode() and the last-kset branches of
cache_replay(), the writeback worker and the GC worker take a cache
segment id from the cache device metadata and index cache-&amp;gt;segments[]
with it without checking it against cache-&amp;gt;n_segs. That metadata is only
CRC-protected with a fixed public seed, so whoever supplies the cache
device on a table load (CAP_SYS_ADMIN) controls the id; an out-of-range
value forms a wild pcache_cache_segment pointer that is dereferenced and
written through -- an out-of-bounds read and write driven by on-disk data.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Add cache_seg_id_valid() and reject an out-of-range id at each decode
site, failing the operation with -EIO instead of indexing past the array.
Bound the id against the initialized-segment count (cache_info.n_segs)
rather than the physical device total. A forged cache_info.n_segs below
seg_num otherwise leaves segments[cache_info.n_segs..seg_num) as zeroed
structs whose data pointer is NULL, so a forged id in that window would
still be dereferenced. A later patch guarantees cache_info.n_segs &amp;lt;=
seg_num, and a driver-created cache sets the two equal, so valid images
are unaffected.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-rr92-7pj4-8whf</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>openSUSE-SU-2026:11880-1 — kernel-devel-7.2.7-1.1 on GA media</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11880-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;kernel-devel-7.2.7-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;kernel-devel-7.2.7-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11880-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-93201</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-93201</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 118 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dm-pcache: validate seg_id fields from persistent memory cache_pos_decode(), cache_key_decode() and the last-kset branches of cache_replay(), the writeback worker and the GC worker take a cache segment id from the cache device metadata and index cache-&amp;gt;segments[] with it without checking it against cache-&amp;gt;n_segs. That metadata is only CRC-protected with a fixed public seed, so whoever supplies the cache device on a table load (CAP_SYS_ADMIN) controls the id; an out-of-range value forms a wild pcache_cache_segment pointer that is dereferenced and written through -- an out-of-bounds read and write driven by on-disk data. Add cache_seg_id_valid() and reject an out-of-range id at each decode site, failing the operation with -EIO instead of indexing past the array. Bound the id against the initialized-segment count (cache_info.n_segs) rather than the physical device total. A forged cache_info.n_segs below seg_num otherwise leaves segments[cache_info.n_segs..seg_num) as zeroed structs whose data pointer is NULL, so a forged id in that window would still be dereferenced. A later patch guarantees cache_info.n_segs &amp;lt;= seg_num, and a driver-created cache sets the two equal, so valid images are unaffected.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 118 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dm-pcache: validate seg_id fields from persistent memory cache_pos_decode(), cache_key_decode() and the last-kset branches of cache_replay(), the writeback worker and the GC worker take a cache segment id from the cache device metadata and index cache-&amp;gt;segments[] with it without checking it against cache-&amp;gt;n_segs. That metadata is only CRC-protected with a fixed public seed, so whoever supplies the cache device on a table load (CAP_SYS_ADMIN) controls the id; an out-of-range value forms a wild pcache_cache_segment pointer that is dereferenced and written through -- an out-of-bounds read and write driven by on-disk data. Add cache_seg_id_valid() and reject an out-of-range id at each decode site, failing the operation with -EIO instead of indexing past the array. Bound the id against the initialized-segment count (cache_info.n_segs) rather than the physical device total. A forged cache_info.n_segs below seg_num otherwise leaves segments[cache_info.n_segs..seg_num) as zeroed structs whose data pointer is NULL, so a forged id in that window would still be dereferenced. A later patch guarantees cache_info.n_segs &amp;lt;= seg_num, and a driver-created cache sets the two equal, so valid images are unaffected.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-93201</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-3444 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-3444</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel möglicherweise ausnutzen, um Berechtigungen zu erweitern, Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, Daten offenzulegen oder zu manipulieren, den Speicher zu beschädigen, Denial-of-Service-Zustände zu verursachen oder andere, nicht näher spezifizierte Angriffe durchzuführen.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel möglicherweise ausnutzen, um Berechtigungen zu erweitern, Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, Daten offenzulegen oder zu manipulieren, den Speicher zu beschädigen, Denial-of-Service-Zustände zu verursachen oder andere, nicht näher spezifizierte Angriffe durchzuführen.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-3444</guid>
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