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    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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      <title>bdu:2026-14241</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2026-14241</link>
      <description>bdu:2026-14241</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2026-14241</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-363765</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-363765</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-363765</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-363765</guid>
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      <title>fkie_cve-2026-85590</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-85590</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;phpMyFAQ before 4.1.8 contains an authentication bypass vulnerability in its two-factor authentication (TOTP) disable functionality. The removeTwofactorConfig() handler (reachable via POST /api/user/remove-twofactor) verifies only that the user is logged in and that a valid CSRF token is supplied, then disables TOTP without requiring password re-entry or a current TOTP code. The same downgrade is also reachable inline via PUT /api/user/data/update, which accepts a plain twofactor_enabled form field under the same session+CSRF-only guard. An attacker who has hijacked a user&amp;#39;s session can silently strip two-factor protection from any account, including administrator accounts, after which password-only authentication succeeds.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;phpMyFAQ before 4.1.8 contains an authentication bypass vulnerability in its two-factor authentication (TOTP) disable functionality. The removeTwofactorConfig() handler (reachable via POST /api/user/remove-twofactor) verifies only that the user is logged in and that a valid CSRF token is supplied, then disables TOTP without requiring password re-entry or a current TOTP code. The same downgrade is also reachable inline via PUT /api/user/data/update, which accepts a plain twofactor_enabled form field under the same session+CSRF-only guard. An attacker who has hijacked a user&amp;#39;s session can silently strip two-factor protection from any account, including administrator accounts, after which password-only authentication succeeds.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-85590</guid>
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      <title>GHSA-x283-48fh-hc5w</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-x283-48fh-hc5w</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;phpMyFAQ before 4.1.8 contains an authentication bypass vulnerability in its two-factor authentication (TOTP) disable functionality. The removeTwofactorConfig() handler (reachable via POST /api/user/remove-twofactor) verifies only that the user is logged in and that a valid CSRF token is supplied, then disables TOTP without requiring password re-entry or a current TOTP code. The same downgrade is also reachable inline via PUT /api/user/data/update, which accepts a plain twofactor_enabled form field under the same session+CSRF-only guard. An attacker who has hijacked a user&amp;#39;s session can silently strip two-factor protection from any account, including administrator accounts, after which password-only authentication succeeds.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;phpMyFAQ before 4.1.8 contains an authentication bypass vulnerability in its two-factor authentication (TOTP) disable functionality. The removeTwofactorConfig() handler (reachable via POST /api/user/remove-twofactor) verifies only that the user is logged in and that a valid CSRF token is supplied, then disables TOTP without requiring password re-entry or a current TOTP code. The same downgrade is also reachable inline via PUT /api/user/data/update, which accepts a plain twofactor_enabled form field under the same session+CSRF-only guard. An attacker who has hijacked a user&amp;#39;s session can silently strip two-factor protection from any account, including administrator accounts, after which password-only authentication succeeds.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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