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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sat, 03 Oct 2026 18:21:55 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BELL-CVE-2026-90018</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-90018</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-90018</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>certfr-2026-avi-1253 — De multiples vulnérabilités ont été découvertes dans le noyau Linux de Debian. Certaines d'entre elles permettent à un…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1253</link>
      <description>certfr-2026-avi-1253</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1253</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-369525</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-369525</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-369525</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-369525</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-90018</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-90018</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read / stack overflow in rtw_get_wps_attr()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;rtw_get_wps_attr() walks WPS attributes inside a WPS IE taken from
a wireless management frame. For each candidate attribute it only
checks that the fixed 4-byte attribute header (2-byte ID + 2-byte
length) fits inside the IE:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if (attr_ptr + 4 &amp;gt; wps_ie + wps_ielen)
		break;
	u16 attr_id = get_unaligned_be16(attr_ptr);
	u16 attr_data_len = get_unaligned_be16(attr_ptr + 2);
	u16 attr_len = attr_data_len + 4;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;attr_data_len (and therefore attr_len) is read directly from the
wire and is never checked against the remaining bytes in the IE
before being used as the size of:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;memcpy(buf_attr, attr_ptr, attr_len);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Since attr_len is fully attacker controlled (0 to 65535+4), this is
both a heap OOB read of wps_ie, and, more seriously, a stack buffer
overflow at several call sites where buf_attr is a single-byte
stack variable, e.g. rtw_get_wps_attr_content()&amp;#39;s callers passing
WPS_ATTR_SELECTED_REGISTRAR into a stack &amp;#34;u8 sr&amp;#34;/&amp;#34;u8
selected_registrar&amp;#34; (drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_cfg80211.c,
drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_mlme_ext.c). A crafted WPS IE in a
beacon or probe response processed during scanning can therefore
smash the stack of the parsing thread.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;rtw_get_wps_attr_content() itself has no independent length check
and simply trusts the attr_len it gets back from rtw_get_wps_attr(),
so fixing the bound here also fixes that…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read / stack overflow in rtw_get_wps_attr()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;rtw_get_wps_attr() walks WPS attributes inside a WPS IE taken from
a wireless management frame. For each candidate attribute it only
checks that the fixed 4-byte attribute header (2-byte ID + 2-byte
length) fits inside the IE:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if (attr_ptr + 4 &amp;gt; wps_ie + wps_ielen)
		break;
	u16 attr_id = get_unaligned_be16(attr_ptr);
	u16 attr_data_len = get_unaligned_be16(attr_ptr + 2);
	u16 attr_len = attr_data_len + 4;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;attr_data_len (and therefore attr_len) is read directly from the
wire and is never checked against the remaining bytes in the IE
before being used as the size of:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;memcpy(buf_attr, attr_ptr, attr_len);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Since attr_len is fully attacker controlled (0 to 65535+4), this is
both a heap OOB read of wps_ie, and, more seriously, a stack buffer
overflow at several call sites where buf_attr is a single-byte
stack variable, e.g. rtw_get_wps_attr_content()&amp;#39;s callers passing
WPS_ATTR_SELECTED_REGISTRAR into a stack &amp;#34;u8 sr&amp;#34;/&amp;#34;u8
selected_registrar&amp;#34; (drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_cfg80211.c,
drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_mlme_ext.c). A crafted WPS IE in a
beacon or probe response processed during scanning can therefore
smash the stack of the parsing thread.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;rtw_get_wps_attr_content() itself has no independent length check
and simply trusts the attr_len it gets back from rtw_get_wps_attr(),
so fixing the bound here also fixes that…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-90018</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-jrhx-3qq6-x5q2</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-jrhx-3qq6-x5q2</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read / stack overflow in rtw_get_wps_attr()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;rtw_get_wps_attr() walks WPS attributes inside a WPS IE taken from
a wireless management frame. For each candidate attribute it only
checks that the fixed 4-byte attribute header (2-byte ID + 2-byte
length) fits inside the IE:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if (attr_ptr + 4 &amp;gt; wps_ie + wps_ielen)
		break;
	u16 attr_id = get_unaligned_be16(attr_ptr);
	u16 attr_data_len = get_unaligned_be16(attr_ptr + 2);
	u16 attr_len = attr_data_len + 4;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;attr_data_len (and therefore attr_len) is read directly from the
wire and is never checked against the remaining bytes in the IE
before being used as the size of:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;memcpy(buf_attr, attr_ptr, attr_len);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Since attr_len is fully attacker controlled (0 to 65535+4), this is
both a heap OOB read of wps_ie, and, more seriously, a stack buffer
overflow at several call sites where buf_attr is a single-byte
stack variable, e.g. rtw_get_wps_attr_content()&amp;#39;s callers passing
WPS_ATTR_SELECTED_REGISTRAR into a stack &amp;#34;u8 sr&amp;#34;/&amp;#34;u8
selected_registrar&amp;#34; (drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_cfg80211.c,
drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_mlme_ext.c). A crafted WPS IE in a
beacon or probe response processed during scanning can therefore
smash the stack of the parsing thread.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;rtw_get_wps_attr_content() itself has no independent length check
and simply trusts the attr_len it gets back from rtw_get_wps_attr(),
so fixing the bound here also fixes that…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read / stack overflow in rtw_get_wps_attr()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;rtw_get_wps_attr() walks WPS attributes inside a WPS IE taken from
a wireless management frame. For each candidate attribute it only
checks that the fixed 4-byte attribute header (2-byte ID + 2-byte
length) fits inside the IE:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if (attr_ptr + 4 &amp;gt; wps_ie + wps_ielen)
		break;
	u16 attr_id = get_unaligned_be16(attr_ptr);
	u16 attr_data_len = get_unaligned_be16(attr_ptr + 2);
	u16 attr_len = attr_data_len + 4;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;attr_data_len (and therefore attr_len) is read directly from the
wire and is never checked against the remaining bytes in the IE
before being used as the size of:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;memcpy(buf_attr, attr_ptr, attr_len);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Since attr_len is fully attacker controlled (0 to 65535+4), this is
both a heap OOB read of wps_ie, and, more seriously, a stack buffer
overflow at several call sites where buf_attr is a single-byte
stack variable, e.g. rtw_get_wps_attr_content()&amp;#39;s callers passing
WPS_ATTR_SELECTED_REGISTRAR into a stack &amp;#34;u8 sr&amp;#34;/&amp;#34;u8
selected_registrar&amp;#34; (drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_cfg80211.c,
drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_mlme_ext.c). A crafted WPS IE in a
beacon or probe response processed during scanning can therefore
smash the stack of the parsing thread.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;rtw_get_wps_attr_content() itself has no independent length check
and simply trusts the attr_len it gets back from rtw_get_wps_attr(),
so fixing the bound here also fixes that…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-jrhx-3qq6-x5q2</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>msrc_CVE-2026-90018 — staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read / stack overflow in rtw_get_wps_attr()</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-90018</link>
      <description>msrc_CVE-2026-90018</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-90018</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>openSUSE-SU-2026:11880-1 — kernel-devel-7.2.7-1.1 on GA media</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11880-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;kernel-devel-7.2.7-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;kernel-devel-7.2.7-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11880-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-90018</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-90018</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe, Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-oracle, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0 and 239 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read / stack overflow in rtw_get_wps_attr() rtw_get_wps_attr() walks WPS attributes inside a WPS IE taken from a wireless management frame. For each candidate attribute it only checks that the fixed 4-byte attribute header (2-byte ID + 2-byte length) fits inside the IE: 	if (attr_ptr + 4 &amp;gt; wps_ie + wps_ielen) 		break; 	u16 attr_id = get_unaligned_be16(attr_ptr); 	u16 attr_data_len = get_unaligned_be16(attr_ptr + 2); 	u16 attr_len = attr_data_len + 4; attr_data_len (and therefore attr_len) is read directly from the wire and is never checked against the remaining bytes in the IE before being used as the size of: 	memcpy(buf_attr, attr_ptr, attr_len); Since attr_len is fully attacker controlled (0 to 65535+4), this is both a heap OOB read of wps_ie, and, more seriously, a stack buffer overflow at several call sites where buf_attr is a single-byte stack variable, e.g. rtw_get_wps_attr_content()&amp;#39;s callers passing WPS_ATTR_SELECTED_REGISTRAR into a stack &amp;#34;u8 sr&amp;#34;/&amp;#34;u8 selected_registrar&amp;#34; (drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_cfg80211.c, drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_mlme_ext.c). A crafted WPS IE in a beacon or probe response processed during scanning can therefore smash the stack of the parsing thread. rtw_get_wps_attr_content() itself has no independent length check and simply trusts the attr_len it gets back from rtw_get_wps_attr(), so fixing the bound here also fixes that caller…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe, Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-oracle, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0 and 239 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read / stack overflow in rtw_get_wps_attr() rtw_get_wps_attr() walks WPS attributes inside a WPS IE taken from a wireless management frame. For each candidate attribute it only checks that the fixed 4-byte attribute header (2-byte ID + 2-byte length) fits inside the IE: 	if (attr_ptr + 4 &amp;gt; wps_ie + wps_ielen) 		break; 	u16 attr_id = get_unaligned_be16(attr_ptr); 	u16 attr_data_len = get_unaligned_be16(attr_ptr + 2); 	u16 attr_len = attr_data_len + 4; attr_data_len (and therefore attr_len) is read directly from the wire and is never checked against the remaining bytes in the IE before being used as the size of: 	memcpy(buf_attr, attr_ptr, attr_len); Since attr_len is fully attacker controlled (0 to 65535+4), this is both a heap OOB read of wps_ie, and, more seriously, a stack buffer overflow at several call sites where buf_attr is a single-byte stack variable, e.g. rtw_get_wps_attr_content()&amp;#39;s callers passing WPS_ATTR_SELECTED_REGISTRAR into a stack &amp;#34;u8 sr&amp;#34;/&amp;#34;u8 selected_registrar&amp;#34; (drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_cfg80211.c, drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_mlme_ext.c). A crafted WPS IE in a beacon or probe response processed during scanning can therefore smash the stack of the parsing thread. rtw_get_wps_attr_content() itself has no independent length check and simply trusts the attr_len it gets back from rtw_get_wps_attr(), so fixing the bound here also fixes that caller…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-90018</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-3438 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-3438</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein lokaler Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen Denial of Service zu verursachen oder eine nicht näher spezifizierte Auswirkung zu erzielen.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein lokaler Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen Denial of Service zu verursachen oder eine nicht näher spezifizierte Auswirkung zu erzielen.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-3438</guid>
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