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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 02 Oct 2026 18:43:58 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BELL-CVE-2026-80780</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-80780</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-80780</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>certfr-2026-avi-1253 — De multiples vulnérabilités ont été découvertes dans le noyau Linux de Debian. Certaines d'entre elles permettent à un…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1253</link>
      <description>certfr-2026-avi-1253</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1253</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-363801</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-363801</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-363801</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-363801</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-80780</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-80780</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;HID: pidff: fix OOB write when hid-&amp;gt;inputs is empty&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;hid_pidff_init_with_quirks() derives its input_dev from&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;list_entry(hid-&amp;gt;inputs.next, struct hid_input, list)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;without first checking that hid-&amp;gt;inputs is non-empty.  The list member
of struct hid_input is at offset 0, so on an empty list list_entry()
yields &amp;amp;hid-&amp;gt;inputs itself and the following hidinput-&amp;gt;input load reads
an unrelated member of struct hid_device.  dev is then a type-confused
pointer, and force-feedback init writes through it: each
set_bit(FF_*, dev-&amp;gt;ffbit) stores 8 bytes at dev + 192, past the end of
the object dev actually aliases, and input_ff_create() adds further
writes of a heap pointer and two function pointers.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Until hid-universal-pidff the only caller was hid_pidff_init() from
usbhid, which runs under HID_CLAIMED_INPUT and therefore always has at
least one hid_input.  universal_pidff_probe() starts the device with
HID_CONNECT_DEFAULT &amp;amp; ~HID_CONNECT_FF and then calls
hid_pidff_init_with_quirks() directly whenever the descriptor carries a
PID usage page, bypassing that gate.  A report descriptor whose only
application collection is on HID_UP_PID leaves hid-&amp;gt;inputs empty while
hid_connect() still succeeds through the hidraw claim, so probe reaches
the unguarded list_entry().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The write happens in the USB probe path, on the hotplug workqueue, so
plugging in a malicious device is enough to trigger it; no attacker
software and no logge…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;HID: pidff: fix OOB write when hid-&amp;gt;inputs is empty&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;hid_pidff_init_with_quirks() derives its input_dev from&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;list_entry(hid-&amp;gt;inputs.next, struct hid_input, list)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;without first checking that hid-&amp;gt;inputs is non-empty.  The list member
of struct hid_input is at offset 0, so on an empty list list_entry()
yields &amp;amp;hid-&amp;gt;inputs itself and the following hidinput-&amp;gt;input load reads
an unrelated member of struct hid_device.  dev is then a type-confused
pointer, and force-feedback init writes through it: each
set_bit(FF_*, dev-&amp;gt;ffbit) stores 8 bytes at dev + 192, past the end of
the object dev actually aliases, and input_ff_create() adds further
writes of a heap pointer and two function pointers.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Until hid-universal-pidff the only caller was hid_pidff_init() from
usbhid, which runs under HID_CLAIMED_INPUT and therefore always has at
least one hid_input.  universal_pidff_probe() starts the device with
HID_CONNECT_DEFAULT &amp;amp; ~HID_CONNECT_FF and then calls
hid_pidff_init_with_quirks() directly whenever the descriptor carries a
PID usage page, bypassing that gate.  A report descriptor whose only
application collection is on HID_UP_PID leaves hid-&amp;gt;inputs empty while
hid_connect() still succeeds through the hidraw claim, so probe reaches
the unguarded list_entry().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The write happens in the USB probe path, on the hotplug workqueue, so
plugging in a malicious device is enough to trigger it; no attacker
software and no logge…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-80780</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-rxff-7rcf-x4wj</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-rxff-7rcf-x4wj</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;HID: pidff: fix OOB write when hid-&amp;gt;inputs is empty&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;hid_pidff_init_with_quirks() derives its input_dev from&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;list_entry(hid-&amp;gt;inputs.next, struct hid_input, list)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;without first checking that hid-&amp;gt;inputs is non-empty.  The list member
of struct hid_input is at offset 0, so on an empty list list_entry()
yields &amp;amp;hid-&amp;gt;inputs itself and the following hidinput-&amp;gt;input load reads
an unrelated member of struct hid_device.  dev is then a type-confused
pointer, and force-feedback init writes through it: each
set_bit(FF_*, dev-&amp;gt;ffbit) stores 8 bytes at dev + 192, past the end of
the object dev actually aliases, and input_ff_create() adds further
writes of a heap pointer and two function pointers.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Until hid-universal-pidff the only caller was hid_pidff_init() from
usbhid, which runs under HID_CLAIMED_INPUT and therefore always has at
least one hid_input.  universal_pidff_probe() starts the device with
HID_CONNECT_DEFAULT &amp;amp; ~HID_CONNECT_FF and then calls
hid_pidff_init_with_quirks() directly whenever the descriptor carries a
PID usage page, bypassing that gate.  A report descriptor whose only
application collection is on HID_UP_PID leaves hid-&amp;gt;inputs empty while
hid_connect() still succeeds through the hidraw claim, so probe reaches
the unguarded list_entry().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The write happens in the USB probe path, on the hotplug workqueue, so
plugging in a malicious device is enough to trigger it; no attacker
software and no logge…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;HID: pidff: fix OOB write when hid-&amp;gt;inputs is empty&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;hid_pidff_init_with_quirks() derives its input_dev from&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;list_entry(hid-&amp;gt;inputs.next, struct hid_input, list)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;without first checking that hid-&amp;gt;inputs is non-empty.  The list member
of struct hid_input is at offset 0, so on an empty list list_entry()
yields &amp;amp;hid-&amp;gt;inputs itself and the following hidinput-&amp;gt;input load reads
an unrelated member of struct hid_device.  dev is then a type-confused
pointer, and force-feedback init writes through it: each
set_bit(FF_*, dev-&amp;gt;ffbit) stores 8 bytes at dev + 192, past the end of
the object dev actually aliases, and input_ff_create() adds further
writes of a heap pointer and two function pointers.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Until hid-universal-pidff the only caller was hid_pidff_init() from
usbhid, which runs under HID_CLAIMED_INPUT and therefore always has at
least one hid_input.  universal_pidff_probe() starts the device with
HID_CONNECT_DEFAULT &amp;amp; ~HID_CONNECT_FF and then calls
hid_pidff_init_with_quirks() directly whenever the descriptor carries a
PID usage page, bypassing that gate.  A report descriptor whose only
application collection is on HID_UP_PID leaves hid-&amp;gt;inputs empty while
hid_connect() still succeeds through the hidraw claim, so probe reaches
the unguarded list_entry().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The write happens in the USB probe path, on the hotplug workqueue, so
plugging in a malicious device is enough to trigger it; no attacker
software and no logge…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-rxff-7rcf-x4wj</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>msrc_CVE-2026-80780 — HID: pidff: fix OOB write when hid-&gt;inputs is empty</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-80780</link>
      <description>msrc_CVE-2026-80780</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-80780</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>openSUSE-SU-2026:11773-1 — kernel-devel-7.2.5-1.1 on GA media</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11773-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;kernel-devel-7.2.5-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;kernel-devel-7.2.5-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11773-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-80780</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-80780</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 154 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: pidff: fix OOB write when hid-&amp;gt;inputs is empty hid_pidff_init_with_quirks() derives its input_dev from 	list_entry(hid-&amp;gt;inputs.next, struct hid_input, list) without first checking that hid-&amp;gt;inputs is non-empty.  The list member of struct hid_input is at offset 0, so on an empty list list_entry() yields &amp;amp;hid-&amp;gt;inputs itself and the following hidinput-&amp;gt;input load reads an unrelated member of struct hid_device.  dev is then a type-confused pointer, and force-feedback init writes through it: each set_bit(FF_*, dev-&amp;gt;ffbit) stores 8 bytes at dev + 192, past the end of the object dev actually aliases, and input_ff_create() adds further writes of a heap pointer and two function pointers. Until hid-universal-pidff the only caller was hid_pidff_init() from usbhid, which runs under HID_CLAIMED_INPUT and therefore always has at least one hid_input.  universal_pidff_probe() starts the device with HID_CONNECT_DEFAULT &amp;amp; ~HID_CONNECT_FF and then calls hid_pidff_init_with_quirks() directly whenever the descriptor carries a PID usage page, bypassing that gate.  A report descriptor whose only application collection is on HID_UP_PID leaves hid-&amp;gt;inputs empty while hid_connect() still succeeds through the hidraw claim, so probe reaches the unguarded list_entry(). The write happens in the USB probe path, on the hotplug workqueue, so plugging in a malicious device is enough to trigger it; no attacker software and no logged-in u…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 154 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: pidff: fix OOB write when hid-&amp;gt;inputs is empty hid_pidff_init_with_quirks() derives its input_dev from 	list_entry(hid-&amp;gt;inputs.next, struct hid_input, list) without first checking that hid-&amp;gt;inputs is non-empty.  The list member of struct hid_input is at offset 0, so on an empty list list_entry() yields &amp;amp;hid-&amp;gt;inputs itself and the following hidinput-&amp;gt;input load reads an unrelated member of struct hid_device.  dev is then a type-confused pointer, and force-feedback init writes through it: each set_bit(FF_*, dev-&amp;gt;ffbit) stores 8 bytes at dev + 192, past the end of the object dev actually aliases, and input_ff_create() adds further writes of a heap pointer and two function pointers. Until hid-universal-pidff the only caller was hid_pidff_init() from usbhid, which runs under HID_CLAIMED_INPUT and therefore always has at least one hid_input.  universal_pidff_probe() starts the device with HID_CONNECT_DEFAULT &amp;amp; ~HID_CONNECT_FF and then calls hid_pidff_init_with_quirks() directly whenever the descriptor carries a PID usage page, bypassing that gate.  A report descriptor whose only application collection is on HID_UP_PID leaves hid-&amp;gt;inputs empty while hid_connect() still succeeds through the hidraw claim, so probe reaches the unguarded list_entry(). The write happens in the USB probe path, on the hotplug workqueue, so plugging in a malicious device is enough to trigger it; no attacker software and no logged-in u…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-80780</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-3211 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-3211</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein entfernter, anonymer Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um Speicherfehler und Kernel-Abstürze beziehungsweise Denial-of-Service-Zustände auszulösen, Speicher außerhalb vorgesehener Grenzen auszulesen sowie in einzelnen Fällen weitere Sicherheitsauswirkungen zu verursachen.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein entfernter, anonymer Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um Speicherfehler und Kernel-Abstürze beziehungsweise Denial-of-Service-Zustände auszulösen, Speicher außerhalb vorgesehener Grenzen auszulesen sowie in einzelnen Fällen weitere Sicherheitsauswirkungen zu verursachen.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-3211</guid>
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