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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 02 Oct 2026 23:59:47 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BELL-CVE-2026-89768</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-89768</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-89768</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>certfr-2026-avi-1253 — De multiples vulnérabilités ont été découvertes dans le noyau Linux de Debian. Certaines d'entre elles permettent à un…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1253</link>
      <description>certfr-2026-avi-1253</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1253</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-367046</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-367046</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-367046</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-367046</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-89768</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-89768</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;fs: fix user path of nested backing files&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;backing_file_open() derives the path to be stored in the new backing
file from user_file-&amp;gt;f_path.  This is incorrect when user_file itself
is a backing file, which is the case for nested stacking filesystems,
e.g. overlayfs mounts where the lowerdir of one overlayfs is the merged
directory of another.  Since commit def3ae83da02 (&amp;#34;fs: store real path
instead of fake path in backing file f_path&amp;#34;) the f_path of a backing
file holds the real path of the intermediate layer, not the path that
the user opened.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Commit 924577e4f6ca (&amp;#34;ovl: Fix nested backing file paths&amp;#34;) fixed this
for such configurations by passing file_user_path() from
ovl_open_realfile().  However, commit 6af36aeb147a (&amp;#34;lsm: add
backing_file LSM hooks&amp;#34;) changed the first argument of
backing_file_open() from the user path back to the user file and
derived the path from user_file-&amp;gt;f_path again, silently re-introducing
the problem.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;As a result, files mapped through a nested overlayfs show the wrong
path in /proc/&amp;lt;pid&amp;gt;/maps and in perf/ftrace mmap records.  For example,
with two nested overlayfs mounts:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;mkdir -p /ovl/{lower,upper,work,merged} /ovl/nested
  echo hello &amp;gt; /ovl/lower/foo
  mount -t overlay overlay \
	-o lowerdir=/ovl/lower,upperdir=/ovl/upper,workdir=/ovl/work \
	/ovl/merged
  # at least two lowerdirs are needed when upperdir is nonexistent
  mount -t overlay overlay \
	-o lowerdir=/ovl/merg…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;fs: fix user path of nested backing files&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;backing_file_open() derives the path to be stored in the new backing
file from user_file-&amp;gt;f_path.  This is incorrect when user_file itself
is a backing file, which is the case for nested stacking filesystems,
e.g. overlayfs mounts where the lowerdir of one overlayfs is the merged
directory of another.  Since commit def3ae83da02 (&amp;#34;fs: store real path
instead of fake path in backing file f_path&amp;#34;) the f_path of a backing
file holds the real path of the intermediate layer, not the path that
the user opened.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Commit 924577e4f6ca (&amp;#34;ovl: Fix nested backing file paths&amp;#34;) fixed this
for such configurations by passing file_user_path() from
ovl_open_realfile().  However, commit 6af36aeb147a (&amp;#34;lsm: add
backing_file LSM hooks&amp;#34;) changed the first argument of
backing_file_open() from the user path back to the user file and
derived the path from user_file-&amp;gt;f_path again, silently re-introducing
the problem.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;As a result, files mapped through a nested overlayfs show the wrong
path in /proc/&amp;lt;pid&amp;gt;/maps and in perf/ftrace mmap records.  For example,
with two nested overlayfs mounts:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;mkdir -p /ovl/{lower,upper,work,merged} /ovl/nested
  echo hello &amp;gt; /ovl/lower/foo
  mount -t overlay overlay \
	-o lowerdir=/ovl/lower,upperdir=/ovl/upper,workdir=/ovl/work \
	/ovl/merged
  # at least two lowerdirs are needed when upperdir is nonexistent
  mount -t overlay overlay \
	-o lowerdir=/ovl/merg…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-89768</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-xv39-4768-vprw</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-xv39-4768-vprw</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;fs: fix user path of nested backing files&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;backing_file_open() derives the path to be stored in the new backing
file from user_file-&amp;gt;f_path.  This is incorrect when user_file itself
is a backing file, which is the case for nested stacking filesystems,
e.g. overlayfs mounts where the lowerdir of one overlayfs is the merged
directory of another.  Since commit def3ae83da02 (&amp;#34;fs: store real path
instead of fake path in backing file f_path&amp;#34;) the f_path of a backing
file holds the real path of the intermediate layer, not the path that
the user opened.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Commit 924577e4f6ca (&amp;#34;ovl: Fix nested backing file paths&amp;#34;) fixed this
for such configurations by passing file_user_path() from
ovl_open_realfile().  However, commit 6af36aeb147a (&amp;#34;lsm: add
backing_file LSM hooks&amp;#34;) changed the first argument of
backing_file_open() from the user path back to the user file and
derived the path from user_file-&amp;gt;f_path again, silently re-introducing
the problem.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;As a result, files mapped through a nested overlayfs show the wrong
path in /proc/&amp;lt;pid&amp;gt;/maps and in perf/ftrace mmap records.  For example,
with two nested overlayfs mounts:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;mkdir -p /ovl/{lower,upper,work,merged} /ovl/nested
  echo hello &amp;gt; /ovl/lower/foo
  mount -t overlay overlay \
	-o lowerdir=/ovl/lower,upperdir=/ovl/upper,workdir=/ovl/work \
	/ovl/merged
  # at least two lowerdirs are needed when upperdir is nonexistent
  mount -t overlay overlay \
	-o lowerdir=/ovl/merg…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;fs: fix user path of nested backing files&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;backing_file_open() derives the path to be stored in the new backing
file from user_file-&amp;gt;f_path.  This is incorrect when user_file itself
is a backing file, which is the case for nested stacking filesystems,
e.g. overlayfs mounts where the lowerdir of one overlayfs is the merged
directory of another.  Since commit def3ae83da02 (&amp;#34;fs: store real path
instead of fake path in backing file f_path&amp;#34;) the f_path of a backing
file holds the real path of the intermediate layer, not the path that
the user opened.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Commit 924577e4f6ca (&amp;#34;ovl: Fix nested backing file paths&amp;#34;) fixed this
for such configurations by passing file_user_path() from
ovl_open_realfile().  However, commit 6af36aeb147a (&amp;#34;lsm: add
backing_file LSM hooks&amp;#34;) changed the first argument of
backing_file_open() from the user path back to the user file and
derived the path from user_file-&amp;gt;f_path again, silently re-introducing
the problem.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;As a result, files mapped through a nested overlayfs show the wrong
path in /proc/&amp;lt;pid&amp;gt;/maps and in perf/ftrace mmap records.  For example,
with two nested overlayfs mounts:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;mkdir -p /ovl/{lower,upper,work,merged} /ovl/nested
  echo hello &amp;gt; /ovl/lower/foo
  mount -t overlay overlay \
	-o lowerdir=/ovl/lower,upperdir=/ovl/upper,workdir=/ovl/work \
	/ovl/merged
  # at least two lowerdirs are needed when upperdir is nonexistent
  mount -t overlay overlay \
	-o lowerdir=/ovl/merg…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-xv39-4768-vprw</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>msrc_CVE-2026-89768 — fs: fix user path of nested backing files</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-89768</link>
      <description>msrc_CVE-2026-89768</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-89768</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>openSUSE-SU-2026:11880-1 — kernel-devel-7.2.7-1.1 on GA media</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11880-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;kernel-devel-7.2.7-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;kernel-devel-7.2.7-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11880-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-89768</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-89768</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 118 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fs: fix user path of nested backing files backing_file_open() derives the path to be stored in the new backing file from user_file-&amp;gt;f_path.  This is incorrect when user_file itself is a backing file, which is the case for nested stacking filesystems, e.g. overlayfs mounts where the lowerdir of one overlayfs is the merged directory of another.  Since commit def3ae83da02 (&amp;#34;fs: store real path instead of fake path in backing file f_path&amp;#34;) the f_path of a backing file holds the real path of the intermediate layer, not the path that the user opened. Commit 924577e4f6ca (&amp;#34;ovl: Fix nested backing file paths&amp;#34;) fixed this for such configurations by passing file_user_path() from ovl_open_realfile().  However, commit 6af36aeb147a (&amp;#34;lsm: add backing_file LSM hooks&amp;#34;) changed the first argument of backing_file_open() from the user path back to the user file and derived the path from user_file-&amp;gt;f_path again, silently re-introducing the problem. As a result, files mapped through a nested overlayfs show the wrong path in /proc/&amp;lt;pid&amp;gt;/maps and in perf/ftrace mmap records.  For example, with two nested overlayfs mounts:   mkdir -p /ovl/{lower,upper,work,merged} /ovl/nested   echo hello &amp;gt; /ovl/lower/foo   mount -t overlay overlay \ 	-o lowerdir=/ovl/lower,upperdir=/ovl/upper,workdir=/ovl/work \ 	/ovl/merged   # at least two lowerdirs are needed when upperdir is nonexistent   mount -t overlay overlay \ 	-o lowerdir=/ovl/merged:/o…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 118 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fs: fix user path of nested backing files backing_file_open() derives the path to be stored in the new backing file from user_file-&amp;gt;f_path.  This is incorrect when user_file itself is a backing file, which is the case for nested stacking filesystems, e.g. overlayfs mounts where the lowerdir of one overlayfs is the merged directory of another.  Since commit def3ae83da02 (&amp;#34;fs: store real path instead of fake path in backing file f_path&amp;#34;) the f_path of a backing file holds the real path of the intermediate layer, not the path that the user opened. Commit 924577e4f6ca (&amp;#34;ovl: Fix nested backing file paths&amp;#34;) fixed this for such configurations by passing file_user_path() from ovl_open_realfile().  However, commit 6af36aeb147a (&amp;#34;lsm: add backing_file LSM hooks&amp;#34;) changed the first argument of backing_file_open() from the user path back to the user file and derived the path from user_file-&amp;gt;f_path again, silently re-introducing the problem. As a result, files mapped through a nested overlayfs show the wrong path in /proc/&amp;lt;pid&amp;gt;/maps and in perf/ftrace mmap records.  For example, with two nested overlayfs mounts:   mkdir -p /ovl/{lower,upper,work,merged} /ovl/nested   echo hello &amp;gt; /ovl/lower/foo   mount -t overlay overlay \ 	-o lowerdir=/ovl/lower,upperdir=/ovl/upper,workdir=/ovl/work \ 	/ovl/merged   # at least two lowerdirs are needed when upperdir is nonexistent   mount -t overlay overlay \ 	-o lowerdir=/ovl/merged:/o…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-89768</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-3321 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-3321</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, Daten oder den Systemzustand zu manipulieren, Denial-of-Service-Zustände herbeizuführen oder andere, nicht näher spezifizierte Angriffe durchzuführen.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, Daten oder den Systemzustand zu manipulieren, Denial-of-Service-Zustände herbeizuführen oder andere, nicht näher spezifizierte Angriffe durchzuführen.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-3321</guid>
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