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    <item>
      <title>BREW-bump-my-version-CVE-2026-84379 — HTTPX2: Multipart part header injection via unvalidated file Content-Type and custom headers</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/brew-bump-my-version-cve-2026-84379</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: bump-my-version&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;HTTPX2 serializes the per-file `Content-Type` and custom headers supplied through the `files=` tuple API directly into the `multipart/form-data` body without validating custom header names or values. An attacker who can influence upload metadata passed to HTTPX2 can use CR or LF characters to terminate a multipart part header and inject additional part headers or end the part header block early.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The three-element file tuple accepts `(filename, content, content_type)`, and the four-element form accepts `(filename, content, content_type, headers)`. `FileField.render_headers()` interpolates the supplied header names and values between CRLF delimiters without validating them.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For example:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
import httpx2&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;request = httpx2.Request(
    &amp;#34;POST&amp;#34;,
    &amp;#34;https://example.com/upload&amp;#34;,
    headers={&amp;#34;Content-Type&amp;#34;: &amp;#34;multipart/form-data; boundary=BOUNDARY&amp;#34;},
    files={
        &amp;#34;file&amp;#34;: (
            &amp;#34;safe.txt&amp;#34;,
            b&amp;#34;payload&amp;#34;,
            &amp;#34;text/plain\r\nX-Injected: true&amp;#34;,
        )
    },
)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;print(request.read().decode())
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The generated body contains an attacker-injected part header:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```text
--BOUNDARY
Content-Disposition: form-data; name=&amp;#34;file&amp;#34;; filename=&amp;#34;safe.txt&amp;#34;
Content-Type: text/plain
X-Injected: true&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;payload
--BOUNDARY--
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The same issue affects names and values in the custom header mapping from the four-element tuple.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Field names and filenames are serialized through a separate escaping path and do not permit CRLF header injectio…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: bump-my-version&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;HTTPX2 serializes the per-file `Content-Type` and custom headers supplied through the `files=` tuple API directly into the `multipart/form-data` body without validating custom header names or values. An attacker who can influence upload metadata passed to HTTPX2 can use CR or LF characters to terminate a multipart part header and inject additional part headers or end the part header block early.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The three-element file tuple accepts `(filename, content, content_type)`, and the four-element form accepts `(filename, content, content_type, headers)`. `FileField.render_headers()` interpolates the supplied header names and values between CRLF delimiters without validating them.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For example:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
import httpx2&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;request = httpx2.Request(
    &amp;#34;POST&amp;#34;,
    &amp;#34;https://example.com/upload&amp;#34;,
    headers={&amp;#34;Content-Type&amp;#34;: &amp;#34;multipart/form-data; boundary=BOUNDARY&amp;#34;},
    files={
        &amp;#34;file&amp;#34;: (
            &amp;#34;safe.txt&amp;#34;,
            b&amp;#34;payload&amp;#34;,
            &amp;#34;text/plain\r\nX-Injected: true&amp;#34;,
        )
    },
)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;print(request.read().decode())
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The generated body contains an attacker-injected part header:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```text
--BOUNDARY
Content-Disposition: form-data; name=&amp;#34;file&amp;#34;; filename=&amp;#34;safe.txt&amp;#34;
Content-Type: text/plain
X-Injected: true&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;payload
--BOUNDARY--
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The same issue affects names and values in the custom header mapping from the four-element tuple.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Field names and filenames are serialized through a separate escaping path and do not permit CRLF header injectio…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/brew-bump-my-version-cve-2026-84379</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-363265</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-363265</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-363265</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-363265</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-84379</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-84379</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;HTTPX2 is a next generation HTTP client for Python. Prior to 2.11.0, FileField.render_headers() in src/httpx2/httpx2/_multipart.py directly interpolates attacker-controlled content_type values and custom headers from the files= three-element (filename, content, content_type) tuple and the files= four-element (filename, content, content_type, headers) tuple into multipart/form-data part headers without validating header names or values. CR or LF characters can terminate a part header, inject additional part headers, or end the part header block early, allowing a downstream multipart parser to treat attacker-supplied lines as genuine headers and potentially alter part semantics or bypass header-based checks. This issue is fixed in version 2.11.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;HTTPX2 is a next generation HTTP client for Python. Prior to 2.11.0, FileField.render_headers() in src/httpx2/httpx2/_multipart.py directly interpolates attacker-controlled content_type values and custom headers from the files= three-element (filename, content, content_type) tuple and the files= four-element (filename, content, content_type, headers) tuple into multipart/form-data part headers without validating header names or values. CR or LF characters can terminate a part header, inject additional part headers, or end the part header block early, allowing a downstream multipart parser to treat attacker-supplied lines as genuine headers and potentially alter part semantics or bypass header-based checks. This issue is fixed in version 2.11.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-84379</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-h4x7-gw46-3wm6 — HTTPX2: Multipart part header injection via unvalidated file Content-Type and custom headers</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-h4x7-gw46-3wm6</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: httpx2&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;HTTPX2 serializes the per-file `Content-Type` and custom headers supplied through the `files=` tuple API directly into the `multipart/form-data` body without validating custom header names or values. An attacker who can influence upload metadata passed to HTTPX2 can use CR or LF characters to terminate a multipart part header and inject additional part headers or end the part header block early.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The three-element file tuple accepts `(filename, content, content_type)`, and the four-element form accepts `(filename, content, content_type, headers)`. `FileField.render_headers()` interpolates the supplied header names and values between CRLF delimiters without validating them.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For example:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
import httpx2&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;request = httpx2.Request(
    &amp;#34;POST&amp;#34;,
    &amp;#34;https://example.com/upload&amp;#34;,
    headers={&amp;#34;Content-Type&amp;#34;: &amp;#34;multipart/form-data; boundary=BOUNDARY&amp;#34;},
    files={
        &amp;#34;file&amp;#34;: (
            &amp;#34;safe.txt&amp;#34;,
            b&amp;#34;payload&amp;#34;,
            &amp;#34;text/plain\r\nX-Injected: true&amp;#34;,
        )
    },
)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;print(request.read().decode())
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The generated body contains an attacker-injected part header:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```text
--BOUNDARY
Content-Disposition: form-data; name=&amp;#34;file&amp;#34;; filename=&amp;#34;safe.txt&amp;#34;
Content-Type: text/plain
X-Injected: true&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;payload
--BOUNDARY--
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The same issue affects names and values in the custom header mapping from the four-element tuple.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Field names and filenames are serialized through a separate escaping path and do not permit CRLF header injectio…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: httpx2&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;HTTPX2 serializes the per-file `Content-Type` and custom headers supplied through the `files=` tuple API directly into the `multipart/form-data` body without validating custom header names or values. An attacker who can influence upload metadata passed to HTTPX2 can use CR or LF characters to terminate a multipart part header and inject additional part headers or end the part header block early.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The three-element file tuple accepts `(filename, content, content_type)`, and the four-element form accepts `(filename, content, content_type, headers)`. `FileField.render_headers()` interpolates the supplied header names and values between CRLF delimiters without validating them.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For example:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
import httpx2&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;request = httpx2.Request(
    &amp;#34;POST&amp;#34;,
    &amp;#34;https://example.com/upload&amp;#34;,
    headers={&amp;#34;Content-Type&amp;#34;: &amp;#34;multipart/form-data; boundary=BOUNDARY&amp;#34;},
    files={
        &amp;#34;file&amp;#34;: (
            &amp;#34;safe.txt&amp;#34;,
            b&amp;#34;payload&amp;#34;,
            &amp;#34;text/plain\r\nX-Injected: true&amp;#34;,
        )
    },
)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;print(request.read().decode())
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The generated body contains an attacker-injected part header:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```text
--BOUNDARY
Content-Disposition: form-data; name=&amp;#34;file&amp;#34;; filename=&amp;#34;safe.txt&amp;#34;
Content-Type: text/plain
X-Injected: true&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;payload
--BOUNDARY--
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The same issue affects names and values in the custom header mapping from the four-element tuple.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Field names and filenames are serialized through a separate escaping path and do not permit CRLF header injectio…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-h4x7-gw46-3wm6</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>PYSEC-2026-3848 — HTTPX2: Multipart part header injection via unvalidated file Content-Type and custom headers</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-3848</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: httpx2&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;HTTPX2 serializes the per-file `Content-Type` and custom headers supplied through the `files=` tuple API directly into the `multipart/form-data` body without validating custom header names or values. An attacker who can influence upload metadata passed to HTTPX2 can use CR or LF characters to terminate a multipart part header and inject additional part headers or end the part header block early.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The three-element file tuple accepts `(filename, content, content_type)`, and the four-element form accepts `(filename, content, content_type, headers)`. `FileField.render_headers()` interpolates the supplied header names and values between CRLF delimiters without validating them.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For example:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
import httpx2&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;request = httpx2.Request(
    &amp;#34;POST&amp;#34;,
    &amp;#34;https://example.com/upload&amp;#34;,
    headers={&amp;#34;Content-Type&amp;#34;: &amp;#34;multipart/form-data; boundary=BOUNDARY&amp;#34;},
    files={
        &amp;#34;file&amp;#34;: (
            &amp;#34;safe.txt&amp;#34;,
            b&amp;#34;payload&amp;#34;,
            &amp;#34;text/plain\r\nX-Injected: true&amp;#34;,
        )
    },
)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;print(request.read().decode())
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The generated body contains an attacker-injected part header:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```text
--BOUNDARY
Content-Disposition: form-data; name=&amp;#34;file&amp;#34;; filename=&amp;#34;safe.txt&amp;#34;
Content-Type: text/plain
X-Injected: true&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;payload
--BOUNDARY--
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The same issue affects names and values in the custom header mapping from the four-element tuple.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Field names and filenames are serialized through a separate escaping path and do not permit CRLF header injectio…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: httpx2&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;HTTPX2 serializes the per-file `Content-Type` and custom headers supplied through the `files=` tuple API directly into the `multipart/form-data` body without validating custom header names or values. An attacker who can influence upload metadata passed to HTTPX2 can use CR or LF characters to terminate a multipart part header and inject additional part headers or end the part header block early.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The three-element file tuple accepts `(filename, content, content_type)`, and the four-element form accepts `(filename, content, content_type, headers)`. `FileField.render_headers()` interpolates the supplied header names and values between CRLF delimiters without validating them.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For example:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
import httpx2&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;request = httpx2.Request(
    &amp;#34;POST&amp;#34;,
    &amp;#34;https://example.com/upload&amp;#34;,
    headers={&amp;#34;Content-Type&amp;#34;: &amp;#34;multipart/form-data; boundary=BOUNDARY&amp;#34;},
    files={
        &amp;#34;file&amp;#34;: (
            &amp;#34;safe.txt&amp;#34;,
            b&amp;#34;payload&amp;#34;,
            &amp;#34;text/plain\r\nX-Injected: true&amp;#34;,
        )
    },
)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;print(request.read().decode())
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The generated body contains an attacker-injected part header:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```text
--BOUNDARY
Content-Disposition: form-data; name=&amp;#34;file&amp;#34;; filename=&amp;#34;safe.txt&amp;#34;
Content-Type: text/plain
X-Injected: true&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;payload
--BOUNDARY--
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The same issue affects names and values in the custom header mapping from the four-element tuple.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Field names and filenames are serialized through a separate escaping path and do not permit CRLF header injectio…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-3848</guid>
    </item>
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