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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sun, 04 Oct 2026 06:13:48 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BELL-CVE-2026-80946</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-80946</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-80946</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-366979</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-366979</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-366979</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-366979</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-80946</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-80946</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;fuse: copy request headers via a stack buffer for io-uring&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The fuse-io-uring transport copies req-&amp;gt;in.h out to the ring in
fuse_uring_copy_to_ring() and req-&amp;gt;out.h back in fuse_uring_commit().
Both headers live inside the fuse_request slab object, whose cache
(fuse_req_cachep) is created without a usercopy whitelist, so copying
them directly to/from userspace trips CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY and
panics:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;usercopy: Kernel memory exposure attempt detected from SLUB object
  &amp;#39;fuse_request&amp;#39; (offset 56, size 40)!
  kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:102!
  Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
  RIP: 0010:usercopy_abort (mm/usercopy.c:90)
  Call Trace:
   __check_heap_object (mm/slub.c:8268)
   __check_object_size (mm/usercopy.c:197 mm/usercopy.c:258 mm/usercopy.c:223)
   copy_header_to_ring (fs/fuse/dev_uring.c:618)
   fuse_uring_prepare_send (fs/fuse/dev_uring.c:776 fs/fuse/dev_uring.c:785)
   fuse_uring_send_in_task (fs/fuse/dev_uring.c:1306)
   tctx_task_work_run (io_uring/tw.c:96)
   task_work_run (kernel/task_work.c:233)
   io_run_task_work (io_uring/tw.h:84)
   io_cqring_wait (io_uring/wait.c:278)
   __do_sys_io_uring_enter (io_uring/io_uring.c:2685)
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Bounce both headers through an on-stack copy so the usercopy touches
stack memory, not the slab object.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;fuse: copy request headers via a stack buffer for io-uring&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The fuse-io-uring transport copies req-&amp;gt;in.h out to the ring in
fuse_uring_copy_to_ring() and req-&amp;gt;out.h back in fuse_uring_commit().
Both headers live inside the fuse_request slab object, whose cache
(fuse_req_cachep) is created without a usercopy whitelist, so copying
them directly to/from userspace trips CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY and
panics:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;usercopy: Kernel memory exposure attempt detected from SLUB object
  &amp;#39;fuse_request&amp;#39; (offset 56, size 40)!
  kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:102!
  Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
  RIP: 0010:usercopy_abort (mm/usercopy.c:90)
  Call Trace:
   __check_heap_object (mm/slub.c:8268)
   __check_object_size (mm/usercopy.c:197 mm/usercopy.c:258 mm/usercopy.c:223)
   copy_header_to_ring (fs/fuse/dev_uring.c:618)
   fuse_uring_prepare_send (fs/fuse/dev_uring.c:776 fs/fuse/dev_uring.c:785)
   fuse_uring_send_in_task (fs/fuse/dev_uring.c:1306)
   tctx_task_work_run (io_uring/tw.c:96)
   task_work_run (kernel/task_work.c:233)
   io_run_task_work (io_uring/tw.h:84)
   io_cqring_wait (io_uring/wait.c:278)
   __do_sys_io_uring_enter (io_uring/io_uring.c:2685)
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Bounce both headers through an on-stack copy so the usercopy touches
stack memory, not the slab object.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-80946</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-4p4j-8fxf-mvhp</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-4p4j-8fxf-mvhp</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;fuse: copy request headers via a stack buffer for io-uring&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The fuse-io-uring transport copies req-&amp;gt;in.h out to the ring in
fuse_uring_copy_to_ring() and req-&amp;gt;out.h back in fuse_uring_commit().
Both headers live inside the fuse_request slab object, whose cache
(fuse_req_cachep) is created without a usercopy whitelist, so copying
them directly to/from userspace trips CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY and
panics:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;usercopy: Kernel memory exposure attempt detected from SLUB object
  &amp;#39;fuse_request&amp;#39; (offset 56, size 40)!
  kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:102!
  Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
  RIP: 0010:usercopy_abort (mm/usercopy.c:90)
  Call Trace:
   __check_heap_object (mm/slub.c:8268)
   __check_object_size (mm/usercopy.c:197 mm/usercopy.c:258 mm/usercopy.c:223)
   copy_header_to_ring (fs/fuse/dev_uring.c:618)
   fuse_uring_prepare_send (fs/fuse/dev_uring.c:776 fs/fuse/dev_uring.c:785)
   fuse_uring_send_in_task (fs/fuse/dev_uring.c:1306)
   tctx_task_work_run (io_uring/tw.c:96)
   task_work_run (kernel/task_work.c:233)
   io_run_task_work (io_uring/tw.h:84)
   io_cqring_wait (io_uring/wait.c:278)
   __do_sys_io_uring_enter (io_uring/io_uring.c:2685)
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Bounce both headers through an on-stack copy so the usercopy touches
stack memory, not the slab object.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;fuse: copy request headers via a stack buffer for io-uring&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The fuse-io-uring transport copies req-&amp;gt;in.h out to the ring in
fuse_uring_copy_to_ring() and req-&amp;gt;out.h back in fuse_uring_commit().
Both headers live inside the fuse_request slab object, whose cache
(fuse_req_cachep) is created without a usercopy whitelist, so copying
them directly to/from userspace trips CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY and
panics:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;usercopy: Kernel memory exposure attempt detected from SLUB object
  &amp;#39;fuse_request&amp;#39; (offset 56, size 40)!
  kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:102!
  Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
  RIP: 0010:usercopy_abort (mm/usercopy.c:90)
  Call Trace:
   __check_heap_object (mm/slub.c:8268)
   __check_object_size (mm/usercopy.c:197 mm/usercopy.c:258 mm/usercopy.c:223)
   copy_header_to_ring (fs/fuse/dev_uring.c:618)
   fuse_uring_prepare_send (fs/fuse/dev_uring.c:776 fs/fuse/dev_uring.c:785)
   fuse_uring_send_in_task (fs/fuse/dev_uring.c:1306)
   tctx_task_work_run (io_uring/tw.c:96)
   task_work_run (kernel/task_work.c:233)
   io_run_task_work (io_uring/tw.h:84)
   io_cqring_wait (io_uring/wait.c:278)
   __do_sys_io_uring_enter (io_uring/io_uring.c:2685)
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Bounce both headers through an on-stack copy so the usercopy touches
stack memory, not the slab object.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-4p4j-8fxf-mvhp</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>openSUSE-SU-2026:11805-1 — kernel-devel-7.2.6-1.1 on GA media</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11805-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;kernel-devel-7.2.6-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;kernel-devel-7.2.6-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11805-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-80946</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-80946</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 120 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fuse: copy request headers via a stack buffer for io-uring The fuse-io-uring transport copies req-&amp;gt;in.h out to the ring in fuse_uring_copy_to_ring() and req-&amp;gt;out.h back in fuse_uring_commit(). Both headers live inside the fuse_request slab object, whose cache (fuse_req_cachep) is created without a usercopy whitelist, so copying them directly to/from userspace trips CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY and panics:   usercopy: Kernel memory exposure attempt detected from SLUB object   &amp;#39;fuse_request&amp;#39; (offset 56, size 40)!   kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:102!   Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI   RIP: 0010:usercopy_abort (mm/usercopy.c:90)   Call Trace:    __check_heap_object (mm/slub.c:8268)    __check_object_size (mm/usercopy.c:197 mm/usercopy.c:258 mm/usercopy.c:223)    copy_header_to_ring (fs/fuse/dev_uring.c:618)    fuse_uring_prepare_send (fs/fuse/dev_uring.c:776 fs/fuse/dev_uring.c:785)    fuse_uring_send_in_task (fs/fuse/dev_uring.c:1306)    tctx_task_work_run (io_uring/tw.c:96)    task_work_run (kernel/task_work.c:233)    io_run_task_work (io_uring/tw.h:84)    io_cqring_wait (io_uring/wait.c:278)    __do_sys_io_uring_enter (io_uring/io_uring.c:2685)    entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121) Bounce both headers through an on-stack copy so the usercopy touches stack memory, not the slab object.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 120 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fuse: copy request headers via a stack buffer for io-uring The fuse-io-uring transport copies req-&amp;gt;in.h out to the ring in fuse_uring_copy_to_ring() and req-&amp;gt;out.h back in fuse_uring_commit(). Both headers live inside the fuse_request slab object, whose cache (fuse_req_cachep) is created without a usercopy whitelist, so copying them directly to/from userspace trips CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY and panics:   usercopy: Kernel memory exposure attempt detected from SLUB object   &amp;#39;fuse_request&amp;#39; (offset 56, size 40)!   kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:102!   Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI   RIP: 0010:usercopy_abort (mm/usercopy.c:90)   Call Trace:    __check_heap_object (mm/slub.c:8268)    __check_object_size (mm/usercopy.c:197 mm/usercopy.c:258 mm/usercopy.c:223)    copy_header_to_ring (fs/fuse/dev_uring.c:618)    fuse_uring_prepare_send (fs/fuse/dev_uring.c:776 fs/fuse/dev_uring.c:785)    fuse_uring_send_in_task (fs/fuse/dev_uring.c:1306)    tctx_task_work_run (io_uring/tw.c:96)    task_work_run (kernel/task_work.c:233)    io_run_task_work (io_uring/tw.h:84)    io_cqring_wait (io_uring/wait.c:278)    __do_sys_io_uring_enter (io_uring/io_uring.c:2685)    entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121) Bounce both headers through an on-stack copy so the usercopy touches stack memory, not the slab object.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-80946</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-3321 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-3321</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, Daten oder den Systemzustand zu manipulieren, Denial-of-Service-Zustände herbeizuführen oder andere, nicht näher spezifizierte Angriffe durchzuführen.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, Daten oder den Systemzustand zu manipulieren, Denial-of-Service-Zustände herbeizuführen oder andere, nicht näher spezifizierte Angriffe durchzuführen.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-3321</guid>
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