https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Sat, 03 Oct 2026 08:42:25 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2026-15027 bdu:2026-15027 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2026-15027 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-370750 EUVD-2026-370750 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-370750 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-92962 <p>vm2 is a sandbox for running untrusted JavaScript. In vm2 versions up to and including 3.11.3, the defaultSandboxPrepareStackTrace function in lib/setup-sandbox.js builds its output array using prototype-walking index assignment (lines[lines.length] = value) rather than a prototype-bypassing define-property primitive. Because this bridge-internal array is allocated in the sandbox realm, code inside the sandbox can install an accessor on Array.prototype for the relevant index; the accessor is then invoked whenever the sandbox reads error.stack (or otherwise triggers Error.prepareStackTrace), allowing sandbox code to observe and intercept each stack-trace line written by the bridge. The same pattern is used in the error-handling (catch) branch. The values written are formatted strings only, so the practical impact is limited to an information side channel and a violation of vm2&#39;s bridge-container defense invariant rather than a sandbox escape; the vendor rates the issue Low. The issue is fixed in vm2 3.11.4, which installs each entry as an own data property via Reflect.defineProperty.</p> <p>vm2 is a sandbox for running untrusted JavaScript. In vm2 versions up to and including 3.11.3, the defaultSandboxPrepareStackTrace function in lib/setup-sandbox.js builds its output array using prototype-walking index assignment (lines[lines.length] = value) rather than a prototype-bypassing define-property primitive. Because this bridge-internal array is allocated in the sandbox realm, code inside the sandbox can install an accessor on Array.prototype for the relevant index; the accessor is then invoked whenever the sandbox reads error.stack (or otherwise triggers Error.prepareStackTrace), allowing sandbox code to observe and intercept each stack-trace line written by the bridge. The same pattern is used in the error-handling (catch) branch. The values written are formatted strings only, so the practical impact is limited to an information side channel and a violation of vm2&#39;s bridge-container defense invariant rather than a sandbox escape; the vendor rates the issue Low. The issue is fixed in vm2 3.11.4, which installs each entry as an own data property via Reflect.defineProperty.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-92962 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-2c9f-f88g-g76p <p>vm2 is a sandbox for running untrusted JavaScript. In vm2 versions up to and including 3.11.3, the defaultSandboxPrepareStackTrace function in lib/setup-sandbox.js builds its output array using prototype-walking index assignment (lines[lines.length] = value) rather than a prototype-bypassing define-property primitive. Because this bridge-internal array is allocated in the sandbox realm, code inside the sandbox can install an accessor on Array.prototype for the relevant index; the accessor is then invoked whenever the sandbox reads error.stack (or otherwise triggers Error.prepareStackTrace), allowing sandbox code to observe and intercept each stack-trace line written by the bridge. The same pattern is used in the error-handling (catch) branch. The values written are formatted strings only, so the practical impact is limited to an information side channel and a violation of vm2&#39;s bridge-container defense invariant rather than a sandbox escape; the vendor rates the issue Low. The issue is fixed in vm2 3.11.4, which installs each entry as an own data property via Reflect.defineProperty.</p> <p>vm2 is a sandbox for running untrusted JavaScript. In vm2 versions up to and including 3.11.3, the defaultSandboxPrepareStackTrace function in lib/setup-sandbox.js builds its output array using prototype-walking index assignment (lines[lines.length] = value) rather than a prototype-bypassing define-property primitive. Because this bridge-internal array is allocated in the sandbox realm, code inside the sandbox can install an accessor on Array.prototype for the relevant index; the accessor is then invoked whenever the sandbox reads error.stack (or otherwise triggers Error.prepareStackTrace), allowing sandbox code to observe and intercept each stack-trace line written by the bridge. The same pattern is used in the error-handling (catch) branch. The values written are formatted strings only, so the practical impact is limited to an information side channel and a violation of vm2&#39;s bridge-container defense invariant rather than a sandbox escape; the vendor rates the issue Low. The issue is fixed in vm2 3.11.4, which installs each entry as an own data property via Reflect.defineProperty.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-2c9f-f88g-g76p https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-1583 <p>Ein entfernter, anonymer Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in vm2 ausnutzen, um beliebigen Programmcode auszuführen, Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, Daten zu manipulieren und vertrauliche Informationen offenzulegen.</p> <p>Ein entfernter, anonymer Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in vm2 ausnutzen, um beliebigen Programmcode auszuführen, Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, Daten zu manipulieren und vertrauliche Informationen offenzulegen.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-1583