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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sat, 03 Oct 2026 05:29:08 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BELL-CVE-2026-90040</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-90040</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-90040</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-369270</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-369270</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-369270</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-369270</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-90040</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-90040</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;KVM: SEV: Forcefully invalidate SNP VMSA if its backing gmem page is zapped&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Wire up a gmem_invalidate_range() call for SNP VMs, and use it to force
vCPUs to reload/recheck their guest-provided VMSA if the backing gmem
page is being invalidated, e.g. is being PUNCH_HOLE&amp;#39;d.  Use the same core
logic to handle invalidations as VMX does for the APIC-access page, as the
two concepts are nearly identical: shove the physical address of a page
into the vCPU&amp;#39;s control structure:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. Snapshot the invalidation sequence counter
 2. Grab the pfn (from guest_memfd in this case)
 3. Acquire mmu_lock for read
 4. Re-request reload if retry is needed, otherwise commit the change.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Note, the re-request action in #4 is necessary as KVM&amp;#39;s retry logic is
fuzzy, i.e. can get false positives.  If the guest_memfd page has been
dropped, at some point a subsequent reload will fail to get a PFN from
guest_memfd, and KVM will fail KVM_RUN.  If the retry was due to a false
positive, KVM will retry until there are no relevant MMU notifier events
(and will retry in the &amp;#34;outer&amp;#34; loop, i.e. will drop locks and resched as
needed).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Note #2!  Take care to invalidate the VMSA when a relevant memslot is
DELETED or MOVED, as invalidations in response to PUNCH_HOLE are predicated
on memslot bindings (KVM doesn&amp;#39;t know what GFN range(s) to invalidate
without a binding).  And more importantly, the VMSA mapping requires a
memslot, i.e. must be inval…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;KVM: SEV: Forcefully invalidate SNP VMSA if its backing gmem page is zapped&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Wire up a gmem_invalidate_range() call for SNP VMs, and use it to force
vCPUs to reload/recheck their guest-provided VMSA if the backing gmem
page is being invalidated, e.g. is being PUNCH_HOLE&amp;#39;d.  Use the same core
logic to handle invalidations as VMX does for the APIC-access page, as the
two concepts are nearly identical: shove the physical address of a page
into the vCPU&amp;#39;s control structure:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. Snapshot the invalidation sequence counter
 2. Grab the pfn (from guest_memfd in this case)
 3. Acquire mmu_lock for read
 4. Re-request reload if retry is needed, otherwise commit the change.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Note, the re-request action in #4 is necessary as KVM&amp;#39;s retry logic is
fuzzy, i.e. can get false positives.  If the guest_memfd page has been
dropped, at some point a subsequent reload will fail to get a PFN from
guest_memfd, and KVM will fail KVM_RUN.  If the retry was due to a false
positive, KVM will retry until there are no relevant MMU notifier events
(and will retry in the &amp;#34;outer&amp;#34; loop, i.e. will drop locks and resched as
needed).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Note #2!  Take care to invalidate the VMSA when a relevant memslot is
DELETED or MOVED, as invalidations in response to PUNCH_HOLE are predicated
on memslot bindings (KVM doesn&amp;#39;t know what GFN range(s) to invalidate
without a binding).  And more importantly, the VMSA mapping requires a
memslot, i.e. must be inval…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-90040</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-hj6j-g456-vf4m</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-hj6j-g456-vf4m</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;KVM: SEV: Forcefully invalidate SNP VMSA if its backing gmem page is zapped&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Wire up a gmem_invalidate_range() call for SNP VMs, and use it to force
vCPUs to reload/recheck their guest-provided VMSA if the backing gmem
page is being invalidated, e.g. is being PUNCH_HOLE&amp;#39;d.  Use the same core
logic to handle invalidations as VMX does for the APIC-access page, as the
two concepts are nearly identical: shove the physical address of a page
into the vCPU&amp;#39;s control structure:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. Snapshot the invalidation sequence counter
 2. Grab the pfn (from guest_memfd in this case)
 3. Acquire mmu_lock for read
 4. Re-request reload if retry is needed, otherwise commit the change.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Note, the re-request action in #4 is necessary as KVM&amp;#39;s retry logic is
fuzzy, i.e. can get false positives.  If the guest_memfd page has been
dropped, at some point a subsequent reload will fail to get a PFN from
guest_memfd, and KVM will fail KVM_RUN.  If the retry was due to a false
positive, KVM will retry until there are no relevant MMU notifier events
(and will retry in the &amp;#34;outer&amp;#34; loop, i.e. will drop locks and resched as
needed).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Note #2!  Take care to invalidate the VMSA when a relevant memslot is
DELETED or MOVED, as invalidations in response to PUNCH_HOLE are predicated
on memslot bindings (KVM doesn&amp;#39;t know what GFN range(s) to invalidate
without a binding).  And more importantly, the VMSA mapping requires a
memslot, i.e. must be inval…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;KVM: SEV: Forcefully invalidate SNP VMSA if its backing gmem page is zapped&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Wire up a gmem_invalidate_range() call for SNP VMs, and use it to force
vCPUs to reload/recheck their guest-provided VMSA if the backing gmem
page is being invalidated, e.g. is being PUNCH_HOLE&amp;#39;d.  Use the same core
logic to handle invalidations as VMX does for the APIC-access page, as the
two concepts are nearly identical: shove the physical address of a page
into the vCPU&amp;#39;s control structure:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. Snapshot the invalidation sequence counter
 2. Grab the pfn (from guest_memfd in this case)
 3. Acquire mmu_lock for read
 4. Re-request reload if retry is needed, otherwise commit the change.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Note, the re-request action in #4 is necessary as KVM&amp;#39;s retry logic is
fuzzy, i.e. can get false positives.  If the guest_memfd page has been
dropped, at some point a subsequent reload will fail to get a PFN from
guest_memfd, and KVM will fail KVM_RUN.  If the retry was due to a false
positive, KVM will retry until there are no relevant MMU notifier events
(and will retry in the &amp;#34;outer&amp;#34; loop, i.e. will drop locks and resched as
needed).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Note #2!  Take care to invalidate the VMSA when a relevant memslot is
DELETED or MOVED, as invalidations in response to PUNCH_HOLE are predicated
on memslot bindings (KVM doesn&amp;#39;t know what GFN range(s) to invalidate
without a binding).  And more importantly, the VMSA mapping requires a
memslot, i.e. must be inval…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-hj6j-g456-vf4m</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>openSUSE-SU-2026:11880-1 — kernel-devel-7.2.7-1.1 on GA media</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11880-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;kernel-devel-7.2.7-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;kernel-devel-7.2.7-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11880-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-90040</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-90040</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 120 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: SEV: Forcefully invalidate SNP VMSA if its backing gmem page is zapped Wire up a gmem_invalidate_range() call for SNP VMs, and use it to force vCPUs to reload/recheck their guest-provided VMSA if the backing gmem page is being invalidated, e.g. is being PUNCH_HOLE&amp;#39;d.  Use the same core logic to handle invalidations as VMX does for the APIC-access page, as the two concepts are nearly identical: shove the physical address of a page into the vCPU&amp;#39;s control structure:  1. Snapshot the invalidation sequence counter  2. Grab the pfn (from guest_memfd in this case)  3. Acquire mmu_lock for read  4. Re-request reload if retry is needed, otherwise commit the change. Note, the re-request action in #4 is necessary as KVM&amp;#39;s retry logic is fuzzy, i.e. can get false positives.  If the guest_memfd page has been dropped, at some point a subsequent reload will fail to get a PFN from guest_memfd, and KVM will fail KVM_RUN.  If the retry was due to a false positive, KVM will retry until there are no relevant MMU notifier events (and will retry in the &amp;#34;outer&amp;#34; loop, i.e. will drop locks and resched as needed). Note #2!  Take care to invalidate the VMSA when a relevant memslot is DELETED or MOVED, as invalidations in response to PUNCH_HOLE are predicated on memslot bindings (KVM doesn&amp;#39;t know what GFN range(s) to invalidate without a binding).  And more importantly, the VMSA mapping requires a memslot, i.e. must be invalidate…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 120 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: SEV: Forcefully invalidate SNP VMSA if its backing gmem page is zapped Wire up a gmem_invalidate_range() call for SNP VMs, and use it to force vCPUs to reload/recheck their guest-provided VMSA if the backing gmem page is being invalidated, e.g. is being PUNCH_HOLE&amp;#39;d.  Use the same core logic to handle invalidations as VMX does for the APIC-access page, as the two concepts are nearly identical: shove the physical address of a page into the vCPU&amp;#39;s control structure:  1. Snapshot the invalidation sequence counter  2. Grab the pfn (from guest_memfd in this case)  3. Acquire mmu_lock for read  4. Re-request reload if retry is needed, otherwise commit the change. Note, the re-request action in #4 is necessary as KVM&amp;#39;s retry logic is fuzzy, i.e. can get false positives.  If the guest_memfd page has been dropped, at some point a subsequent reload will fail to get a PFN from guest_memfd, and KVM will fail KVM_RUN.  If the retry was due to a false positive, KVM will retry until there are no relevant MMU notifier events (and will retry in the &amp;#34;outer&amp;#34; loop, i.e. will drop locks and resched as needed). Note #2!  Take care to invalidate the VMSA when a relevant memslot is DELETED or MOVED, as invalidations in response to PUNCH_HOLE are predicated on memslot bindings (KVM doesn&amp;#39;t know what GFN range(s) to invalidate without a binding).  And more importantly, the VMSA mapping requires a memslot, i.e. must be invalidate…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-90040</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-3438 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-3438</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein lokaler Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen Denial of Service zu verursachen oder eine nicht näher spezifizierte Auswirkung zu erzielen.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein lokaler Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen Denial of Service zu verursachen oder eine nicht näher spezifizierte Auswirkung zu erzielen.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-3438</guid>
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