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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 05 Oct 2026 19:45:59 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BELL-CVE-2026-80575</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-80575</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-80575</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>certfr-2026-avi-1232 — De multiples vulnérabilités ont été découvertes dans le noyau Linux de Debian LTS. Certaines d'entre elles permettent à…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1232</link>
      <description>certfr-2026-avi-1232</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1232</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-359805</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-359805</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-359805</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-359805</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-80575</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-80575</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Input: cs40l50-vibra - validate custom data from user space&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;cs40l50_add() copies the custom data of an FF_PERIODIC/FF_CUSTOM effect
straight from the ff_effect the user passed to EVIOCSFF, without
requiring it to hold anything:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;work_data.custom_data = memdup_array_user(periodic-&amp;gt;custom_data,
                                              periodic-&amp;gt;custom_len,
                                              sizeof(s16));
    work_data.custom_len = periodic-&amp;gt;custom_len;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The driver then reads two words out of that buffer: custom_data[0] as the
waveform bank in cs40l50_effect_bank_set(), and custom_data[1] as the
index within the bank in cs40l50_effect_index_set().  Neither read is
covered by a length check, and custom_len is fully user controlled:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- custom_len == 0 makes memdup_array_user() call memdup_user() with a
    length of zero, which returns ZERO_SIZE_PTR rather than an error, so
    custom_data[0] dereferences it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- custom_len == 1 allocates two bytes.  A bank of ROM or RAM keeps
    effect-&amp;gt;type out of the OWT case, and custom_data[1] is then read one
    word past the allocation.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The bank value itself is also mishandled.  It is masked with
CS40L50_CUSTOM_DATA_MASK (0xffff) but stored in an s16, so a
custom_data[0] of 0x8000 or above wraps to a negative value that passes
the &amp;#34;bank_type &amp;gt;= CS40L50_WVFRM_BANK_NUM&amp;#34; test.
cs40l50_effect_index_set() indexes vib-&amp;gt;dsp.banks[] with it before the
s…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Input: cs40l50-vibra - validate custom data from user space&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;cs40l50_add() copies the custom data of an FF_PERIODIC/FF_CUSTOM effect
straight from the ff_effect the user passed to EVIOCSFF, without
requiring it to hold anything:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;work_data.custom_data = memdup_array_user(periodic-&amp;gt;custom_data,
                                              periodic-&amp;gt;custom_len,
                                              sizeof(s16));
    work_data.custom_len = periodic-&amp;gt;custom_len;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The driver then reads two words out of that buffer: custom_data[0] as the
waveform bank in cs40l50_effect_bank_set(), and custom_data[1] as the
index within the bank in cs40l50_effect_index_set().  Neither read is
covered by a length check, and custom_len is fully user controlled:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- custom_len == 0 makes memdup_array_user() call memdup_user() with a
    length of zero, which returns ZERO_SIZE_PTR rather than an error, so
    custom_data[0] dereferences it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- custom_len == 1 allocates two bytes.  A bank of ROM or RAM keeps
    effect-&amp;gt;type out of the OWT case, and custom_data[1] is then read one
    word past the allocation.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The bank value itself is also mishandled.  It is masked with
CS40L50_CUSTOM_DATA_MASK (0xffff) but stored in an s16, so a
custom_data[0] of 0x8000 or above wraps to a negative value that passes
the &amp;#34;bank_type &amp;gt;= CS40L50_WVFRM_BANK_NUM&amp;#34; test.
cs40l50_effect_index_set() indexes vib-&amp;gt;dsp.banks[] with it before the
s…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-80575</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-6c2r-6hqv-3xph</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-6c2r-6hqv-3xph</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Input: cs40l50-vibra - validate custom data from user space&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;cs40l50_add() copies the custom data of an FF_PERIODIC/FF_CUSTOM effect
straight from the ff_effect the user passed to EVIOCSFF, without
requiring it to hold anything:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;work_data.custom_data = memdup_array_user(periodic-&amp;gt;custom_data,
                                              periodic-&amp;gt;custom_len,
                                              sizeof(s16));
    work_data.custom_len = periodic-&amp;gt;custom_len;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The driver then reads two words out of that buffer: custom_data[0] as the
waveform bank in cs40l50_effect_bank_set(), and custom_data[1] as the
index within the bank in cs40l50_effect_index_set().  Neither read is
covered by a length check, and custom_len is fully user controlled:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- custom_len == 0 makes memdup_array_user() call memdup_user() with a
    length of zero, which returns ZERO_SIZE_PTR rather than an error, so
    custom_data[0] dereferences it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- custom_len == 1 allocates two bytes.  A bank of ROM or RAM keeps
    effect-&amp;gt;type out of the OWT case, and custom_data[1] is then read one
    word past the allocation.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The bank value itself is also mishandled.  It is masked with
CS40L50_CUSTOM_DATA_MASK (0xffff) but stored in an s16, so a
custom_data[0] of 0x8000 or above wraps to a negative value that passes
the &amp;#34;bank_type &amp;gt;= CS40L50_WVFRM_BANK_NUM&amp;#34; test.
cs40l50_effect_index_set() indexes vib-&amp;gt;dsp.banks[] with it before the
s…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Input: cs40l50-vibra - validate custom data from user space&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;cs40l50_add() copies the custom data of an FF_PERIODIC/FF_CUSTOM effect
straight from the ff_effect the user passed to EVIOCSFF, without
requiring it to hold anything:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;work_data.custom_data = memdup_array_user(periodic-&amp;gt;custom_data,
                                              periodic-&amp;gt;custom_len,
                                              sizeof(s16));
    work_data.custom_len = periodic-&amp;gt;custom_len;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The driver then reads two words out of that buffer: custom_data[0] as the
waveform bank in cs40l50_effect_bank_set(), and custom_data[1] as the
index within the bank in cs40l50_effect_index_set().  Neither read is
covered by a length check, and custom_len is fully user controlled:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- custom_len == 0 makes memdup_array_user() call memdup_user() with a
    length of zero, which returns ZERO_SIZE_PTR rather than an error, so
    custom_data[0] dereferences it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- custom_len == 1 allocates two bytes.  A bank of ROM or RAM keeps
    effect-&amp;gt;type out of the OWT case, and custom_data[1] is then read one
    word past the allocation.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The bank value itself is also mishandled.  It is masked with
CS40L50_CUSTOM_DATA_MASK (0xffff) but stored in an s16, so a
custom_data[0] of 0x8000 or above wraps to a negative value that passes
the &amp;#34;bank_type &amp;gt;= CS40L50_WVFRM_BANK_NUM&amp;#34; test.
cs40l50_effect_index_set() indexes vib-&amp;gt;dsp.banks[] with it before the
s…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-6c2r-6hqv-3xph</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-80575</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-80575</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 120 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: cs40l50-vibra - validate custom data from user space cs40l50_add() copies the custom data of an FF_PERIODIC/FF_CUSTOM effect straight from the ff_effect the user passed to EVIOCSFF, without requiring it to hold anything:     work_data.custom_data = memdup_array_user(periodic-&amp;gt;custom_data,                                               periodic-&amp;gt;custom_len,                                               sizeof(s16));     work_data.custom_len = periodic-&amp;gt;custom_len; The driver then reads two words out of that buffer: custom_data[0] as the waveform bank in cs40l50_effect_bank_set(), and custom_data[1] as the index within the bank in cs40l50_effect_index_set().  Neither read is covered by a length check, and custom_len is fully user controlled:   - custom_len == 0 makes memdup_array_user() call memdup_user() with a     length of zero, which returns ZERO_SIZE_PTR rather than an error, so     custom_data[0] dereferences it.   - custom_len == 1 allocates two bytes.  A bank of ROM or RAM keeps     effect-&amp;gt;type out of the OWT case, and custom_data[1] is then read one     word past the allocation. The bank value itself is also mishandled.  It is masked with CS40L50_CUSTOM_DATA_MASK (0xffff) but stored in an s16, so a custom_data[0] of 0x8000 or above wraps to a negative value that passes the &amp;#34;bank_type &amp;gt;= CS40L50_WVFRM_BANK_NUM&amp;#34; test. cs40l50_effect_index_set() indexes vib-&amp;gt;dsp.banks[] with it before the switch s…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 120 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: cs40l50-vibra - validate custom data from user space cs40l50_add() copies the custom data of an FF_PERIODIC/FF_CUSTOM effect straight from the ff_effect the user passed to EVIOCSFF, without requiring it to hold anything:     work_data.custom_data = memdup_array_user(periodic-&amp;gt;custom_data,                                               periodic-&amp;gt;custom_len,                                               sizeof(s16));     work_data.custom_len = periodic-&amp;gt;custom_len; The driver then reads two words out of that buffer: custom_data[0] as the waveform bank in cs40l50_effect_bank_set(), and custom_data[1] as the index within the bank in cs40l50_effect_index_set().  Neither read is covered by a length check, and custom_len is fully user controlled:   - custom_len == 0 makes memdup_array_user() call memdup_user() with a     length of zero, which returns ZERO_SIZE_PTR rather than an error, so     custom_data[0] dereferences it.   - custom_len == 1 allocates two bytes.  A bank of ROM or RAM keeps     effect-&amp;gt;type out of the OWT case, and custom_data[1] is then read one     word past the allocation. The bank value itself is also mishandled.  It is masked with CS40L50_CUSTOM_DATA_MASK (0xffff) but stored in an s16, so a custom_data[0] of 0x8000 or above wraps to a negative value that passes the &amp;#34;bank_type &amp;gt;= CS40L50_WVFRM_BANK_NUM&amp;#34; test. cs40l50_effect_index_set() indexes vib-&amp;gt;dsp.banks[] with it before the switch s…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-80575</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-3042 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-3042</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen, darunter möglicherweise die Ausführung von beliebigem Code, die Ausweitung von Berechtigungen, die Offenlegung von Informationen, die Manipulation von Daten oder Denial-of-Service-Zustände.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen, darunter möglicherweise die Ausführung von beliebigem Code, die Ausweitung von Berechtigungen, die Offenlegung von Informationen, die Manipulation von Daten oder Denial-of-Service-Zustände.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-3042</guid>
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