https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Sat, 03 Oct 2026 01:42:42 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-89634 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-89634 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1253 certfr-2026-avi-1253 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1253 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-367669 EUVD-2026-367669 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-367669 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-89634 <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>smb: client: fix ALIGN() overflow in symlink_data() error context loop</p> <p>The check added by commit 7d9a7f1f96cd (&#34;smb/client: fix possible infinite loop and oob read in symlink_data()&#34;) compared the post-ALIGN length against the remaining buffer, but ALIGN() itself can overflow: for ErrorDataLength near UINT32_MAX (e.g. 0xFFFFFFF9), ALIGN(x, 8) wraps to 0, so the subsequent bounds check passes, and the loop advances by zero bytes leaving &#39;p&#39; pointing into stale data.</p> <p>Fix by checking the raw ErrorDataLength against the remaining space before applying ALIGN(), then checking again after. Since raw_len is bounded by the buffer, raw_len + 7 cannot overflow, so the second check is an exact post-alignment bounds guard.</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>smb: client: fix ALIGN() overflow in symlink_data() error context loop</p> <p>The check added by commit 7d9a7f1f96cd (&#34;smb/client: fix possible infinite loop and oob read in symlink_data()&#34;) compared the post-ALIGN length against the remaining buffer, but ALIGN() itself can overflow: for ErrorDataLength near UINT32_MAX (e.g. 0xFFFFFFF9), ALIGN(x, 8) wraps to 0, so the subsequent bounds check passes, and the loop advances by zero bytes leaving &#39;p&#39; pointing into stale data.</p> <p>Fix by checking the raw ErrorDataLength against the remaining space before applying ALIGN(), then checking again after. Since raw_len is bounded by the buffer, raw_len + 7 cannot overflow, so the second check is an exact post-alignment bounds guard.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-89634 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-959h-4fxq-gqhj <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>smb: client: fix ALIGN() overflow in symlink_data() error context loop</p> <p>The check added by commit 7d9a7f1f96cd (&#34;smb/client: fix possible infinite loop and oob read in symlink_data()&#34;) compared the post-ALIGN length against the remaining buffer, but ALIGN() itself can overflow: for ErrorDataLength near UINT32_MAX (e.g. 0xFFFFFFF9), ALIGN(x, 8) wraps to 0, so the subsequent bounds check passes, and the loop advances by zero bytes leaving &#39;p&#39; pointing into stale data.</p> <p>Fix by checking the raw ErrorDataLength against the remaining space before applying ALIGN(), then checking again after. Since raw_len is bounded by the buffer, raw_len + 7 cannot overflow, so the second check is an exact post-alignment bounds guard.</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>smb: client: fix ALIGN() overflow in symlink_data() error context loop</p> <p>The check added by commit 7d9a7f1f96cd (&#34;smb/client: fix possible infinite loop and oob read in symlink_data()&#34;) compared the post-ALIGN length against the remaining buffer, but ALIGN() itself can overflow: for ErrorDataLength near UINT32_MAX (e.g. 0xFFFFFFF9), ALIGN(x, 8) wraps to 0, so the subsequent bounds check passes, and the loop advances by zero bytes leaving &#39;p&#39; pointing into stale data.</p> <p>Fix by checking the raw ErrorDataLength against the remaining space before applying ALIGN(), then checking again after. Since raw_len is bounded by the buffer, raw_len + 7 cannot overflow, so the second check is an exact post-alignment bounds guard.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-959h-4fxq-gqhj https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11880-1 <p>kernel-devel-7.2.7-1.1 on GA media</p> <p>kernel-devel-7.2.7-1.1 on GA media</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11880-1 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-89634 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 160 more</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: fix ALIGN() overflow in symlink_data() error context loop The check added by commit 7d9a7f1f96cd (&#34;smb/client: fix possible infinite loop and oob read in symlink_data()&#34;) compared the post-ALIGN length against the remaining buffer, but ALIGN() itself can overflow: for ErrorDataLength near UINT32_MAX (e.g. 0xFFFFFFF9), ALIGN(x, 8) wraps to 0, so the subsequent bounds check passes, and the loop advances by zero bytes leaving &#39;p&#39; pointing into stale data. Fix by checking the raw ErrorDataLength against the remaining space before applying ALIGN(), then checking again after. Since raw_len is bounded by the buffer, raw_len + 7 cannot overflow, so the second check is an exact post-alignment bounds guard.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 160 more</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: fix ALIGN() overflow in symlink_data() error context loop The check added by commit 7d9a7f1f96cd (&#34;smb/client: fix possible infinite loop and oob read in symlink_data()&#34;) compared the post-ALIGN length against the remaining buffer, but ALIGN() itself can overflow: for ErrorDataLength near UINT32_MAX (e.g. 0xFFFFFFF9), ALIGN(x, 8) wraps to 0, so the subsequent bounds check passes, and the loop advances by zero bytes leaving &#39;p&#39; pointing into stale data. Fix by checking the raw ErrorDataLength against the remaining space before applying ALIGN(), then checking again after. Since raw_len is bounded by the buffer, raw_len + 7 cannot overflow, so the second check is an exact post-alignment bounds guard.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-89634 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-3321 <p>Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, Daten oder den Systemzustand zu manipulieren, Denial-of-Service-Zustände herbeizuführen oder andere, nicht näher spezifizierte Angriffe durchzuführen.</p> <p>Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, Daten oder den Systemzustand zu manipulieren, Denial-of-Service-Zustände herbeizuführen oder andere, nicht näher spezifizierte Angriffe durchzuführen.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-3321