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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sun, 04 Oct 2026 18:40:51 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BELL-CVE-2026-80895</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-80895</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-80895</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-363938</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-363938</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-363938</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-363938</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-80895</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-80895</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;mshv: Order pt_vp_array publish against irqfd assertion path&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;mshv_partition_ioctl_create_vp() initialises a VP struct (allocations,
mutex_init, init_waitqueue_head, page mappings) and then publishes the
pointer into partition-&amp;gt;pt_vp_array.  Several ISR paths read this array
locklessly: the intercept ISR, the two scheduler ISRs, and
mshv_try_assert_irq_fast() on the irqfd fast path.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Of these, only mshv_try_assert_irq_fast() can structurally race the
publish.  It runs from an eventfd waker without holding pt_mutex, and
MSHV_IRQFD does not require the target lapic_apic_id (== vp_index) to
refer to an existing VP at registration time.  A user can therefore
register an irqfd targeting a yet-to-be-created VP, then trigger
mshv_try_assert_irq_fast() concurrently with MSHV_CREATE_VP for the
same index.  On weakly-ordered architectures the reader can observe a
non-NULL pointer in pt_vp_array before the initialising stores to the
VP struct become visible, leading to use of partially-initialised
fields (e.g. vp_register_page).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The other ISR readers cannot reach this race: the hypervisor will not
generate intercept or scheduler messages for a VP that has never been
told to run, and the user can only call MSHV_RUN_VP on the VP fd
returned by MSHV_CREATE_VP, which by construction is returned after
the publish.  Leave those readers as plain loads.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Use smp_store_release() in mshv_partition_ioctl_create_vp() to publish…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;mshv: Order pt_vp_array publish against irqfd assertion path&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;mshv_partition_ioctl_create_vp() initialises a VP struct (allocations,
mutex_init, init_waitqueue_head, page mappings) and then publishes the
pointer into partition-&amp;gt;pt_vp_array.  Several ISR paths read this array
locklessly: the intercept ISR, the two scheduler ISRs, and
mshv_try_assert_irq_fast() on the irqfd fast path.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Of these, only mshv_try_assert_irq_fast() can structurally race the
publish.  It runs from an eventfd waker without holding pt_mutex, and
MSHV_IRQFD does not require the target lapic_apic_id (== vp_index) to
refer to an existing VP at registration time.  A user can therefore
register an irqfd targeting a yet-to-be-created VP, then trigger
mshv_try_assert_irq_fast() concurrently with MSHV_CREATE_VP for the
same index.  On weakly-ordered architectures the reader can observe a
non-NULL pointer in pt_vp_array before the initialising stores to the
VP struct become visible, leading to use of partially-initialised
fields (e.g. vp_register_page).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The other ISR readers cannot reach this race: the hypervisor will not
generate intercept or scheduler messages for a VP that has never been
told to run, and the user can only call MSHV_RUN_VP on the VP fd
returned by MSHV_CREATE_VP, which by construction is returned after
the publish.  Leave those readers as plain loads.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Use smp_store_release() in mshv_partition_ioctl_create_vp() to publish…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-80895</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-8532-xhgq-93cj</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-8532-xhgq-93cj</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;mshv: Order pt_vp_array publish against irqfd assertion path&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;mshv_partition_ioctl_create_vp() initialises a VP struct (allocations,
mutex_init, init_waitqueue_head, page mappings) and then publishes the
pointer into partition-&amp;gt;pt_vp_array.  Several ISR paths read this array
locklessly: the intercept ISR, the two scheduler ISRs, and
mshv_try_assert_irq_fast() on the irqfd fast path.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Of these, only mshv_try_assert_irq_fast() can structurally race the
publish.  It runs from an eventfd waker without holding pt_mutex, and
MSHV_IRQFD does not require the target lapic_apic_id (== vp_index) to
refer to an existing VP at registration time.  A user can therefore
register an irqfd targeting a yet-to-be-created VP, then trigger
mshv_try_assert_irq_fast() concurrently with MSHV_CREATE_VP for the
same index.  On weakly-ordered architectures the reader can observe a
non-NULL pointer in pt_vp_array before the initialising stores to the
VP struct become visible, leading to use of partially-initialised
fields (e.g. vp_register_page).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The other ISR readers cannot reach this race: the hypervisor will not
generate intercept or scheduler messages for a VP that has never been
told to run, and the user can only call MSHV_RUN_VP on the VP fd
returned by MSHV_CREATE_VP, which by construction is returned after
the publish.  Leave those readers as plain loads.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Use smp_store_release() in mshv_partition_ioctl_create_vp() to publish…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;mshv: Order pt_vp_array publish against irqfd assertion path&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;mshv_partition_ioctl_create_vp() initialises a VP struct (allocations,
mutex_init, init_waitqueue_head, page mappings) and then publishes the
pointer into partition-&amp;gt;pt_vp_array.  Several ISR paths read this array
locklessly: the intercept ISR, the two scheduler ISRs, and
mshv_try_assert_irq_fast() on the irqfd fast path.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Of these, only mshv_try_assert_irq_fast() can structurally race the
publish.  It runs from an eventfd waker without holding pt_mutex, and
MSHV_IRQFD does not require the target lapic_apic_id (== vp_index) to
refer to an existing VP at registration time.  A user can therefore
register an irqfd targeting a yet-to-be-created VP, then trigger
mshv_try_assert_irq_fast() concurrently with MSHV_CREATE_VP for the
same index.  On weakly-ordered architectures the reader can observe a
non-NULL pointer in pt_vp_array before the initialising stores to the
VP struct become visible, leading to use of partially-initialised
fields (e.g. vp_register_page).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The other ISR readers cannot reach this race: the hypervisor will not
generate intercept or scheduler messages for a VP that has never been
told to run, and the user can only call MSHV_RUN_VP on the VP fd
returned by MSHV_CREATE_VP, which by construction is returned after
the publish.  Leave those readers as plain loads.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Use smp_store_release() in mshv_partition_ioctl_create_vp() to publish…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-8532-xhgq-93cj</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-80895</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-80895</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 120 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mshv: Order pt_vp_array publish against irqfd assertion path mshv_partition_ioctl_create_vp() initialises a VP struct (allocations, mutex_init, init_waitqueue_head, page mappings) and then publishes the pointer into partition-&amp;gt;pt_vp_array.  Several ISR paths read this array locklessly: the intercept ISR, the two scheduler ISRs, and mshv_try_assert_irq_fast() on the irqfd fast path. Of these, only mshv_try_assert_irq_fast() can structurally race the publish.  It runs from an eventfd waker without holding pt_mutex, and MSHV_IRQFD does not require the target lapic_apic_id (== vp_index) to refer to an existing VP at registration time.  A user can therefore register an irqfd targeting a yet-to-be-created VP, then trigger mshv_try_assert_irq_fast() concurrently with MSHV_CREATE_VP for the same index.  On weakly-ordered architectures the reader can observe a non-NULL pointer in pt_vp_array before the initialising stores to the VP struct become visible, leading to use of partially-initialised fields (e.g. vp_register_page). The other ISR readers cannot reach this race: the hypervisor will not generate intercept or scheduler messages for a VP that has never been told to run, and the user can only call MSHV_RUN_VP on the VP fd returned by MSHV_CREATE_VP, which by construction is returned after the publish.  Leave those readers as plain loads. Use smp_store_release() in mshv_partition_ioctl_create_vp() to publish the p…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 120 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mshv: Order pt_vp_array publish against irqfd assertion path mshv_partition_ioctl_create_vp() initialises a VP struct (allocations, mutex_init, init_waitqueue_head, page mappings) and then publishes the pointer into partition-&amp;gt;pt_vp_array.  Several ISR paths read this array locklessly: the intercept ISR, the two scheduler ISRs, and mshv_try_assert_irq_fast() on the irqfd fast path. Of these, only mshv_try_assert_irq_fast() can structurally race the publish.  It runs from an eventfd waker without holding pt_mutex, and MSHV_IRQFD does not require the target lapic_apic_id (== vp_index) to refer to an existing VP at registration time.  A user can therefore register an irqfd targeting a yet-to-be-created VP, then trigger mshv_try_assert_irq_fast() concurrently with MSHV_CREATE_VP for the same index.  On weakly-ordered architectures the reader can observe a non-NULL pointer in pt_vp_array before the initialising stores to the VP struct become visible, leading to use of partially-initialised fields (e.g. vp_register_page). The other ISR readers cannot reach this race: the hypervisor will not generate intercept or scheduler messages for a VP that has never been told to run, and the user can only call MSHV_RUN_VP on the VP fd returned by MSHV_CREATE_VP, which by construction is returned after the publish.  Leave those readers as plain loads. Use smp_store_release() in mshv_partition_ioctl_create_vp() to publish the p…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-80895</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-3211 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-3211</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein entfernter, anonymer Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um Speicherfehler und Kernel-Abstürze beziehungsweise Denial-of-Service-Zustände auszulösen, Speicher außerhalb vorgesehener Grenzen auszulesen sowie in einzelnen Fällen weitere Sicherheitsauswirkungen zu verursachen.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein entfernter, anonymer Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um Speicherfehler und Kernel-Abstürze beziehungsweise Denial-of-Service-Zustände auszulösen, Speicher außerhalb vorgesehener Grenzen auszulesen sowie in einzelnen Fällen weitere Sicherheitsauswirkungen zu verursachen.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-3211</guid>
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