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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sat, 03 Oct 2026 17:59:04 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>bdu:2026-14137</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2026-14137</link>
      <description>bdu:2026-14137</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2026-14137</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-363632</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-363632</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-363632</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-363632</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-83613</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-83613</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;xmldom is a pure JavaScript W3C standard-based (XML DOM Level 2 Core) DOMParser and XMLSerializer module. Prior to @xmldom/xmldom versions 0.8.15 and 0.9.12, and in xmldom version 0.6.0 and earlier, DOMHandler.startElement in lib/dom-parser.js inserts every parsed attribute through setAttributeNode, while NamedNodeMap.setNamedItem in lib/dom.js calls the linear getNamedItem or getNamedItemNS lookup for each insertion. A well-formed element with many distinct attributes therefore requires quadratic comparisons during DOMParser.parseFromString() and can stall a Node.js event loop before application validation. This issue is fixed in @xmldom/xmldom versions 0.8.15 and 0.9.12; no fixed version is available for xmldom.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;xmldom is a pure JavaScript W3C standard-based (XML DOM Level 2 Core) DOMParser and XMLSerializer module. Prior to @xmldom/xmldom versions 0.8.15 and 0.9.12, and in xmldom version 0.6.0 and earlier, DOMHandler.startElement in lib/dom-parser.js inserts every parsed attribute through setAttributeNode, while NamedNodeMap.setNamedItem in lib/dom.js calls the linear getNamedItem or getNamedItemNS lookup for each insertion. A well-formed element with many distinct attributes therefore requires quadratic comparisons during DOMParser.parseFromString() and can stall a Node.js event loop before application validation. This issue is fixed in @xmldom/xmldom versions 0.8.15 and 0.9.12; no fixed version is available for xmldom.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-83613</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-8344-3jmq-59r6 — xmldom: Quadratic-time attribute deduplication</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-8344-3jmq-59r6</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: @xmldom/xmldom, npm: xmldom&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;xmldom builds the attribute collection of every parsed element by inserting attributes one at a
time into a DOM `NamedNodeMap`. Each insertion first performs a **linear scan of all
already-inserted attributes** to enforce the DOM uniqueness rule (no two attributes with the same
qualified name / namespace+local-name). Parsing an element that carries `M` distinct attributes
therefore costs `1 + 2 + … + M = O(M²)` comparisons.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Because the trigger is simply &amp;#34;one element with many attributes&amp;#34;, the attack payload is a
**fully well-formed XML document**. No malformed markup, no error recovery, and no non-default
parser options are involved — parsing completes silently with zero `warning`/`error`/`fatalError`
events. An attacker who can submit a modest, highly compressible document (a single element with
tens of thousands of attributes, ~340 KB uncompressed) can consume seconds of single-threaded CPU
per request, enabling an unauthenticated denial of service.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is distinct from the known quadratic-**memory** namespace-map issue: it burns **CPU** and it
does not require any namespace declarations or nesting.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The DOM content handler adds each attribute of a starting element by calling
`el.setAttributeNode(attr)` in a loop:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```js
// DOMHandler.startElement
for (var i = 0; i &amp;lt; len; i++) {
	var namespaceURI = attrs.getURI(i);
	var value = attrs.getValue(i);
	var qName = attrs.getQName(i);
	var attr = doc.createAttributeNS(namespaceURI, qName);
	attr.value =…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: @xmldom/xmldom, npm: xmldom&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;xmldom builds the attribute collection of every parsed element by inserting attributes one at a
time into a DOM `NamedNodeMap`. Each insertion first performs a **linear scan of all
already-inserted attributes** to enforce the DOM uniqueness rule (no two attributes with the same
qualified name / namespace+local-name). Parsing an element that carries `M` distinct attributes
therefore costs `1 + 2 + … + M = O(M²)` comparisons.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Because the trigger is simply &amp;#34;one element with many attributes&amp;#34;, the attack payload is a
**fully well-formed XML document**. No malformed markup, no error recovery, and no non-default
parser options are involved — parsing completes silently with zero `warning`/`error`/`fatalError`
events. An attacker who can submit a modest, highly compressible document (a single element with
tens of thousands of attributes, ~340 KB uncompressed) can consume seconds of single-threaded CPU
per request, enabling an unauthenticated denial of service.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is distinct from the known quadratic-**memory** namespace-map issue: it burns **CPU** and it
does not require any namespace declarations or nesting.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The DOM content handler adds each attribute of a starting element by calling
`el.setAttributeNode(attr)` in a loop:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```js
// DOMHandler.startElement
for (var i = 0; i &amp;lt; len; i++) {
	var namespaceURI = attrs.getURI(i);
	var value = attrs.getValue(i);
	var qName = attrs.getQName(i);
	var attr = doc.createAttributeNS(namespaceURI, qName);
	attr.value =…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-8344-3jmq-59r6</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>msrc_CVE-2026-83613 — xmldom: Quadratic-time attribute deduplication</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-83613</link>
      <description>msrc_CVE-2026-83613</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-83613</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>RHSA-2026:69248 — Red Hat Security Advisory: Red Hat Developer Hub 1.9.9 release.</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rhsa-2026:69248</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;undici: undici: Denial of Service via unrequested WebSocket subprotocol encoding/asn1: golang: Go encoding/asn1: Denial of Service via excessive recursion in Unmarshal ip-address: ip-address: Server-Side Request Forgery via IPv4-mapped/NAT64 IPv6 address misclassification urllib: urllib: Credential leakage via cross-origin redirects net/http: golang: Go net/http: Unencrypted HTTP/2 connections vulnerable to Denial of Service html/template: golang: Go html/template: Cross-Site Scripting via pathological input encoding/xml: golang: Go: Denial of Service via XML decoding recursion depth issue net/url: golang: golang net/url: Denial of Service from quadratic complexity in path resolution crypto/tls: golang: Golang crypto/tls: Denial of Service via indefinite KeyUpdate messages nanoid: nanoid: Denial of Service via negative size input in non-secure module functions axios: axios: Denial of Service via uncontrolled recursion in form data processing pymdown-extensions: Pymdown-extensions: Denial of Service via Regular Expression Vulnerability brace-expansion: DoS via unbounded intermediate arrays, bypassing the CVE-2026-14257 mitigation ip-address: ip-address: Inconsistent IP address parsing leads to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) and trust-boundary bypass nanoid: nanoid: Predictable ID generation due to integer overflow fast-uri: fast-uri: Server-Side Request Forgery via repeated hostname percent-decoding fast-uri: fast-uri: Host confusion via skipped IDN canonicalization fast-…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;undici: undici: Denial of Service via unrequested WebSocket subprotocol encoding/asn1: golang: Go encoding/asn1: Denial of Service via excessive recursion in Unmarshal ip-address: ip-address: Server-Side Request Forgery via IPv4-mapped/NAT64 IPv6 address misclassification urllib: urllib: Credential leakage via cross-origin redirects net/http: golang: Go net/http: Unencrypted HTTP/2 connections vulnerable to Denial of Service html/template: golang: Go html/template: Cross-Site Scripting via pathological input encoding/xml: golang: Go: Denial of Service via XML decoding recursion depth issue net/url: golang: golang net/url: Denial of Service from quadratic complexity in path resolution crypto/tls: golang: Golang crypto/tls: Denial of Service via indefinite KeyUpdate messages nanoid: nanoid: Denial of Service via negative size input in non-secure module functions axios: axios: Denial of Service via uncontrolled recursion in form data processing pymdown-extensions: Pymdown-extensions: Denial of Service via Regular Expression Vulnerability brace-expansion: DoS via unbounded intermediate arrays, bypassing the CVE-2026-14257 mitigation ip-address: ip-address: Inconsistent IP address parsing leads to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) and trust-boundary bypass nanoid: nanoid: Predictable ID generation due to integer overflow fast-uri: fast-uri: Server-Side Request Forgery via repeated hostname percent-decoding fast-uri: fast-uri: Host confusion via skipped IDN canonicalization fast-…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rhsa-2026:69248</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-83613</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-83613</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:20.04:LTS: node-xmldom, Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: node-xmldom, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: node-xmldom, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: node-xmldom&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;xmldom is a pure JavaScript W3C standard-based (XML DOM Level 2 Core) DOMParser and XMLSerializer module. Prior to @xmldom/xmldom versions 0.8.15 and 0.9.12, and in xmldom version 0.6.0 and earlier, DOMHandler.startElement in lib/dom-parser.js inserts every parsed attribute through setAttributeNode, while NamedNodeMap.setNamedItem in lib/dom.js calls the linear getNamedItem or getNamedItemNS lookup for each insertion. A well-formed element with many distinct attributes therefore requires quadratic comparisons during DOMParser.parseFromString() and can stall a Node.js event loop before application validation. This issue is fixed in @xmldom/xmldom versions 0.8.15 and 0.9.12; no fixed version is available for xmldom.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:20.04:LTS: node-xmldom, Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: node-xmldom, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: node-xmldom, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: node-xmldom&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;xmldom is a pure JavaScript W3C standard-based (XML DOM Level 2 Core) DOMParser and XMLSerializer module. Prior to @xmldom/xmldom versions 0.8.15 and 0.9.12, and in xmldom version 0.6.0 and earlier, DOMHandler.startElement in lib/dom-parser.js inserts every parsed attribute through setAttributeNode, while NamedNodeMap.setNamedItem in lib/dom.js calls the linear getNamedItem or getNamedItemNS lookup for each insertion. A well-formed element with many distinct attributes therefore requires quadratic comparisons during DOMParser.parseFromString() and can stall a Node.js event loop before application validation. This issue is fixed in @xmldom/xmldom versions 0.8.15 and 0.9.12; no fixed version is available for xmldom.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-83613</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-3596 — IBM App Connect Enterprise: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-3596</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in IBM App Connect Enterprise ausnutzen, um Sicherheitsvorkehrungen zu umgehen, um einen Denial of Service Angriff durchzuführen, um Informationen offenzulegen, um Dateien zu manipulieren und um einen Cross-Site Scripting Angriff durchzuführen.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in IBM App Connect Enterprise ausnutzen, um Sicherheitsvorkehrungen zu umgehen, um einen Denial of Service Angriff durchzuführen, um Informationen offenzulegen, um Dateien zu manipulieren und um einen Cross-Site Scripting Angriff durchzuführen.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-3596</guid>
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