https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Sun, 04 Oct 2026 00:01:34 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-80700 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-80700 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1232 certfr-2026-avi-1232 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1232 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-361578 EUVD-2026-361578 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-361578 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-80700 <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>drm/vmwgfx: validate external BO copy bounds for both stride paths</p> <p>vmw_external_bo_copy() trusts caller-supplied offsets, strides, and heights and operates on imported dma-buf vmaps:</p> <p>- The equal-stride memcpy() bound was clamped after subtracting the offsets from dst_size and src_size; an offset larger than the BO size wraps the unsigned subtraction to a huge value and the resulting memcpy() runs off the end of the vmap. dst_stride * height is also a u32 multiplication that can overflow. - The non-equal-stride row-by-row path had no bound at all. The loop touches bytes through offset + (height - 1) * stride + width_in_bytes, with only a WARN_ON(dst_stride &lt; width_in_bytes), and could likewise step past the end of either mapping.</p> <p>The offsets and strides are derived from STDU/SOU plane state, so a configured CRTC submitting a crafted atomic commit on an imported framebuffer can reach this path.</p> <p>Validate the exact row-copy endpoint against each BO&#39;s size up front using check_mul_overflow() and check_add_overflow(). Use the bulk memcpy() path only when width_in_bytes covers the whole stride; otherwise copy one row at a time so partial-row updates near the bottom of a framebuffer remain valid. Also reject zero strides and stride &lt; width_in_bytes, both of which the row-by-row path cannot represent safely.</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>drm/vmwgfx: validate external BO copy bounds for both stride paths</p> <p>vmw_external_bo_copy() trusts caller-supplied offsets, strides, and heights and operates on imported dma-buf vmaps:</p> <p>- The equal-stride memcpy() bound was clamped after subtracting the offsets from dst_size and src_size; an offset larger than the BO size wraps the unsigned subtraction to a huge value and the resulting memcpy() runs off the end of the vmap. dst_stride * height is also a u32 multiplication that can overflow. - The non-equal-stride row-by-row path had no bound at all. The loop touches bytes through offset + (height - 1) * stride + width_in_bytes, with only a WARN_ON(dst_stride &lt; width_in_bytes), and could likewise step past the end of either mapping.</p> <p>The offsets and strides are derived from STDU/SOU plane state, so a configured CRTC submitting a crafted atomic commit on an imported framebuffer can reach this path.</p> <p>Validate the exact row-copy endpoint against each BO&#39;s size up front using check_mul_overflow() and check_add_overflow(). Use the bulk memcpy() path only when width_in_bytes covers the whole stride; otherwise copy one row at a time so partial-row updates near the bottom of a framebuffer remain valid. Also reject zero strides and stride &lt; width_in_bytes, both of which the row-by-row path cannot represent safely.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-80700 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-c29c-h3vq-mr67 <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>drm/vmwgfx: validate external BO copy bounds for both stride paths</p> <p>vmw_external_bo_copy() trusts caller-supplied offsets, strides, and heights and operates on imported dma-buf vmaps:</p> <p>- The equal-stride memcpy() bound was clamped after subtracting the offsets from dst_size and src_size; an offset larger than the BO size wraps the unsigned subtraction to a huge value and the resulting memcpy() runs off the end of the vmap. dst_stride * height is also a u32 multiplication that can overflow. - The non-equal-stride row-by-row path had no bound at all. The loop touches bytes through offset + (height - 1) * stride + width_in_bytes, with only a WARN_ON(dst_stride &lt; width_in_bytes), and could likewise step past the end of either mapping.</p> <p>The offsets and strides are derived from STDU/SOU plane state, so a configured CRTC submitting a crafted atomic commit on an imported framebuffer can reach this path.</p> <p>Validate the exact row-copy endpoint against each BO&#39;s size up front using check_mul_overflow() and check_add_overflow(). Use the bulk memcpy() path only when width_in_bytes covers the whole stride; otherwise copy one row at a time so partial-row updates near the bottom of a framebuffer remain valid. Also reject zero strides and stride &lt; width_in_bytes, both of which the row-by-row path cannot represent safely.</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>drm/vmwgfx: validate external BO copy bounds for both stride paths</p> <p>vmw_external_bo_copy() trusts caller-supplied offsets, strides, and heights and operates on imported dma-buf vmaps:</p> <p>- The equal-stride memcpy() bound was clamped after subtracting the offsets from dst_size and src_size; an offset larger than the BO size wraps the unsigned subtraction to a huge value and the resulting memcpy() runs off the end of the vmap. dst_stride * height is also a u32 multiplication that can overflow. - The non-equal-stride row-by-row path had no bound at all. The loop touches bytes through offset + (height - 1) * stride + width_in_bytes, with only a WARN_ON(dst_stride &lt; width_in_bytes), and could likewise step past the end of either mapping.</p> <p>The offsets and strides are derived from STDU/SOU plane state, so a configured CRTC submitting a crafted atomic commit on an imported framebuffer can reach this path.</p> <p>Validate the exact row-copy endpoint against each BO&#39;s size up front using check_mul_overflow() and check_add_overflow(). Use the bulk memcpy() path only when width_in_bytes covers the whole stride; otherwise copy one row at a time so partial-row updates near the bottom of a framebuffer remain valid. Also reject zero strides and stride &lt; width_in_bytes, both of which the row-by-row path cannot represent safely.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-c29c-h3vq-mr67 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-80700 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 154 more</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/vmwgfx: validate external BO copy bounds for both stride paths vmw_external_bo_copy() trusts caller-supplied offsets, strides, and heights and operates on imported dma-buf vmaps: - The equal-stride memcpy() bound was clamped after subtracting the offsets from dst_size and src_size; an offset larger than the BO size wraps the unsigned subtraction to a huge value and the resulting memcpy() runs off the end of the vmap. dst_stride * height is also a u32 multiplication that can overflow. - The non-equal-stride row-by-row path had no bound at all. The loop touches bytes through offset + (height - 1) * stride + width_in_bytes, with only a WARN_ON(dst_stride &lt; width_in_bytes), and could likewise step past the end of either mapping. The offsets and strides are derived from STDU/SOU plane state, so a configured CRTC submitting a crafted atomic commit on an imported framebuffer can reach this path. Validate the exact row-copy endpoint against each BO&#39;s size up front using check_mul_overflow() and check_add_overflow(). Use the bulk memcpy() path only when width_in_bytes covers the whole stride; otherwise copy one row at a time so partial-row updates near the bottom of a framebuffer remain valid. Also reject zero strides and stride &lt; width_in_bytes, both of which the row-by-row path cannot represent safely.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 154 more</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/vmwgfx: validate external BO copy bounds for both stride paths vmw_external_bo_copy() trusts caller-supplied offsets, strides, and heights and operates on imported dma-buf vmaps: - The equal-stride memcpy() bound was clamped after subtracting the offsets from dst_size and src_size; an offset larger than the BO size wraps the unsigned subtraction to a huge value and the resulting memcpy() runs off the end of the vmap. dst_stride * height is also a u32 multiplication that can overflow. - The non-equal-stride row-by-row path had no bound at all. The loop touches bytes through offset + (height - 1) * stride + width_in_bytes, with only a WARN_ON(dst_stride &lt; width_in_bytes), and could likewise step past the end of either mapping. The offsets and strides are derived from STDU/SOU plane state, so a configured CRTC submitting a crafted atomic commit on an imported framebuffer can reach this path. Validate the exact row-copy endpoint against each BO&#39;s size up front using check_mul_overflow() and check_add_overflow(). Use the bulk memcpy() path only when width_in_bytes covers the whole stride; otherwise copy one row at a time so partial-row updates near the bottom of a framebuffer remain valid. Also reject zero strides and stride &lt; width_in_bytes, both of which the row-by-row path cannot represent safely.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-80700 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-3075 <p>Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen, darunter möglicherweise Speicherbeschädigungen, die Offenlegung oder Manipulation von Daten sowie Denial-of-Service-Zustände.</p> <p>Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen, darunter möglicherweise Speicherbeschädigungen, die Offenlegung oder Manipulation von Daten sowie Denial-of-Service-Zustände.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-3075