<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Sat, 03 Oct 2026 23:40:47 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BELL-CVE-2026-80810</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-80810</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-80810</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-363828</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-363828</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-363828</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-363828</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-80810</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-80810</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;io_uring/rsrc: fix folio size overflow in io_vec_fill_bvec()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;io_vec_fill_bvec() computes the folio size with a plain int 1:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;unsigned long folio_size = 1 &amp;lt;&amp;lt; imu-&amp;gt;folio_shift;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;imu-&amp;gt;folio_shift is unsigned int and comes from folio_shift() of the
folio backing the registered buffer, so it can be 32 or more on a 64 bit
kernel. Shifting int 1 that far is undefined, and on x86 and arm64 the
count is taken modulo 32, so a shift of 34 yields 4 rather than 16G.
Every other folio_shift shift in this file already uses 1UL.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The result is that the segment estimate and the fill loop disagree.
io_estimate_bvec_size() sizes the bvec array with the real shift:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;max_segs += (iov[i].iov_len &amp;gt;&amp;gt; shift) + 2;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;so a 1M iovec on a 16G folio is charged 2 segments, while
io_vec_fill_bvec() then walks the same iovec in folio_size chunks of 4
bytes and writes res_bvec[bvec_idx] a quarter of a million times, past
the end of the array it was given. src_bvec is advanced once per
iteration as well, so imu-&amp;gt;bvec is read past its end at the same time.
validate_fixed_range() only checks that the range is inside the
registered buffer and does not bound the segment count.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reaching it needs a folio with a shift of at least 32, which means a
gigantic hugetlb page: 16G on arm64 with 64K pages, where
CONT_PMD_SHIFT is 34 and hugetlb_add_hstate(CONT_PMD_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT)
registers that size, and likewise on powerpc. x86_64 tops out at 1G, so…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;io_uring/rsrc: fix folio size overflow in io_vec_fill_bvec()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;io_vec_fill_bvec() computes the folio size with a plain int 1:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;unsigned long folio_size = 1 &amp;lt;&amp;lt; imu-&amp;gt;folio_shift;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;imu-&amp;gt;folio_shift is unsigned int and comes from folio_shift() of the
folio backing the registered buffer, so it can be 32 or more on a 64 bit
kernel. Shifting int 1 that far is undefined, and on x86 and arm64 the
count is taken modulo 32, so a shift of 34 yields 4 rather than 16G.
Every other folio_shift shift in this file already uses 1UL.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The result is that the segment estimate and the fill loop disagree.
io_estimate_bvec_size() sizes the bvec array with the real shift:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;max_segs += (iov[i].iov_len &amp;gt;&amp;gt; shift) + 2;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;so a 1M iovec on a 16G folio is charged 2 segments, while
io_vec_fill_bvec() then walks the same iovec in folio_size chunks of 4
bytes and writes res_bvec[bvec_idx] a quarter of a million times, past
the end of the array it was given. src_bvec is advanced once per
iteration as well, so imu-&amp;gt;bvec is read past its end at the same time.
validate_fixed_range() only checks that the range is inside the
registered buffer and does not bound the segment count.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reaching it needs a folio with a shift of at least 32, which means a
gigantic hugetlb page: 16G on arm64 with 64K pages, where
CONT_PMD_SHIFT is 34 and hugetlb_add_hstate(CONT_PMD_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT)
registers that size, and likewise on powerpc. x86_64 tops out at 1G, so…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-80810</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-ccgp-64pj-g833</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-ccgp-64pj-g833</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;io_uring/rsrc: fix folio size overflow in io_vec_fill_bvec()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;io_vec_fill_bvec() computes the folio size with a plain int 1:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;unsigned long folio_size = 1 &amp;lt;&amp;lt; imu-&amp;gt;folio_shift;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;imu-&amp;gt;folio_shift is unsigned int and comes from folio_shift() of the
folio backing the registered buffer, so it can be 32 or more on a 64 bit
kernel. Shifting int 1 that far is undefined, and on x86 and arm64 the
count is taken modulo 32, so a shift of 34 yields 4 rather than 16G.
Every other folio_shift shift in this file already uses 1UL.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The result is that the segment estimate and the fill loop disagree.
io_estimate_bvec_size() sizes the bvec array with the real shift:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;max_segs += (iov[i].iov_len &amp;gt;&amp;gt; shift) + 2;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;so a 1M iovec on a 16G folio is charged 2 segments, while
io_vec_fill_bvec() then walks the same iovec in folio_size chunks of 4
bytes and writes res_bvec[bvec_idx] a quarter of a million times, past
the end of the array it was given. src_bvec is advanced once per
iteration as well, so imu-&amp;gt;bvec is read past its end at the same time.
validate_fixed_range() only checks that the range is inside the
registered buffer and does not bound the segment count.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reaching it needs a folio with a shift of at least 32, which means a
gigantic hugetlb page: 16G on arm64 with 64K pages, where
CONT_PMD_SHIFT is 34 and hugetlb_add_hstate(CONT_PMD_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT)
registers that size, and likewise on powerpc. x86_64 tops out at 1G, so…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;io_uring/rsrc: fix folio size overflow in io_vec_fill_bvec()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;io_vec_fill_bvec() computes the folio size with a plain int 1:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;unsigned long folio_size = 1 &amp;lt;&amp;lt; imu-&amp;gt;folio_shift;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;imu-&amp;gt;folio_shift is unsigned int and comes from folio_shift() of the
folio backing the registered buffer, so it can be 32 or more on a 64 bit
kernel. Shifting int 1 that far is undefined, and on x86 and arm64 the
count is taken modulo 32, so a shift of 34 yields 4 rather than 16G.
Every other folio_shift shift in this file already uses 1UL.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The result is that the segment estimate and the fill loop disagree.
io_estimate_bvec_size() sizes the bvec array with the real shift:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;max_segs += (iov[i].iov_len &amp;gt;&amp;gt; shift) + 2;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;so a 1M iovec on a 16G folio is charged 2 segments, while
io_vec_fill_bvec() then walks the same iovec in folio_size chunks of 4
bytes and writes res_bvec[bvec_idx] a quarter of a million times, past
the end of the array it was given. src_bvec is advanced once per
iteration as well, so imu-&amp;gt;bvec is read past its end at the same time.
validate_fixed_range() only checks that the range is inside the
registered buffer and does not bound the segment count.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reaching it needs a folio with a shift of at least 32, which means a
gigantic hugetlb page: 16G on arm64 with 64K pages, where
CONT_PMD_SHIFT is 34 and hugetlb_add_hstate(CONT_PMD_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT)
registers that size, and likewise on powerpc. x86_64 tops out at 1G, so…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-ccgp-64pj-g833</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>openSUSE-SU-2026:11773-1 — kernel-devel-7.2.5-1.1 on GA media</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11773-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;kernel-devel-7.2.5-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;kernel-devel-7.2.5-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11773-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-80810</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-80810</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 120 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: io_uring/rsrc: fix folio size overflow in io_vec_fill_bvec() io_vec_fill_bvec() computes the folio size with a plain int 1: 	unsigned long folio_size = 1 &amp;lt;&amp;lt; imu-&amp;gt;folio_shift; imu-&amp;gt;folio_shift is unsigned int and comes from folio_shift() of the folio backing the registered buffer, so it can be 32 or more on a 64 bit kernel. Shifting int 1 that far is undefined, and on x86 and arm64 the count is taken modulo 32, so a shift of 34 yields 4 rather than 16G. Every other folio_shift shift in this file already uses 1UL. The result is that the segment estimate and the fill loop disagree. io_estimate_bvec_size() sizes the bvec array with the real shift: 	max_segs += (iov[i].iov_len &amp;gt;&amp;gt; shift) + 2; so a 1M iovec on a 16G folio is charged 2 segments, while io_vec_fill_bvec() then walks the same iovec in folio_size chunks of 4 bytes and writes res_bvec[bvec_idx] a quarter of a million times, past the end of the array it was given. src_bvec is advanced once per iteration as well, so imu-&amp;gt;bvec is read past its end at the same time. validate_fixed_range() only checks that the range is inside the registered buffer and does not bound the segment count. Reaching it needs a folio with a shift of at least 32, which means a gigantic hugetlb page: 16G on arm64 with 64K pages, where CONT_PMD_SHIFT is 34 and hugetlb_add_hstate(CONT_PMD_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT) registers that size, and likewise on powerpc. x86_64 tops out at 1G, so a shift…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 120 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: io_uring/rsrc: fix folio size overflow in io_vec_fill_bvec() io_vec_fill_bvec() computes the folio size with a plain int 1: 	unsigned long folio_size = 1 &amp;lt;&amp;lt; imu-&amp;gt;folio_shift; imu-&amp;gt;folio_shift is unsigned int and comes from folio_shift() of the folio backing the registered buffer, so it can be 32 or more on a 64 bit kernel. Shifting int 1 that far is undefined, and on x86 and arm64 the count is taken modulo 32, so a shift of 34 yields 4 rather than 16G. Every other folio_shift shift in this file already uses 1UL. The result is that the segment estimate and the fill loop disagree. io_estimate_bvec_size() sizes the bvec array with the real shift: 	max_segs += (iov[i].iov_len &amp;gt;&amp;gt; shift) + 2; so a 1M iovec on a 16G folio is charged 2 segments, while io_vec_fill_bvec() then walks the same iovec in folio_size chunks of 4 bytes and writes res_bvec[bvec_idx] a quarter of a million times, past the end of the array it was given. src_bvec is advanced once per iteration as well, so imu-&amp;gt;bvec is read past its end at the same time. validate_fixed_range() only checks that the range is inside the registered buffer and does not bound the segment count. Reaching it needs a folio with a shift of at least 32, which means a gigantic hugetlb page: 16G on arm64 with 64K pages, where CONT_PMD_SHIFT is 34 and hugetlb_add_hstate(CONT_PMD_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT) registers that size, and likewise on powerpc. x86_64 tops out at 1G, so a shift…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-80810</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-3211 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-3211</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein entfernter, anonymer Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um Speicherfehler und Kernel-Abstürze beziehungsweise Denial-of-Service-Zustände auszulösen, Speicher außerhalb vorgesehener Grenzen auszulesen sowie in einzelnen Fällen weitere Sicherheitsauswirkungen zu verursachen.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein entfernter, anonymer Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um Speicherfehler und Kernel-Abstürze beziehungsweise Denial-of-Service-Zustände auszulösen, Speicher außerhalb vorgesehener Grenzen auszulesen sowie in einzelnen Fällen weitere Sicherheitsauswirkungen zu verursachen.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-3211</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
