<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 02 Oct 2026 16:27:00 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BELL-CVE-2026-89766</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-89766</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-89766</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-367045</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-367045</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-367045</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-367045</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-89766</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-89766</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;pidfd: hold exec_update_lock around namespace ioctl&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The PIDFD_GET_*_NAMESPACE ioctls in pidfd_ioctl() perform a filesystem
credentials ptrace access check before handing out a namespace file
descriptor.  The accompanying comment states that the code &amp;#34;mirrors nsfs
behavior&amp;#34;, but, unlike the corresponding procfs paths, it does so without
holding the target task&amp;#39;s exec_update_lock.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;proc_ns_get_link() and proc_ns_readlink() both take exec_update_lock for
reading around the ptrace check and the namespace lookup, so that the
credentials used for the access decision match those of the task when its
namespace is read.  Without it, a caller can pass the check against the
target&amp;#39;s old credentials and then read the namespace after the target has
execve()&amp;#39;d a setuid binary and committed new credentials -- accessing
namespace information it should have been denied.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Hold exec_update_lock for reading around the ptrace check and the
namespace lookup so that pidfd truly mirrors nsfs behavior, as the comment
already claims.  open_namespace() itself runs outside the lock: once a
namespace reference is obtained it carries its own refcount and is opened
with the caller&amp;#39;s own credentials, so a concurrent execve() on the target
can no longer affect the outcome.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;pidfd: hold exec_update_lock around namespace ioctl&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The PIDFD_GET_*_NAMESPACE ioctls in pidfd_ioctl() perform a filesystem
credentials ptrace access check before handing out a namespace file
descriptor.  The accompanying comment states that the code &amp;#34;mirrors nsfs
behavior&amp;#34;, but, unlike the corresponding procfs paths, it does so without
holding the target task&amp;#39;s exec_update_lock.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;proc_ns_get_link() and proc_ns_readlink() both take exec_update_lock for
reading around the ptrace check and the namespace lookup, so that the
credentials used for the access decision match those of the task when its
namespace is read.  Without it, a caller can pass the check against the
target&amp;#39;s old credentials and then read the namespace after the target has
execve()&amp;#39;d a setuid binary and committed new credentials -- accessing
namespace information it should have been denied.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Hold exec_update_lock for reading around the ptrace check and the
namespace lookup so that pidfd truly mirrors nsfs behavior, as the comment
already claims.  open_namespace() itself runs outside the lock: once a
namespace reference is obtained it carries its own refcount and is opened
with the caller&amp;#39;s own credentials, so a concurrent execve() on the target
can no longer affect the outcome.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-89766</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-7f3v-362v-5m4g</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-7f3v-362v-5m4g</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;pidfd: hold exec_update_lock around namespace ioctl&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The PIDFD_GET_*_NAMESPACE ioctls in pidfd_ioctl() perform a filesystem
credentials ptrace access check before handing out a namespace file
descriptor.  The accompanying comment states that the code &amp;#34;mirrors nsfs
behavior&amp;#34;, but, unlike the corresponding procfs paths, it does so without
holding the target task&amp;#39;s exec_update_lock.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;proc_ns_get_link() and proc_ns_readlink() both take exec_update_lock for
reading around the ptrace check and the namespace lookup, so that the
credentials used for the access decision match those of the task when its
namespace is read.  Without it, a caller can pass the check against the
target&amp;#39;s old credentials and then read the namespace after the target has
execve()&amp;#39;d a setuid binary and committed new credentials -- accessing
namespace information it should have been denied.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Hold exec_update_lock for reading around the ptrace check and the
namespace lookup so that pidfd truly mirrors nsfs behavior, as the comment
already claims.  open_namespace() itself runs outside the lock: once a
namespace reference is obtained it carries its own refcount and is opened
with the caller&amp;#39;s own credentials, so a concurrent execve() on the target
can no longer affect the outcome.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;pidfd: hold exec_update_lock around namespace ioctl&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The PIDFD_GET_*_NAMESPACE ioctls in pidfd_ioctl() perform a filesystem
credentials ptrace access check before handing out a namespace file
descriptor.  The accompanying comment states that the code &amp;#34;mirrors nsfs
behavior&amp;#34;, but, unlike the corresponding procfs paths, it does so without
holding the target task&amp;#39;s exec_update_lock.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;proc_ns_get_link() and proc_ns_readlink() both take exec_update_lock for
reading around the ptrace check and the namespace lookup, so that the
credentials used for the access decision match those of the task when its
namespace is read.  Without it, a caller can pass the check against the
target&amp;#39;s old credentials and then read the namespace after the target has
execve()&amp;#39;d a setuid binary and committed new credentials -- accessing
namespace information it should have been denied.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Hold exec_update_lock for reading around the ptrace check and the
namespace lookup so that pidfd truly mirrors nsfs behavior, as the comment
already claims.  open_namespace() itself runs outside the lock: once a
namespace reference is obtained it carries its own refcount and is opened
with the caller&amp;#39;s own credentials, so a concurrent execve() on the target
can no longer affect the outcome.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-7f3v-362v-5m4g</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>openSUSE-SU-2026:11880-1 — kernel-devel-7.2.7-1.1 on GA media</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11880-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;kernel-devel-7.2.7-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;kernel-devel-7.2.7-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11880-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-89766</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-89766</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 120 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: pidfd: hold exec_update_lock around namespace ioctl The PIDFD_GET_*_NAMESPACE ioctls in pidfd_ioctl() perform a filesystem credentials ptrace access check before handing out a namespace file descriptor.  The accompanying comment states that the code &amp;#34;mirrors nsfs behavior&amp;#34;, but, unlike the corresponding procfs paths, it does so without holding the target task&amp;#39;s exec_update_lock. proc_ns_get_link() and proc_ns_readlink() both take exec_update_lock for reading around the ptrace check and the namespace lookup, so that the credentials used for the access decision match those of the task when its namespace is read.  Without it, a caller can pass the check against the target&amp;#39;s old credentials and then read the namespace after the target has execve()&amp;#39;d a setuid binary and committed new credentials -- accessing namespace information it should have been denied. Hold exec_update_lock for reading around the ptrace check and the namespace lookup so that pidfd truly mirrors nsfs behavior, as the comment already claims.  open_namespace() itself runs outside the lock: once a namespace reference is obtained it carries its own refcount and is opened with the caller&amp;#39;s own credentials, so a concurrent execve() on the target can no longer affect the outcome.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 120 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: pidfd: hold exec_update_lock around namespace ioctl The PIDFD_GET_*_NAMESPACE ioctls in pidfd_ioctl() perform a filesystem credentials ptrace access check before handing out a namespace file descriptor.  The accompanying comment states that the code &amp;#34;mirrors nsfs behavior&amp;#34;, but, unlike the corresponding procfs paths, it does so without holding the target task&amp;#39;s exec_update_lock. proc_ns_get_link() and proc_ns_readlink() both take exec_update_lock for reading around the ptrace check and the namespace lookup, so that the credentials used for the access decision match those of the task when its namespace is read.  Without it, a caller can pass the check against the target&amp;#39;s old credentials and then read the namespace after the target has execve()&amp;#39;d a setuid binary and committed new credentials -- accessing namespace information it should have been denied. Hold exec_update_lock for reading around the ptrace check and the namespace lookup so that pidfd truly mirrors nsfs behavior, as the comment already claims.  open_namespace() itself runs outside the lock: once a namespace reference is obtained it carries its own refcount and is opened with the caller&amp;#39;s own credentials, so a concurrent execve() on the target can no longer affect the outcome.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-89766</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-3321 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-3321</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, Daten oder den Systemzustand zu manipulieren, Denial-of-Service-Zustände herbeizuführen oder andere, nicht näher spezifizierte Angriffe durchzuführen.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, Daten oder den Systemzustand zu manipulieren, Denial-of-Service-Zustände herbeizuführen oder andere, nicht näher spezifizierte Angriffe durchzuführen.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-3321</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
