https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Mon, 05 Oct 2026 03:49:50 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-80961 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-80961 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-367257 EUVD-2026-367257 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-367257 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-80961 <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>dm-pcache: validate kset key_num and intra-segment bounds</p> <p>Two more fields decoded from the cache device go unbounded. The kset key_num drives cache_kset_crc() and the replay loop in cache_replay(), the writeback worker and the GC worker, but only the magic and a fixed-seed CRC are checked first, so a non-last kset whose key_num exceeds the PCACHE_KSET_KEYS_MAX buffer reads past its end before the CRC compare. A key&#39;s intra-segment offset and length in cache_key_decode() are taken verbatim, so a key running past its segment is replayed into the cache tree and the data CRC check and every later read hit then copy adjacent persistent memory into the caller&#39;s bio -- an out-of-bounds read that leaks to user space. Both fields are controlled by whoever supplies the cache device (CAP_SYS_ADMIN); the CRC seed is public.</p> <p>Add kset_onmedia_valid() to bound key_num before any kset read, and reject a key whose offset plus length, computed in 64 bits, exceeds the segment data_size. Valid metadata is unaffected.</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>dm-pcache: validate kset key_num and intra-segment bounds</p> <p>Two more fields decoded from the cache device go unbounded. The kset key_num drives cache_kset_crc() and the replay loop in cache_replay(), the writeback worker and the GC worker, but only the magic and a fixed-seed CRC are checked first, so a non-last kset whose key_num exceeds the PCACHE_KSET_KEYS_MAX buffer reads past its end before the CRC compare. A key&#39;s intra-segment offset and length in cache_key_decode() are taken verbatim, so a key running past its segment is replayed into the cache tree and the data CRC check and every later read hit then copy adjacent persistent memory into the caller&#39;s bio -- an out-of-bounds read that leaks to user space. Both fields are controlled by whoever supplies the cache device (CAP_SYS_ADMIN); the CRC seed is public.</p> <p>Add kset_onmedia_valid() to bound key_num before any kset read, and reject a key whose offset plus length, computed in 64 bits, exceeds the segment data_size. Valid metadata is unaffected.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-80961 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-7hfq-329h-84pc <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>dm-pcache: validate kset key_num and intra-segment bounds</p> <p>Two more fields decoded from the cache device go unbounded. The kset key_num drives cache_kset_crc() and the replay loop in cache_replay(), the writeback worker and the GC worker, but only the magic and a fixed-seed CRC are checked first, so a non-last kset whose key_num exceeds the PCACHE_KSET_KEYS_MAX buffer reads past its end before the CRC compare. A key&#39;s intra-segment offset and length in cache_key_decode() are taken verbatim, so a key running past its segment is replayed into the cache tree and the data CRC check and every later read hit then copy adjacent persistent memory into the caller&#39;s bio -- an out-of-bounds read that leaks to user space. Both fields are controlled by whoever supplies the cache device (CAP_SYS_ADMIN); the CRC seed is public.</p> <p>Add kset_onmedia_valid() to bound key_num before any kset read, and reject a key whose offset plus length, computed in 64 bits, exceeds the segment data_size. Valid metadata is unaffected.</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>dm-pcache: validate kset key_num and intra-segment bounds</p> <p>Two more fields decoded from the cache device go unbounded. The kset key_num drives cache_kset_crc() and the replay loop in cache_replay(), the writeback worker and the GC worker, but only the magic and a fixed-seed CRC are checked first, so a non-last kset whose key_num exceeds the PCACHE_KSET_KEYS_MAX buffer reads past its end before the CRC compare. A key&#39;s intra-segment offset and length in cache_key_decode() are taken verbatim, so a key running past its segment is replayed into the cache tree and the data CRC check and every later read hit then copy adjacent persistent memory into the caller&#39;s bio -- an out-of-bounds read that leaks to user space. Both fields are controlled by whoever supplies the cache device (CAP_SYS_ADMIN); the CRC seed is public.</p> <p>Add kset_onmedia_valid() to bound key_num before any kset read, and reject a key whose offset plus length, computed in 64 bits, exceeds the segment data_size. Valid metadata is unaffected.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-7hfq-329h-84pc https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11805-1 <p>kernel-devel-7.2.6-1.1 on GA media</p> <p>kernel-devel-7.2.6-1.1 on GA media</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11805-1 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-80961 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 118 more</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dm-pcache: validate kset key_num and intra-segment bounds Two more fields decoded from the cache device go unbounded. The kset key_num drives cache_kset_crc() and the replay loop in cache_replay(), the writeback worker and the GC worker, but only the magic and a fixed-seed CRC are checked first, so a non-last kset whose key_num exceeds the PCACHE_KSET_KEYS_MAX buffer reads past its end before the CRC compare. A key&#39;s intra-segment offset and length in cache_key_decode() are taken verbatim, so a key running past its segment is replayed into the cache tree and the data CRC check and every later read hit then copy adjacent persistent memory into the caller&#39;s bio -- an out-of-bounds read that leaks to user space. Both fields are controlled by whoever supplies the cache device (CAP_SYS_ADMIN); the CRC seed is public. Add kset_onmedia_valid() to bound key_num before any kset read, and reject a key whose offset plus length, computed in 64 bits, exceeds the segment data_size. Valid metadata is unaffected.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 118 more</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dm-pcache: validate kset key_num and intra-segment bounds Two more fields decoded from the cache device go unbounded. The kset key_num drives cache_kset_crc() and the replay loop in cache_replay(), the writeback worker and the GC worker, but only the magic and a fixed-seed CRC are checked first, so a non-last kset whose key_num exceeds the PCACHE_KSET_KEYS_MAX buffer reads past its end before the CRC compare. A key&#39;s intra-segment offset and length in cache_key_decode() are taken verbatim, so a key running past its segment is replayed into the cache tree and the data CRC check and every later read hit then copy adjacent persistent memory into the caller&#39;s bio -- an out-of-bounds read that leaks to user space. Both fields are controlled by whoever supplies the cache device (CAP_SYS_ADMIN); the CRC seed is public. Add kset_onmedia_valid() to bound key_num before any kset read, and reject a key whose offset plus length, computed in 64 bits, exceeds the segment data_size. Valid metadata is unaffected.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-80961 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-3321 <p>Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, Daten oder den Systemzustand zu manipulieren, Denial-of-Service-Zustände herbeizuführen oder andere, nicht näher spezifizierte Angriffe durchzuführen.</p> <p>Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, Daten oder den Systemzustand zu manipulieren, Denial-of-Service-Zustände herbeizuführen oder andere, nicht näher spezifizierte Angriffe durchzuführen.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-3321