https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Fri, 02 Oct 2026 18:35:16 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-366541 EUVD-2026-366541 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-366541 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-87995 <p>Open WebUI is an extensible, feature-rich, and user-friendly self-hosted AI platform. From 0.8.11 until 0.11.1, src/lib/components/chat/FileNav/PortPreview.svelte rendered terminal port content in an iframe sandbox containing both allow-scripts and allow-same-origin. Because the terminal proxy serves that content from the Open WebUI origin, an authenticated user with access to a shared terminal server could host script on a previewed port and take over a victim&#39;s account when the victim opened the preview. This issue is fixed in version 0.11.1.</p> <p>Open WebUI is an extensible, feature-rich, and user-friendly self-hosted AI platform. From 0.8.11 until 0.11.1, src/lib/components/chat/FileNav/PortPreview.svelte rendered terminal port content in an iframe sandbox containing both allow-scripts and allow-same-origin. Because the terminal proxy serves that content from the Open WebUI origin, an authenticated user with access to a shared terminal server could host script on a previewed port and take over a victim&#39;s account when the victim opened the preview. This issue is fixed in version 0.11.1.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-87995 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-jmc6-2wr8-h3wj <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: open-webui</p> <p>## Summary Any authenticated user with access to a shared terminal server could get script of their choosing to run in the Open WebUI origin itself. The in-app port preview rendered the content of a previewed port in an iframe whose sandbox always granted `allow-same-origin` alongside `allow-scripts`, and that content is served from a path on the application&#39;s own origin, so the sandbox provided no isolation at all. Script served on a previewed port could read the victim&#39;s session token and take over the account.</p> <p>## Preconditions - At least one terminal server configured by an admin (`TERMINAL_SERVER_CONNECTIONS`, empty by default) and reachable by both the attacker and the victim. Deployments with no terminal server configured are not affected. - The attacker needs a normal authenticated account with access to that terminal connection, no admin rights, plus the ability to start a process listening on a port there. - Personal terminals a user configures for themselves are not affected. Those carry an external URL, so the previewed document is cross-origin and the sandbox held. - The victim has to open the port list and click the attacker&#39;s port. - `TERMINAL_PROXY_HEADERS` unset and no `CONTENT_SECURITY_POLICY` set, which are the defaults. An operator who had already set a restrictive Content-Security-Policy through either was not exposed, since those headers apply to the proxied response. - The `iframeSandboxAllowSameOrigin` user setting is off by default, but the affected…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: open-webui</p> <p>## Summary Any authenticated user with access to a shared terminal server could get script of their choosing to run in the Open WebUI origin itself. The in-app port preview rendered the content of a previewed port in an iframe whose sandbox always granted `allow-same-origin` alongside `allow-scripts`, and that content is served from a path on the application&#39;s own origin, so the sandbox provided no isolation at all. Script served on a previewed port could read the victim&#39;s session token and take over the account.</p> <p>## Preconditions - At least one terminal server configured by an admin (`TERMINAL_SERVER_CONNECTIONS`, empty by default) and reachable by both the attacker and the victim. Deployments with no terminal server configured are not affected. - The attacker needs a normal authenticated account with access to that terminal connection, no admin rights, plus the ability to start a process listening on a port there. - Personal terminals a user configures for themselves are not affected. Those carry an external URL, so the previewed document is cross-origin and the sandbox held. - The victim has to open the port list and click the attacker&#39;s port. - `TERMINAL_PROXY_HEADERS` unset and no `CONTENT_SECURITY_POLICY` set, which are the defaults. An operator who had already set a restrictive Content-Security-Policy through either was not exposed, since those headers apply to the proxied response. - The `iframeSandboxAllowSameOrigin` user setting is off by default, but the affected…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-jmc6-2wr8-h3wj https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-4123 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: open-webui</p> <p>## Summary Any authenticated user with access to a shared terminal server could get script of their choosing to run in the Open WebUI origin itself. The in-app port preview rendered the content of a previewed port in an iframe whose sandbox always granted `allow-same-origin` alongside `allow-scripts`, and that content is served from a path on the application&#39;s own origin, so the sandbox provided no isolation at all. Script served on a previewed port could read the victim&#39;s session token and take over the account.</p> <p>## Preconditions - At least one terminal server configured by an admin (`TERMINAL_SERVER_CONNECTIONS`, empty by default) and reachable by both the attacker and the victim. Deployments with no terminal server configured are not affected. - The attacker needs a normal authenticated account with access to that terminal connection, no admin rights, plus the ability to start a process listening on a port there. - Personal terminals a user configures for themselves are not affected. Those carry an external URL, so the previewed document is cross-origin and the sandbox held. - The victim has to open the port list and click the attacker&#39;s port. - `TERMINAL_PROXY_HEADERS` unset and no `CONTENT_SECURITY_POLICY` set, which are the defaults. An operator who had already set a restrictive Content-Security-Policy through either was not exposed, since those headers apply to the proxied response. - The `iframeSandboxAllowSameOrigin` user setting is off by default, but the affected…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: open-webui</p> <p>## Summary Any authenticated user with access to a shared terminal server could get script of their choosing to run in the Open WebUI origin itself. The in-app port preview rendered the content of a previewed port in an iframe whose sandbox always granted `allow-same-origin` alongside `allow-scripts`, and that content is served from a path on the application&#39;s own origin, so the sandbox provided no isolation at all. Script served on a previewed port could read the victim&#39;s session token and take over the account.</p> <p>## Preconditions - At least one terminal server configured by an admin (`TERMINAL_SERVER_CONNECTIONS`, empty by default) and reachable by both the attacker and the victim. Deployments with no terminal server configured are not affected. - The attacker needs a normal authenticated account with access to that terminal connection, no admin rights, plus the ability to start a process listening on a port there. - Personal terminals a user configures for themselves are not affected. Those carry an external URL, so the previewed document is cross-origin and the sandbox held. - The victim has to open the port list and click the attacker&#39;s port. - `TERMINAL_PROXY_HEADERS` unset and no `CONTENT_SECURITY_POLICY` set, which are the defaults. An operator who had already set a restrictive Content-Security-Policy through either was not exposed, since those headers apply to the proxied response. - The `iframeSandboxAllowSameOrigin` user setting is off by default, but the affected…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-4123