<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 02 Oct 2026 22:33:16 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BELL-CVE-2026-89996</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-89996</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-89996</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-369257</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-369257</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-369257</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-369257</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-89996</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-89996</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;dma-buf: dma-heap: don&amp;#39;t publish fd before copy_to_user() succeeds&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;DMA_HEAP_IOCTL_ALLOC allocates a dma-buf and installs an fd into the
caller&amp;#39;s fd table via dma_buf_fd() -&amp;gt; fd_install() before
dma_heap_ioctl() copies the result back to userspace.  If the trailing
copy_to_user() fails, userspace never learns the fd number, but the
fd (and the underlying dma-buf reference) are already visible to
other threads in the same process and are leaked for the lifetime of
the process.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The obvious &amp;#34;close it on the failure path&amp;#34; fix is unsafe: once
fd_install() has run, another thread can already dup() the fd, send
it via SCM_RIGHTS, or close() it and let its number be reused, so a
subsequent close_fd() from the ioctl path can operate on an unrelated
file.  This was pointed out by Christian König on v1 [1].&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Restructure the allocation path so that fd_install() is the last,
unfailable step of a successful ioctl:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. heap-&amp;gt;ops-&amp;gt;allocate()      creates the dma_buf.
  2. get_unused_fd_flags()      reserves an fd number in the caller&amp;#39;s
                                fd table without publishing it, so
                                no other thread can observe it.
  3. copy_to_user()             delivers the fd number to userspace;
                                on failure the fd is returned with
                                put_unused_fd() and the dma_buf
                                reference is dropped with…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;dma-buf: dma-heap: don&amp;#39;t publish fd before copy_to_user() succeeds&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;DMA_HEAP_IOCTL_ALLOC allocates a dma-buf and installs an fd into the
caller&amp;#39;s fd table via dma_buf_fd() -&amp;gt; fd_install() before
dma_heap_ioctl() copies the result back to userspace.  If the trailing
copy_to_user() fails, userspace never learns the fd number, but the
fd (and the underlying dma-buf reference) are already visible to
other threads in the same process and are leaked for the lifetime of
the process.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The obvious &amp;#34;close it on the failure path&amp;#34; fix is unsafe: once
fd_install() has run, another thread can already dup() the fd, send
it via SCM_RIGHTS, or close() it and let its number be reused, so a
subsequent close_fd() from the ioctl path can operate on an unrelated
file.  This was pointed out by Christian König on v1 [1].&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Restructure the allocation path so that fd_install() is the last,
unfailable step of a successful ioctl:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. heap-&amp;gt;ops-&amp;gt;allocate()      creates the dma_buf.
  2. get_unused_fd_flags()      reserves an fd number in the caller&amp;#39;s
                                fd table without publishing it, so
                                no other thread can observe it.
  3. copy_to_user()             delivers the fd number to userspace;
                                on failure the fd is returned with
                                put_unused_fd() and the dma_buf
                                reference is dropped with…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-89996</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-cr94-3ppf-3v5m</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-cr94-3ppf-3v5m</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;dma-buf: dma-heap: don&amp;#39;t publish fd before copy_to_user() succeeds&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;DMA_HEAP_IOCTL_ALLOC allocates a dma-buf and installs an fd into the
caller&amp;#39;s fd table via dma_buf_fd() -&amp;gt; fd_install() before
dma_heap_ioctl() copies the result back to userspace.  If the trailing
copy_to_user() fails, userspace never learns the fd number, but the
fd (and the underlying dma-buf reference) are already visible to
other threads in the same process and are leaked for the lifetime of
the process.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The obvious &amp;#34;close it on the failure path&amp;#34; fix is unsafe: once
fd_install() has run, another thread can already dup() the fd, send
it via SCM_RIGHTS, or close() it and let its number be reused, so a
subsequent close_fd() from the ioctl path can operate on an unrelated
file.  This was pointed out by Christian König on v1 [1].&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Restructure the allocation path so that fd_install() is the last,
unfailable step of a successful ioctl:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. heap-&amp;gt;ops-&amp;gt;allocate()      creates the dma_buf.
  2. get_unused_fd_flags()      reserves an fd number in the caller&amp;#39;s
                                fd table without publishing it, so
                                no other thread can observe it.
  3. copy_to_user()             delivers the fd number to userspace;
                                on failure the fd is returned with
                                put_unused_fd() and the dma_buf
                                reference is dropped with…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;dma-buf: dma-heap: don&amp;#39;t publish fd before copy_to_user() succeeds&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;DMA_HEAP_IOCTL_ALLOC allocates a dma-buf and installs an fd into the
caller&amp;#39;s fd table via dma_buf_fd() -&amp;gt; fd_install() before
dma_heap_ioctl() copies the result back to userspace.  If the trailing
copy_to_user() fails, userspace never learns the fd number, but the
fd (and the underlying dma-buf reference) are already visible to
other threads in the same process and are leaked for the lifetime of
the process.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The obvious &amp;#34;close it on the failure path&amp;#34; fix is unsafe: once
fd_install() has run, another thread can already dup() the fd, send
it via SCM_RIGHTS, or close() it and let its number be reused, so a
subsequent close_fd() from the ioctl path can operate on an unrelated
file.  This was pointed out by Christian König on v1 [1].&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Restructure the allocation path so that fd_install() is the last,
unfailable step of a successful ioctl:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. heap-&amp;gt;ops-&amp;gt;allocate()      creates the dma_buf.
  2. get_unused_fd_flags()      reserves an fd number in the caller&amp;#39;s
                                fd table without publishing it, so
                                no other thread can observe it.
  3. copy_to_user()             delivers the fd number to userspace;
                                on failure the fd is returned with
                                put_unused_fd() and the dma_buf
                                reference is dropped with…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-cr94-3ppf-3v5m</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>openSUSE-SU-2026:11880-1 — kernel-devel-7.2.7-1.1 on GA media</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11880-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;kernel-devel-7.2.7-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;kernel-devel-7.2.7-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11880-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-89996</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-89996</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 195 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dma-buf: dma-heap: don&amp;#39;t publish fd before copy_to_user() succeeds DMA_HEAP_IOCTL_ALLOC allocates a dma-buf and installs an fd into the caller&amp;#39;s fd table via dma_buf_fd() -&amp;gt; fd_install() before dma_heap_ioctl() copies the result back to userspace.  If the trailing copy_to_user() fails, userspace never learns the fd number, but the fd (and the underlying dma-buf reference) are already visible to other threads in the same process and are leaked for the lifetime of the process. The obvious &amp;#34;close it on the failure path&amp;#34; fix is unsafe: once fd_install() has run, another thread can already dup() the fd, send it via SCM_RIGHTS, or close() it and let its number be reused, so a subsequent close_fd() from the ioctl path can operate on an unrelated file.  This was pointed out by Christian König on v1 [1]. Restructure the allocation path so that fd_install() is the last, unfailable step of a successful ioctl:   1. heap-&amp;gt;ops-&amp;gt;allocate()      creates the dma_buf.   2. get_unused_fd_flags()      reserves an fd number in the caller&amp;#39;s                                 fd table without publishing it, so                                 no other thread can observe it.   3. copy_to_user()             delivers the fd number to userspace;                                 on failure the fd is returned with                                 put_unused_fd() and the dma_buf                                 reference is dropped with…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 195 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dma-buf: dma-heap: don&amp;#39;t publish fd before copy_to_user() succeeds DMA_HEAP_IOCTL_ALLOC allocates a dma-buf and installs an fd into the caller&amp;#39;s fd table via dma_buf_fd() -&amp;gt; fd_install() before dma_heap_ioctl() copies the result back to userspace.  If the trailing copy_to_user() fails, userspace never learns the fd number, but the fd (and the underlying dma-buf reference) are already visible to other threads in the same process and are leaked for the lifetime of the process. The obvious &amp;#34;close it on the failure path&amp;#34; fix is unsafe: once fd_install() has run, another thread can already dup() the fd, send it via SCM_RIGHTS, or close() it and let its number be reused, so a subsequent close_fd() from the ioctl path can operate on an unrelated file.  This was pointed out by Christian König on v1 [1]. Restructure the allocation path so that fd_install() is the last, unfailable step of a successful ioctl:   1. heap-&amp;gt;ops-&amp;gt;allocate()      creates the dma_buf.   2. get_unused_fd_flags()      reserves an fd number in the caller&amp;#39;s                                 fd table without publishing it, so                                 no other thread can observe it.   3. copy_to_user()             delivers the fd number to userspace;                                 on failure the fd is returned with                                 put_unused_fd() and the dma_buf                                 reference is dropped with…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-89996</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-3438 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-3438</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein lokaler Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen Denial of Service zu verursachen oder eine nicht näher spezifizierte Auswirkung zu erzielen.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein lokaler Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen Denial of Service zu verursachen oder eine nicht näher spezifizierte Auswirkung zu erzielen.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-3438</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
