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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sun, 04 Oct 2026 00:52:36 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BELL-CVE-2026-80602</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-80602</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-80602</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-361010</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-361010</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-361010</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-361010</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-80602</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-80602</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;perf/x86/amd/lbr: Fix kernel address leakage&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A user-only branch stack can contain branches that originate from
the kernel. As a result, kernel addresses are exposed to user space
even when PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_USER is requested. On AMD processors
supporting X86_FEATURE_AMD_LBR_V2, perf can still report SYSRET/ERET
entries for which the branch-from addresses are in the kernel.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;E.g.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;$ perf record -e cycles -o - -j any,save_type,u -- \
        perf bench syscall basic --loop 1000 | \
        perf script -i - -F brstack|tr &amp;#39; &amp;#39; &amp;#39;\n&amp;#39;| \
        grep -E &amp;#39;0x[89a-f][0-9a-f]{15}&amp;#39;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;...
  0xffffffff81001268/0x717a90a38f1a/M/-/-/0/ERET/NON_SPEC_CORRECT_PATH
  0xffffffff81001268/0x717a90a39157/M/-/-/0/ERET/NON_SPEC_CORRECT_PATH
  0xffffffff81001268/0x717a90a2c628/M/-/-/0/ERET/NON_SPEC_CORRECT_PATH
  0xffffffff81001268/0x717a90a41b60/M/-/-/0/ERET/NON_SPEC_CORRECT_PATH
  0xffffffff81001268/0x717a90a260db/M/-/-/0/ERET/NON_SPEC_CORRECT_PATH
  0xffffffff81001268/0x717a90a260db/M/-/-/0/ERET/NON_SPEC_CORRECT_PATH
  0xffffffff81001268/0x717a8bef1c30/M/-/-/0/ERET/NON_SPEC_CORRECT_PATH
  0xffffffff81001268/0x717a8e4d3c90/M/-/-/0/ERET/NON_SPEC_CORRECT_PATH
  ...&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The reason is that the hardware filter only considers the privilege
level applicable to the branch target. Extend software filtering to
also validate the branch-from addresses against br_sel, so that any
branch record whose branch-from address is in the kernel is drop…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;perf/x86/amd/lbr: Fix kernel address leakage&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A user-only branch stack can contain branches that originate from
the kernel. As a result, kernel addresses are exposed to user space
even when PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_USER is requested. On AMD processors
supporting X86_FEATURE_AMD_LBR_V2, perf can still report SYSRET/ERET
entries for which the branch-from addresses are in the kernel.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;E.g.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;$ perf record -e cycles -o - -j any,save_type,u -- \
        perf bench syscall basic --loop 1000 | \
        perf script -i - -F brstack|tr &amp;#39; &amp;#39; &amp;#39;\n&amp;#39;| \
        grep -E &amp;#39;0x[89a-f][0-9a-f]{15}&amp;#39;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;...
  0xffffffff81001268/0x717a90a38f1a/M/-/-/0/ERET/NON_SPEC_CORRECT_PATH
  0xffffffff81001268/0x717a90a39157/M/-/-/0/ERET/NON_SPEC_CORRECT_PATH
  0xffffffff81001268/0x717a90a2c628/M/-/-/0/ERET/NON_SPEC_CORRECT_PATH
  0xffffffff81001268/0x717a90a41b60/M/-/-/0/ERET/NON_SPEC_CORRECT_PATH
  0xffffffff81001268/0x717a90a260db/M/-/-/0/ERET/NON_SPEC_CORRECT_PATH
  0xffffffff81001268/0x717a90a260db/M/-/-/0/ERET/NON_SPEC_CORRECT_PATH
  0xffffffff81001268/0x717a8bef1c30/M/-/-/0/ERET/NON_SPEC_CORRECT_PATH
  0xffffffff81001268/0x717a8e4d3c90/M/-/-/0/ERET/NON_SPEC_CORRECT_PATH
  ...&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The reason is that the hardware filter only considers the privilege
level applicable to the branch target. Extend software filtering to
also validate the branch-from addresses against br_sel, so that any
branch record whose branch-from address is in the kernel is drop…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-80602</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-p9w6-rgxx-9xh3</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-p9w6-rgxx-9xh3</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;perf/x86/amd/lbr: Fix kernel address leakage&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A user-only branch stack can contain branches that originate from
the kernel. As a result, kernel addresses are exposed to user space
even when PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_USER is requested. On AMD processors
supporting X86_FEATURE_AMD_LBR_V2, perf can still report SYSRET/ERET
entries for which the branch-from addresses are in the kernel.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;E.g.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;$ perf record -e cycles -o - -j any,save_type,u -- \
        perf bench syscall basic --loop 1000 | \
        perf script -i - -F brstack|tr &amp;#39; &amp;#39; &amp;#39;\n&amp;#39;| \
        grep -E &amp;#39;0x[89a-f][0-9a-f]{15}&amp;#39;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;...
  0xffffffff81001268/0x717a90a38f1a/M/-/-/0/ERET/NON_SPEC_CORRECT_PATH
  0xffffffff81001268/0x717a90a39157/M/-/-/0/ERET/NON_SPEC_CORRECT_PATH
  0xffffffff81001268/0x717a90a2c628/M/-/-/0/ERET/NON_SPEC_CORRECT_PATH
  0xffffffff81001268/0x717a90a41b60/M/-/-/0/ERET/NON_SPEC_CORRECT_PATH
  0xffffffff81001268/0x717a90a260db/M/-/-/0/ERET/NON_SPEC_CORRECT_PATH
  0xffffffff81001268/0x717a90a260db/M/-/-/0/ERET/NON_SPEC_CORRECT_PATH
  0xffffffff81001268/0x717a8bef1c30/M/-/-/0/ERET/NON_SPEC_CORRECT_PATH
  0xffffffff81001268/0x717a8e4d3c90/M/-/-/0/ERET/NON_SPEC_CORRECT_PATH
  ...&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The reason is that the hardware filter only considers the privilege
level applicable to the branch target. Extend software filtering to
also validate the branch-from addresses against br_sel, so that any
branch record whose branch-from address is in the kernel is drop…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;perf/x86/amd/lbr: Fix kernel address leakage&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A user-only branch stack can contain branches that originate from
the kernel. As a result, kernel addresses are exposed to user space
even when PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_USER is requested. On AMD processors
supporting X86_FEATURE_AMD_LBR_V2, perf can still report SYSRET/ERET
entries for which the branch-from addresses are in the kernel.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;E.g.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;$ perf record -e cycles -o - -j any,save_type,u -- \
        perf bench syscall basic --loop 1000 | \
        perf script -i - -F brstack|tr &amp;#39; &amp;#39; &amp;#39;\n&amp;#39;| \
        grep -E &amp;#39;0x[89a-f][0-9a-f]{15}&amp;#39;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;...
  0xffffffff81001268/0x717a90a38f1a/M/-/-/0/ERET/NON_SPEC_CORRECT_PATH
  0xffffffff81001268/0x717a90a39157/M/-/-/0/ERET/NON_SPEC_CORRECT_PATH
  0xffffffff81001268/0x717a90a2c628/M/-/-/0/ERET/NON_SPEC_CORRECT_PATH
  0xffffffff81001268/0x717a90a41b60/M/-/-/0/ERET/NON_SPEC_CORRECT_PATH
  0xffffffff81001268/0x717a90a260db/M/-/-/0/ERET/NON_SPEC_CORRECT_PATH
  0xffffffff81001268/0x717a90a260db/M/-/-/0/ERET/NON_SPEC_CORRECT_PATH
  0xffffffff81001268/0x717a8bef1c30/M/-/-/0/ERET/NON_SPEC_CORRECT_PATH
  0xffffffff81001268/0x717a8e4d3c90/M/-/-/0/ERET/NON_SPEC_CORRECT_PATH
  ...&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The reason is that the hardware filter only considers the privilege
level applicable to the branch target. Extend software filtering to
also validate the branch-from addresses against br_sel, so that any
branch record whose branch-from address is in the kernel is drop…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-p9w6-rgxx-9xh3</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-80602</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-80602</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 154 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: perf/x86/amd/lbr: Fix kernel address leakage A user-only branch stack can contain branches that originate from the kernel. As a result, kernel addresses are exposed to user space even when PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_USER is requested. On AMD processors supporting X86_FEATURE_AMD_LBR_V2, perf can still report SYSRET/ERET entries for which the branch-from addresses are in the kernel. E.g.   $ perf record -e cycles -o - -j any,save_type,u -- \         perf bench syscall basic --loop 1000 | \         perf script -i - -F brstack|tr &amp;#39; &amp;#39; &amp;#39;\n&amp;#39;| \         grep -E &amp;#39;0x[89a-f][0-9a-f]{15}&amp;#39;   ...   0xffffffff81001268/0x717a90a38f1a/M/-/-/0/ERET/NON_SPEC_CORRECT_PATH   0xffffffff81001268/0x717a90a39157/M/-/-/0/ERET/NON_SPEC_CORRECT_PATH   0xffffffff81001268/0x717a90a2c628/M/-/-/0/ERET/NON_SPEC_CORRECT_PATH   0xffffffff81001268/0x717a90a41b60/M/-/-/0/ERET/NON_SPEC_CORRECT_PATH   0xffffffff81001268/0x717a90a260db/M/-/-/0/ERET/NON_SPEC_CORRECT_PATH   0xffffffff81001268/0x717a90a260db/M/-/-/0/ERET/NON_SPEC_CORRECT_PATH   0xffffffff81001268/0x717a8bef1c30/M/-/-/0/ERET/NON_SPEC_CORRECT_PATH   0xffffffff81001268/0x717a8e4d3c90/M/-/-/0/ERET/NON_SPEC_CORRECT_PATH   ... The reason is that the hardware filter only considers the privilege level applicable to the branch target. Extend software filtering to also validate the branch-from addresses against br_sel, so that any branch record whose branch-from address is in the kernel is dropped wh…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 154 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: perf/x86/amd/lbr: Fix kernel address leakage A user-only branch stack can contain branches that originate from the kernel. As a result, kernel addresses are exposed to user space even when PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_USER is requested. On AMD processors supporting X86_FEATURE_AMD_LBR_V2, perf can still report SYSRET/ERET entries for which the branch-from addresses are in the kernel. E.g.   $ perf record -e cycles -o - -j any,save_type,u -- \         perf bench syscall basic --loop 1000 | \         perf script -i - -F brstack|tr &amp;#39; &amp;#39; &amp;#39;\n&amp;#39;| \         grep -E &amp;#39;0x[89a-f][0-9a-f]{15}&amp;#39;   ...   0xffffffff81001268/0x717a90a38f1a/M/-/-/0/ERET/NON_SPEC_CORRECT_PATH   0xffffffff81001268/0x717a90a39157/M/-/-/0/ERET/NON_SPEC_CORRECT_PATH   0xffffffff81001268/0x717a90a2c628/M/-/-/0/ERET/NON_SPEC_CORRECT_PATH   0xffffffff81001268/0x717a90a41b60/M/-/-/0/ERET/NON_SPEC_CORRECT_PATH   0xffffffff81001268/0x717a90a260db/M/-/-/0/ERET/NON_SPEC_CORRECT_PATH   0xffffffff81001268/0x717a90a260db/M/-/-/0/ERET/NON_SPEC_CORRECT_PATH   0xffffffff81001268/0x717a8bef1c30/M/-/-/0/ERET/NON_SPEC_CORRECT_PATH   0xffffffff81001268/0x717a8e4d3c90/M/-/-/0/ERET/NON_SPEC_CORRECT_PATH   ... The reason is that the hardware filter only considers the privilege level applicable to the branch target. Extend software filtering to also validate the branch-from addresses against br_sel, so that any branch record whose branch-from address is in the kernel is dropped wh…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-80602</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-3075 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-3075</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen, darunter möglicherweise Speicherbeschädigungen, die Offenlegung oder Manipulation von Daten sowie Denial-of-Service-Zustände.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen, darunter möglicherweise Speicherbeschädigungen, die Offenlegung oder Manipulation von Daten sowie Denial-of-Service-Zustände.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-3075</guid>
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