https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Sat, 03 Oct 2026 10:59:15 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-86219 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Alpaquita:stream: perl-authen-sasl</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Alpaquita:stream: perl-authen-sasl</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-86219 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-365331 EUVD-2026-365331 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-365331 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-86219 <p>Authen::SASL::Perl::DIGEST_MD5 versions before 2.2100 for Perl accept replayed authentication responses via unverified nonce in server_step.</p> <p>server_start generates a fresh nonce and sends it in the challenge, and nothing later compares that value against the nonce the client returns. server_step derives the expected digest from the client&#39;s own parameters, so a response verifies whenever its digest matches the nonce it carries. The count table it also checks is keyed on the client-supplied nonce and starts empty in each new server object, so a captured first response, carrying `nc=00000001`, passes that too. RFC 2831 defines the nonce in the response as the value the server sent in the preceding challenge.</p> <p>An attacker who observes one successful `qop=auth` exchange can replay the captured response against a later session for the same service, host, realm and user, and authenticate as that user without knowing the password.</p> <p>Authen::SASL::Perl::DIGEST_MD5 versions before 2.2100 for Perl accept replayed authentication responses via unverified nonce in server_step.</p> <p>server_start generates a fresh nonce and sends it in the challenge, and nothing later compares that value against the nonce the client returns. server_step derives the expected digest from the client&#39;s own parameters, so a response verifies whenever its digest matches the nonce it carries. The count table it also checks is keyed on the client-supplied nonce and starts empty in each new server object, so a captured first response, carrying `nc=00000001`, passes that too. RFC 2831 defines the nonce in the response as the value the server sent in the preceding challenge.</p> <p>An attacker who observes one successful `qop=auth` exchange can replay the captured response against a later session for the same service, host, realm and user, and authenticate as that user without knowing the password.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-86219 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-w4h4-7ff5-56xr <p>Authen::SASL::Perl::DIGEST_MD5 versions before 2.2100 for Perl accept replayed authentication responses via unverified nonce in server_step.</p> <p>server_start generates a fresh nonce and sends it in the challenge, and nothing later compares that value against the nonce the client returns. server_step derives the expected digest from the client&#39;s own parameters, so a response verifies whenever its digest matches the nonce it carries. The count table it also checks is keyed on the client-supplied nonce and starts empty in each new server object, so a captured first response, carrying `nc=00000001`, passes that too. RFC 2831 defines the nonce in the response as the value the server sent in the preceding challenge.</p> <p>An attacker who observes one successful `qop=auth` exchange can replay the captured response against a later session for the same service, host, realm and user, and authenticate as that user without knowing the password.</p> <p>Authen::SASL::Perl::DIGEST_MD5 versions before 2.2100 for Perl accept replayed authentication responses via unverified nonce in server_step.</p> <p>server_start generates a fresh nonce and sends it in the challenge, and nothing later compares that value against the nonce the client returns. server_step derives the expected digest from the client&#39;s own parameters, so a response verifies whenever its digest matches the nonce it carries. The count table it also checks is keyed on the client-supplied nonce and starts empty in each new server object, so a captured first response, carrying `nc=00000001`, passes that too. RFC 2831 defines the nonce in the response as the value the server sent in the preceding challenge.</p> <p>An attacker who observes one successful `qop=auth` exchange can replay the captured response against a later session for the same service, host, realm and user, and authenticate as that user without knowing the password.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-w4h4-7ff5-56xr https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/oesa-2026-3775 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> openEuler:24.03-LTS-SP1: perl-Authen-SASL</p> <p>Authen::SASL::Perl is the pure Perl implementation of SASL mechanisms in the Authen::SASL framework, At the time of this writing it provides the client part implementation for the following SASL mechanisms. Security Fix(es):</p> <p>Authen::SASL::Perl::DIGEST_MD5 versions before 2.2100 for Perl accept replayed authentication responses via unverified nonce in server_step. server_start generates a fresh nonce and sends it in the challenge, and nothing later compares that value against the nonce the client returns. server_step derives the expected digest from the client&amp;apos;s own parameters, so a response verifies whenever its digest matches the nonce it carries. The count table it also checks is keyed on the client-supplied nonce and starts empty in each new server object, so a captured first response, carrying `nc=00000001`, passes that too. RFC 2831 defines the nonce in the response as the value the server sent in the preceding challenge. An attacker who observes one successful `qop=auth` exchange can replay the captured response against a later session for the same service, host, realm and user, and authenticate as that user without knowing the password.(CVE-2026-86219)</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> openEuler:24.03-LTS-SP1: perl-Authen-SASL</p> <p>Authen::SASL::Perl is the pure Perl implementation of SASL mechanisms in the Authen::SASL framework, At the time of this writing it provides the client part implementation for the following SASL mechanisms. Security Fix(es):</p> <p>Authen::SASL::Perl::DIGEST_MD5 versions before 2.2100 for Perl accept replayed authentication responses via unverified nonce in server_step. server_start generates a fresh nonce and sends it in the challenge, and nothing later compares that value against the nonce the client returns. server_step derives the expected digest from the client&amp;apos;s own parameters, so a response verifies whenever its digest matches the nonce it carries. The count table it also checks is keyed on the client-supplied nonce and starts empty in each new server object, so a captured first response, carrying `nc=00000001`, passes that too. RFC 2831 defines the nonce in the response as the value the server sent in the preceding challenge. An attacker who observes one successful `qop=auth` exchange can replay the captured response against a later session for the same service, host, realm and user, and authenticate as that user without knowing the password.(CVE-2026-86219)</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/oesa-2026-3775 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11734-1 <p>perl-Authen-SASL-2.210.0-1.1 on GA media</p> <p>perl-Authen-SASL-2.210.0-1.1 on GA media</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11734-1 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/suse-su-2026:23913-1 <p>Security update for perl-Authen-SASL</p> <p>Security update for perl-Authen-SASL</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/suse-su-2026:23913-1 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-86219 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: libauthen-sasl-perl, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: libauthen-sasl-perl, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: libauthen-sasl-perl, Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS: libauthen-sasl-perl, Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: libauthen-sasl-perl, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: libauthen-sasl-perl, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: libauthen-sasl-perl</p> <p>Authen::SASL::Perl::DIGEST_MD5 versions before 2.2100 for Perl accept replayed authentication responses via unverified nonce in server_step. server_start generates a fresh nonce and sends it in the challenge, and nothing later compares that value against the nonce the client returns. server_step derives the expected digest from the client&#39;s own parameters, so a response verifies whenever its digest matches the nonce it carries. The count table it also checks is keyed on the client-supplied nonce and starts empty in each new server object, so a captured first response, carrying `nc=00000001`, passes that too. RFC 2831 defines the nonce in the response as the value the server sent in the preceding challenge. An attacker who observes one successful `qop=auth` exchange can replay the captured response against a later session for the same service, host, realm and user, and authenticate as that user without knowing the password.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: libauthen-sasl-perl, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: libauthen-sasl-perl, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: libauthen-sasl-perl, Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS: libauthen-sasl-perl, Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: libauthen-sasl-perl, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: libauthen-sasl-perl, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: libauthen-sasl-perl</p> <p>Authen::SASL::Perl::DIGEST_MD5 versions before 2.2100 for Perl accept replayed authentication responses via unverified nonce in server_step. server_start generates a fresh nonce and sends it in the challenge, and nothing later compares that value against the nonce the client returns. server_step derives the expected digest from the client&#39;s own parameters, so a response verifies whenever its digest matches the nonce it carries. The count table it also checks is keyed on the client-supplied nonce and starts empty in each new server object, so a captured first response, carrying `nc=00000001`, passes that too. RFC 2831 defines the nonce in the response as the value the server sent in the preceding challenge. An attacker who observes one successful `qop=auth` exchange can replay the captured response against a later session for the same service, host, realm and user, and authenticate as that user without knowing the password.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-86219