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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 02 Oct 2026 17:49:19 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BELL-CVE-2026-89763</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-89763</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-89763</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>certfr-2026-avi-1253 — De multiples vulnérabilités ont été découvertes dans le noyau Linux de Debian. Certaines d'entre elles permettent à un…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1253</link>
      <description>certfr-2026-avi-1253</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1253</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-372857</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-372857</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-372857</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-372857</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-89763</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-89763</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;KEYS: trusted: Fix TPM teardown ordering&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;trusted_tpm_exit() drops the TPM chip reference and frees the digest
array before unregistering the trusted key type. key_type_lookup()
holds key_types_sem for reading until the key operation finishes, while
unregister_key_type() takes it for writing. It therefore provides the
synchronization point that must precede backend teardown.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The current order permits this interleaving:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;CPU 0                              CPU 1
  trusted_tpm_exit()                 key_type_lookup(&amp;#34;trusted&amp;#34;)
    put_device(&amp;amp;chip-&amp;gt;dev)             trusted_tpm_seal()
    kfree(digests)                       pcrlock()
    unregister_key_type()                  tpm_pcr_extend(..., digests)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;CPU 1 can consequently dereference the freed digest array. The chip can
also be released before callbacks stop using it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;KASAN reported:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in tpm_pcr_extend+0x1f0/0x200
  Read of size 2 at addr ffff88810872d000 by task poc/89
  Call Trace:
    tpm_pcr_extend+0x1f0/0x200
    pcrlock+0x42/0x70 [trusted]
    trusted_tpm_seal+0x1b6/0x570 [trusted]
    trusted_instantiate+0x293/0x340 [trusted]
    __key_instantiate_and_link+0xb2/0x2b0
    __key_create_or_update+0x61e/0xb50
    __do_sys_add_key+0x1b8/0x310
  Allocated by task 88:
    __kmalloc_noprof+0x1a7/0x490
    do_one_initcall+0xa1/0x390
    do_init_module+0x2df/0x840
  Freed by task 90:
    kfree+0x131/0x3c0
    trusted_tpm…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;KEYS: trusted: Fix TPM teardown ordering&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;trusted_tpm_exit() drops the TPM chip reference and frees the digest
array before unregistering the trusted key type. key_type_lookup()
holds key_types_sem for reading until the key operation finishes, while
unregister_key_type() takes it for writing. It therefore provides the
synchronization point that must precede backend teardown.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The current order permits this interleaving:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;CPU 0                              CPU 1
  trusted_tpm_exit()                 key_type_lookup(&amp;#34;trusted&amp;#34;)
    put_device(&amp;amp;chip-&amp;gt;dev)             trusted_tpm_seal()
    kfree(digests)                       pcrlock()
    unregister_key_type()                  tpm_pcr_extend(..., digests)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;CPU 1 can consequently dereference the freed digest array. The chip can
also be released before callbacks stop using it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;KASAN reported:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in tpm_pcr_extend+0x1f0/0x200
  Read of size 2 at addr ffff88810872d000 by task poc/89
  Call Trace:
    tpm_pcr_extend+0x1f0/0x200
    pcrlock+0x42/0x70 [trusted]
    trusted_tpm_seal+0x1b6/0x570 [trusted]
    trusted_instantiate+0x293/0x340 [trusted]
    __key_instantiate_and_link+0xb2/0x2b0
    __key_create_or_update+0x61e/0xb50
    __do_sys_add_key+0x1b8/0x310
  Allocated by task 88:
    __kmalloc_noprof+0x1a7/0x490
    do_one_initcall+0xa1/0x390
    do_init_module+0x2df/0x840
  Freed by task 90:
    kfree+0x131/0x3c0
    trusted_tpm…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-89763</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-wv58-h966-qv76</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-wv58-h966-qv76</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;KEYS: trusted: Fix TPM teardown ordering&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;trusted_tpm_exit() drops the TPM chip reference and frees the digest
array before unregistering the trusted key type. key_type_lookup()
holds key_types_sem for reading until the key operation finishes, while
unregister_key_type() takes it for writing. It therefore provides the
synchronization point that must precede backend teardown.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The current order permits this interleaving:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;CPU 0                              CPU 1
  trusted_tpm_exit()                 key_type_lookup(&amp;#34;trusted&amp;#34;)
    put_device(&amp;amp;chip-&amp;gt;dev)             trusted_tpm_seal()
    kfree(digests)                       pcrlock()
    unregister_key_type()                  tpm_pcr_extend(..., digests)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;CPU 1 can consequently dereference the freed digest array. The chip can
also be released before callbacks stop using it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;KASAN reported:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in tpm_pcr_extend+0x1f0/0x200
  Read of size 2 at addr ffff88810872d000 by task poc/89
  Call Trace:
    tpm_pcr_extend+0x1f0/0x200
    pcrlock+0x42/0x70 [trusted]
    trusted_tpm_seal+0x1b6/0x570 [trusted]
    trusted_instantiate+0x293/0x340 [trusted]
    __key_instantiate_and_link+0xb2/0x2b0
    __key_create_or_update+0x61e/0xb50
    __do_sys_add_key+0x1b8/0x310
  Allocated by task 88:
    __kmalloc_noprof+0x1a7/0x490
    do_one_initcall+0xa1/0x390
    do_init_module+0x2df/0x840
  Freed by task 90:
    kfree+0x131/0x3c0
    trusted_tpm…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;KEYS: trusted: Fix TPM teardown ordering&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;trusted_tpm_exit() drops the TPM chip reference and frees the digest
array before unregistering the trusted key type. key_type_lookup()
holds key_types_sem for reading until the key operation finishes, while
unregister_key_type() takes it for writing. It therefore provides the
synchronization point that must precede backend teardown.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The current order permits this interleaving:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;CPU 0                              CPU 1
  trusted_tpm_exit()                 key_type_lookup(&amp;#34;trusted&amp;#34;)
    put_device(&amp;amp;chip-&amp;gt;dev)             trusted_tpm_seal()
    kfree(digests)                       pcrlock()
    unregister_key_type()                  tpm_pcr_extend(..., digests)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;CPU 1 can consequently dereference the freed digest array. The chip can
also be released before callbacks stop using it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;KASAN reported:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in tpm_pcr_extend+0x1f0/0x200
  Read of size 2 at addr ffff88810872d000 by task poc/89
  Call Trace:
    tpm_pcr_extend+0x1f0/0x200
    pcrlock+0x42/0x70 [trusted]
    trusted_tpm_seal+0x1b6/0x570 [trusted]
    trusted_instantiate+0x293/0x340 [trusted]
    __key_instantiate_and_link+0xb2/0x2b0
    __key_create_or_update+0x61e/0xb50
    __do_sys_add_key+0x1b8/0x310
  Allocated by task 88:
    __kmalloc_noprof+0x1a7/0x490
    do_one_initcall+0xa1/0x390
    do_init_module+0x2df/0x840
  Freed by task 90:
    kfree+0x131/0x3c0
    trusted_tpm…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-wv58-h966-qv76</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>OESA-2026-4185 — kernel security update</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/oesa-2026-4185</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP4: kernel&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.&#13;
&#13;
Security Fix(es):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;netfilter: ipset: fix race between dump and ip_set_list resize&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The release path of ip_set_dump_do() and ip_set_dump_done() read
inst-&amp;amp;gt;ip_set_list via ip_set_ref_netlink(), a plain rcu_dereference_raw()
of the array pointer. These run from netlink_recvmsg() without the nfnl
mutex and without an RCU read-side critical section.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A concurrent ip_set_create() can grow the array: it publishes the new
array, calls synchronize_net() and then kvfree()s the old one. Since the
dump paths read the array outside any RCU reader, synchronize_net() does
not wait for them and the old array can be freed while they still index
into it, causing a use-after-free.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The dumped set itself stays pinned via set-&amp;amp;gt;ref_netlink, so only the
array load needs protecting. Take rcu_read_lock() around it, matching
ip_set_get_byname() and __ip_set_put_byindex().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ip_set_dump_do (net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_core.c:1697)
  Read of size 8 at addr ffff88800b5c4018 by task exploit/150
  Call Trace:
   ...
   kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:595)
   ip_set_dump_do (net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_core.c:1697)
   netlink_dump (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2325)
   netlink_recvmsg (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1976)
   sock_recvmsg (net/socket.c:1159)
   __sys_recvfrom (net/socket.c:2315)
   ...
  Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-can…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP4: kernel&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.&#13;
&#13;
Security Fix(es):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;netfilter: ipset: fix race between dump and ip_set_list resize&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The release path of ip_set_dump_do() and ip_set_dump_done() read
inst-&amp;amp;gt;ip_set_list via ip_set_ref_netlink(), a plain rcu_dereference_raw()
of the array pointer. These run from netlink_recvmsg() without the nfnl
mutex and without an RCU read-side critical section.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A concurrent ip_set_create() can grow the array: it publishes the new
array, calls synchronize_net() and then kvfree()s the old one. Since the
dump paths read the array outside any RCU reader, synchronize_net() does
not wait for them and the old array can be freed while they still index
into it, causing a use-after-free.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The dumped set itself stays pinned via set-&amp;amp;gt;ref_netlink, so only the
array load needs protecting. Take rcu_read_lock() around it, matching
ip_set_get_byname() and __ip_set_put_byindex().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ip_set_dump_do (net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_core.c:1697)
  Read of size 8 at addr ffff88800b5c4018 by task exploit/150
  Call Trace:
   ...
   kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:595)
   ip_set_dump_do (net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_core.c:1697)
   netlink_dump (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2325)
   netlink_recvmsg (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1976)
   sock_recvmsg (net/socket.c:1159)
   __sys_recvfrom (net/socket.c:2315)
   ...
  Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-can…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/oesa-2026-4185</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>openSUSE-SU-2026:11880-1 — kernel-devel-7.2.7-1.1 on GA media</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11880-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;kernel-devel-7.2.7-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;kernel-devel-7.2.7-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11880-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-89763</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-89763</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.4, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.4, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3 and 219 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KEYS: trusted: Fix TPM teardown ordering trusted_tpm_exit() drops the TPM chip reference and frees the digest array before unregistering the trusted key type. key_type_lookup() holds key_types_sem for reading until the key operation finishes, while unregister_key_type() takes it for writing. It therefore provides the synchronization point that must precede backend teardown. The current order permits this interleaving:   CPU 0                              CPU 1   trusted_tpm_exit()                 key_type_lookup(&amp;#34;trusted&amp;#34;)     put_device(&amp;amp;chip-&amp;gt;dev)             trusted_tpm_seal()     kfree(digests)                       pcrlock()     unregister_key_type()                  tpm_pcr_extend(..., digests) CPU 1 can consequently dereference the freed digest array. The chip can also be released before callbacks stop using it. KASAN reported:   BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in tpm_pcr_extend+0x1f0/0x200   Read of size 2 at addr ffff88810872d000 by task poc/89   Call Trace:     tpm_pcr_extend+0x1f0/0x200     pcrlock+0x42/0x70 [trusted]     trusted_tpm_seal+0x1b6/0x570 [trusted]     trusted_instantiate+0x293/0x340 [trusted]     __key_instantiate_and_link+0xb2/0x2b0     __key_create_or_update+0x61e/0xb50     __do_sys_add_key+0x1b8/0x310   Allocated by task 88:     __kmalloc_noprof+0x1a7/0x490     do_one_initcall+0xa1/0x390     do_init_module+0x2df/0x840   Freed by task 90:     kfree+0x131/0x3c0     trusted_tpm_exit+0…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.4, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.4, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3 and 219 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KEYS: trusted: Fix TPM teardown ordering trusted_tpm_exit() drops the TPM chip reference and frees the digest array before unregistering the trusted key type. key_type_lookup() holds key_types_sem for reading until the key operation finishes, while unregister_key_type() takes it for writing. It therefore provides the synchronization point that must precede backend teardown. The current order permits this interleaving:   CPU 0                              CPU 1   trusted_tpm_exit()                 key_type_lookup(&amp;#34;trusted&amp;#34;)     put_device(&amp;amp;chip-&amp;gt;dev)             trusted_tpm_seal()     kfree(digests)                       pcrlock()     unregister_key_type()                  tpm_pcr_extend(..., digests) CPU 1 can consequently dereference the freed digest array. The chip can also be released before callbacks stop using it. KASAN reported:   BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in tpm_pcr_extend+0x1f0/0x200   Read of size 2 at addr ffff88810872d000 by task poc/89   Call Trace:     tpm_pcr_extend+0x1f0/0x200     pcrlock+0x42/0x70 [trusted]     trusted_tpm_seal+0x1b6/0x570 [trusted]     trusted_instantiate+0x293/0x340 [trusted]     __key_instantiate_and_link+0xb2/0x2b0     __key_create_or_update+0x61e/0xb50     __do_sys_add_key+0x1b8/0x310   Allocated by task 88:     __kmalloc_noprof+0x1a7/0x490     do_one_initcall+0xa1/0x390     do_init_module+0x2df/0x840   Freed by task 90:     kfree+0x131/0x3c0     trusted_tpm_exit+0…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-89763</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-3321 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-3321</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, Daten oder den Systemzustand zu manipulieren, Denial-of-Service-Zustände herbeizuführen oder andere, nicht näher spezifizierte Angriffe durchzuführen.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, Daten oder den Systemzustand zu manipulieren, Denial-of-Service-Zustände herbeizuführen oder andere, nicht näher spezifizierte Angriffe durchzuführen.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-3321</guid>
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