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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sat, 03 Oct 2026 10:53:39 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BELL-CVE-2026-89540</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-89540</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-89540</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>certfr-2026-avi-1253 — De multiples vulnérabilités ont été découvertes dans le noyau Linux de Debian. Certaines d'entre elles permettent à un…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1253</link>
      <description>certfr-2026-avi-1253</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1253</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-367619</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-367619</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-367619</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-367619</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-89540</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-89540</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;sunrpc: init gssp_lock before publishing proc entry&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;create_use_gss_proxy_proc_entry() publishes /proc/net/rpc/use-gss-proxy
via proc_create_data() before init_gssp_clnt() runs mutex_init() on
sn-&amp;gt;gssp_lock.  Once the dentry is linked under proc_subdir_lock it is
immediately reachable from userspace, so a write that lands in the
window drives set_gssp_clnt() into mutex_lock() on a zero-initialized
struct mutex.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;create_use_gss_proxy_proc_entry(net)
      proc_create_data(&amp;#34;use-gss-proxy&amp;#34;, ...)   /* dentry live */
      init_gssp_clnt(sn)
        mutex_init(&amp;amp;sn-&amp;gt;gssp_lock)             /* too late */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;write_gssp()
      set_gssp_clnt(net)
        mutex_lock(&amp;amp;sn-&amp;gt;gssp_lock)             /* uninitialized */
        gssp_rpc_create(...)
        sn-&amp;gt;gssp_clnt = clnt
        mutex_unlock(&amp;amp;sn-&amp;gt;gssp_lock)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The window spans only the two statements between proc_create_data()
returning and init_gssp_clnt(), so a writer reaches it only if the
registering thread is preempted there while another task is already
opening the freshly published file.  register_pernet_subsys() runs in
preemptible context under pernet_ops_rwsem, so that preemption is
possible, and the window widens on auth_rpcgss module load, when the
proc entry is created for every live net namespace whose tasks are
already running.  A writer that wins the race locks a zero-filled
struct mutex.  On CONFIG_DEBUG_MUTEXES the missing magic value trips a
&amp;#34;lo…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;sunrpc: init gssp_lock before publishing proc entry&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;create_use_gss_proxy_proc_entry() publishes /proc/net/rpc/use-gss-proxy
via proc_create_data() before init_gssp_clnt() runs mutex_init() on
sn-&amp;gt;gssp_lock.  Once the dentry is linked under proc_subdir_lock it is
immediately reachable from userspace, so a write that lands in the
window drives set_gssp_clnt() into mutex_lock() on a zero-initialized
struct mutex.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;create_use_gss_proxy_proc_entry(net)
      proc_create_data(&amp;#34;use-gss-proxy&amp;#34;, ...)   /* dentry live */
      init_gssp_clnt(sn)
        mutex_init(&amp;amp;sn-&amp;gt;gssp_lock)             /* too late */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;write_gssp()
      set_gssp_clnt(net)
        mutex_lock(&amp;amp;sn-&amp;gt;gssp_lock)             /* uninitialized */
        gssp_rpc_create(...)
        sn-&amp;gt;gssp_clnt = clnt
        mutex_unlock(&amp;amp;sn-&amp;gt;gssp_lock)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The window spans only the two statements between proc_create_data()
returning and init_gssp_clnt(), so a writer reaches it only if the
registering thread is preempted there while another task is already
opening the freshly published file.  register_pernet_subsys() runs in
preemptible context under pernet_ops_rwsem, so that preemption is
possible, and the window widens on auth_rpcgss module load, when the
proc entry is created for every live net namespace whose tasks are
already running.  A writer that wins the race locks a zero-filled
struct mutex.  On CONFIG_DEBUG_MUTEXES the missing magic value trips a
&amp;#34;lo…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-89540</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-gwh2-5395-p8p6</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-gwh2-5395-p8p6</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;sunrpc: init gssp_lock before publishing proc entry&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;create_use_gss_proxy_proc_entry() publishes /proc/net/rpc/use-gss-proxy
via proc_create_data() before init_gssp_clnt() runs mutex_init() on
sn-&amp;gt;gssp_lock.  Once the dentry is linked under proc_subdir_lock it is
immediately reachable from userspace, so a write that lands in the
window drives set_gssp_clnt() into mutex_lock() on a zero-initialized
struct mutex.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;create_use_gss_proxy_proc_entry(net)
      proc_create_data(&amp;#34;use-gss-proxy&amp;#34;, ...)   /* dentry live */
      init_gssp_clnt(sn)
        mutex_init(&amp;amp;sn-&amp;gt;gssp_lock)             /* too late */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;write_gssp()
      set_gssp_clnt(net)
        mutex_lock(&amp;amp;sn-&amp;gt;gssp_lock)             /* uninitialized */
        gssp_rpc_create(...)
        sn-&amp;gt;gssp_clnt = clnt
        mutex_unlock(&amp;amp;sn-&amp;gt;gssp_lock)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The window spans only the two statements between proc_create_data()
returning and init_gssp_clnt(), so a writer reaches it only if the
registering thread is preempted there while another task is already
opening the freshly published file.  register_pernet_subsys() runs in
preemptible context under pernet_ops_rwsem, so that preemption is
possible, and the window widens on auth_rpcgss module load, when the
proc entry is created for every live net namespace whose tasks are
already running.  A writer that wins the race locks a zero-filled
struct mutex.  On CONFIG_DEBUG_MUTEXES the missing magic value trips a
&amp;#34;lo…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;sunrpc: init gssp_lock before publishing proc entry&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;create_use_gss_proxy_proc_entry() publishes /proc/net/rpc/use-gss-proxy
via proc_create_data() before init_gssp_clnt() runs mutex_init() on
sn-&amp;gt;gssp_lock.  Once the dentry is linked under proc_subdir_lock it is
immediately reachable from userspace, so a write that lands in the
window drives set_gssp_clnt() into mutex_lock() on a zero-initialized
struct mutex.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;create_use_gss_proxy_proc_entry(net)
      proc_create_data(&amp;#34;use-gss-proxy&amp;#34;, ...)   /* dentry live */
      init_gssp_clnt(sn)
        mutex_init(&amp;amp;sn-&amp;gt;gssp_lock)             /* too late */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;write_gssp()
      set_gssp_clnt(net)
        mutex_lock(&amp;amp;sn-&amp;gt;gssp_lock)             /* uninitialized */
        gssp_rpc_create(...)
        sn-&amp;gt;gssp_clnt = clnt
        mutex_unlock(&amp;amp;sn-&amp;gt;gssp_lock)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The window spans only the two statements between proc_create_data()
returning and init_gssp_clnt(), so a writer reaches it only if the
registering thread is preempted there while another task is already
opening the freshly published file.  register_pernet_subsys() runs in
preemptible context under pernet_ops_rwsem, so that preemption is
possible, and the window widens on auth_rpcgss module load, when the
proc entry is created for every live net namespace whose tasks are
already running.  A writer that wins the race locks a zero-filled
struct mutex.  On CONFIG_DEBUG_MUTEXES the missing magic value trips a
&amp;#34;lo…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-gwh2-5395-p8p6</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>msrc_CVE-2026-89540 — sunrpc: init gssp_lock before publishing proc entry</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-89540</link>
      <description>msrc_CVE-2026-89540</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-89540</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>openSUSE-SU-2026:11880-1 — kernel-devel-7.2.7-1.1 on GA media</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11880-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;kernel-devel-7.2.7-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;kernel-devel-7.2.7-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11880-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-89540</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-89540</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 246 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sunrpc: init gssp_lock before publishing proc entry create_use_gss_proxy_proc_entry() publishes /proc/net/rpc/use-gss-proxy via proc_create_data() before init_gssp_clnt() runs mutex_init() on sn-&amp;gt;gssp_lock.  Once the dentry is linked under proc_subdir_lock it is immediately reachable from userspace, so a write that lands in the window drives set_gssp_clnt() into mutex_lock() on a zero-initialized struct mutex.     create_use_gss_proxy_proc_entry(net)       proc_create_data(&amp;#34;use-gss-proxy&amp;#34;, ...)   /* dentry live */       init_gssp_clnt(sn)         mutex_init(&amp;amp;sn-&amp;gt;gssp_lock)             /* too late */     write_gssp()       set_gssp_clnt(net)         mutex_lock(&amp;amp;sn-&amp;gt;gssp_lock)             /* uninitialized */         gssp_rpc_create(...)         sn-&amp;gt;gssp_clnt = clnt         mutex_unlock(&amp;amp;sn-&amp;gt;gssp_lock) The window spans only the two statements between proc_create_data() returning and init_gssp_clnt(), so a writer reaches it only if the registering thread is preempted there while another task is already opening the freshly published file.  register_pernet_subsys() runs in preemptible context under pernet_ops_rwsem, so that preemption is possible, and the window widens on auth_rpcgss module load, when the proc entry is created for every live net namespace whose tasks are already running.  A writer that wins the race locks a zero-filled struct mutex.  On CONFIG_DEBUG_MUTEXES the missing magic value trips a &amp;#34;lock us…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 246 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sunrpc: init gssp_lock before publishing proc entry create_use_gss_proxy_proc_entry() publishes /proc/net/rpc/use-gss-proxy via proc_create_data() before init_gssp_clnt() runs mutex_init() on sn-&amp;gt;gssp_lock.  Once the dentry is linked under proc_subdir_lock it is immediately reachable from userspace, so a write that lands in the window drives set_gssp_clnt() into mutex_lock() on a zero-initialized struct mutex.     create_use_gss_proxy_proc_entry(net)       proc_create_data(&amp;#34;use-gss-proxy&amp;#34;, ...)   /* dentry live */       init_gssp_clnt(sn)         mutex_init(&amp;amp;sn-&amp;gt;gssp_lock)             /* too late */     write_gssp()       set_gssp_clnt(net)         mutex_lock(&amp;amp;sn-&amp;gt;gssp_lock)             /* uninitialized */         gssp_rpc_create(...)         sn-&amp;gt;gssp_clnt = clnt         mutex_unlock(&amp;amp;sn-&amp;gt;gssp_lock) The window spans only the two statements between proc_create_data() returning and init_gssp_clnt(), so a writer reaches it only if the registering thread is preempted there while another task is already opening the freshly published file.  register_pernet_subsys() runs in preemptible context under pernet_ops_rwsem, so that preemption is possible, and the window widens on auth_rpcgss module load, when the proc entry is created for every live net namespace whose tasks are already running.  A writer that wins the race locks a zero-filled struct mutex.  On CONFIG_DEBUG_MUTEXES the missing magic value trips a &amp;#34;lock us…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-89540</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-3321 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-3321</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, Daten oder den Systemzustand zu manipulieren, Denial-of-Service-Zustände herbeizuführen oder andere, nicht näher spezifizierte Angriffe durchzuführen.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, Daten oder den Systemzustand zu manipulieren, Denial-of-Service-Zustände herbeizuführen oder andere, nicht näher spezifizierte Angriffe durchzuführen.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-3321</guid>
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