<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 06 Oct 2026 00:34:09 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BELL-CVE-2026-80527</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-80527</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-80527</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>certfr-2026-avi-1163 — De multiples vulnérabilités ont été découvertes dans le noyau Linux de Debian LTS. Certaines d'entre elles permettent à…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1163</link>
      <description>certfr-2026-avi-1163</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1163</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-359783</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-359783</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-359783</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-359783</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-80527</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-80527</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ceph: fix hanging __ceph_get_caps() with stale mds_wanted&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A reader can hang forever in __ceph_get_caps() when the client no
longer holds `FILE_RD`, but local cap state still says that the
capability is already wanted (via `mds_wanted`).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;One way to trigger this is through MDS cap revocation.  If another
client performs a conflicting operation, the MDS can revoke `FILE_RD`
from the reader; the next read then has to reacquire `FILE_RD`.  If
the cap update that should request `FILE_RD` never reaches the MDS
after `cap-&amp;gt;mds_wanted` was raised, the reader is left holding only
non-file caps while local `mds_wanted` still includes the file read
caps.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In that state, try_get_cap_refs() sees `need &amp;lt;= mds_wanted` and
returns 0, so __ceph_get_caps() just waits on `i_cap_wq`.  If the cap
update that was supposed to request `FILE_RD never reaches the MDS
after `cap-&amp;gt;mds_wanted was` raised, no further request is sent and the
waiter can sleep indefinitely until unrelated cap traffic happens to
wake it up.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The ordering issue is that `cap-&amp;gt;mds_wanted` is updated in
__prep_cap() before the `CEPH_MSG_CLIENT_CAPS message` is actually
queued for send.  That makes one field serve two different meanings at
once: what this client wants, and what the client believes the MDS
already knows it wants.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A proper fix would be to split those states and track whether a cap
update is actually in flight or has been observed by the MDS.
How…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ceph: fix hanging __ceph_get_caps() with stale mds_wanted&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A reader can hang forever in __ceph_get_caps() when the client no
longer holds `FILE_RD`, but local cap state still says that the
capability is already wanted (via `mds_wanted`).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;One way to trigger this is through MDS cap revocation.  If another
client performs a conflicting operation, the MDS can revoke `FILE_RD`
from the reader; the next read then has to reacquire `FILE_RD`.  If
the cap update that should request `FILE_RD` never reaches the MDS
after `cap-&amp;gt;mds_wanted` was raised, the reader is left holding only
non-file caps while local `mds_wanted` still includes the file read
caps.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In that state, try_get_cap_refs() sees `need &amp;lt;= mds_wanted` and
returns 0, so __ceph_get_caps() just waits on `i_cap_wq`.  If the cap
update that was supposed to request `FILE_RD never reaches the MDS
after `cap-&amp;gt;mds_wanted was` raised, no further request is sent and the
waiter can sleep indefinitely until unrelated cap traffic happens to
wake it up.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The ordering issue is that `cap-&amp;gt;mds_wanted` is updated in
__prep_cap() before the `CEPH_MSG_CLIENT_CAPS message` is actually
queued for send.  That makes one field serve two different meanings at
once: what this client wants, and what the client believes the MDS
already knows it wants.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A proper fix would be to split those states and track whether a cap
update is actually in flight or has been observed by the MDS.
How…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-80527</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-q6xj-rvvg-h9r2</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-q6xj-rvvg-h9r2</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ceph: fix hanging __ceph_get_caps() with stale mds_wanted&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A reader can hang forever in __ceph_get_caps() when the client no
longer holds `FILE_RD`, but local cap state still says that the
capability is already wanted (via `mds_wanted`).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;One way to trigger this is through MDS cap revocation.  If another
client performs a conflicting operation, the MDS can revoke `FILE_RD`
from the reader; the next read then has to reacquire `FILE_RD`.  If
the cap update that should request `FILE_RD` never reaches the MDS
after `cap-&amp;gt;mds_wanted` was raised, the reader is left holding only
non-file caps while local `mds_wanted` still includes the file read
caps.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In that state, try_get_cap_refs() sees `need &amp;lt;= mds_wanted` and
returns 0, so __ceph_get_caps() just waits on `i_cap_wq`.  If the cap
update that was supposed to request `FILE_RD never reaches the MDS
after `cap-&amp;gt;mds_wanted was` raised, no further request is sent and the
waiter can sleep indefinitely until unrelated cap traffic happens to
wake it up.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The ordering issue is that `cap-&amp;gt;mds_wanted` is updated in
__prep_cap() before the `CEPH_MSG_CLIENT_CAPS message` is actually
queued for send.  That makes one field serve two different meanings at
once: what this client wants, and what the client believes the MDS
already knows it wants.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A proper fix would be to split those states and track whether a cap
update is actually in flight or has been observed by the MDS.
How…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ceph: fix hanging __ceph_get_caps() with stale mds_wanted&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A reader can hang forever in __ceph_get_caps() when the client no
longer holds `FILE_RD`, but local cap state still says that the
capability is already wanted (via `mds_wanted`).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;One way to trigger this is through MDS cap revocation.  If another
client performs a conflicting operation, the MDS can revoke `FILE_RD`
from the reader; the next read then has to reacquire `FILE_RD`.  If
the cap update that should request `FILE_RD` never reaches the MDS
after `cap-&amp;gt;mds_wanted` was raised, the reader is left holding only
non-file caps while local `mds_wanted` still includes the file read
caps.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In that state, try_get_cap_refs() sees `need &amp;lt;= mds_wanted` and
returns 0, so __ceph_get_caps() just waits on `i_cap_wq`.  If the cap
update that was supposed to request `FILE_RD never reaches the MDS
after `cap-&amp;gt;mds_wanted was` raised, no further request is sent and the
waiter can sleep indefinitely until unrelated cap traffic happens to
wake it up.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The ordering issue is that `cap-&amp;gt;mds_wanted` is updated in
__prep_cap() before the `CEPH_MSG_CLIENT_CAPS message` is actually
queued for send.  That makes one field serve two different meanings at
once: what this client wants, and what the client believes the MDS
already knows it wants.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A proper fix would be to split those states and track whether a cap
update is actually in flight or has been observed by the MDS.
How…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-q6xj-rvvg-h9r2</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>msrc_CVE-2026-80527 — ceph: fix hanging __ceph_get_caps() with stale mds_wanted</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-80527</link>
      <description>msrc_CVE-2026-80527</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-80527</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>OESA-2026-3702 — kernel security update</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/oesa-2026-3702</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP4: kernel&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.&#13;
&#13;
Security Fix(es):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;net/9p: fix double req put in p9_fd_cancelled&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Syzkaller reports a KASAN issue as below:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xfbd59c0000000021: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI
KASAN: maybe wild-memory-access in range [0xdead000000000108-0xdead00000000010f]
CPU: 0 PID: 5083 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 6.1.134-syzkaller-00037-g855bd1d7d838 #0
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.12.0-1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:__list_del include/linux/list.h:114 [inline]
RIP: 0010:__list_del_entry include/linux/list.h:137 [inline]
RIP: 0010:list_del include/linux/list.h:148 [inline]
RIP: 0010:p9_fd_cancelled+0xe9/0x200 net/9p/trans_fd.c:734&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Call Trace:
 &amp;amp;lt;TASK&amp;amp;gt;
 p9_client_flush+0x351/0x440 net/9p/client.c:614
 p9_client_rpc+0xb6b/0xc70 net/9p/client.c:734
 p9_client_version net/9p/client.c:920 [inline]
 p9_client_create+0xb51/0x1240 net/9p/client.c:1027
 v9fs_session_init+0x1f0/0x18f0 fs/9p/v9fs.c:408
 v9fs_mount+0xba/0xcb0 fs/9p/vfs_super.c:126
 legacy_get_tree+0x108/0x220 fs/fs_context.c:632
 vfs_get_tree+0x8e/0x300 fs/super.c:1573
 do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:3056 [inline]
 path_mount+0x6a6/0x1e90 fs/namespace.c:3386
 do_mount fs/namespace.c:3399 [inline]
 __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3607 [inline]
 __se_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3584 [inline]
 __x64_sys_mount+0x283/0x300 fs/namespace.c:358…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP4: kernel&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.&#13;
&#13;
Security Fix(es):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;net/9p: fix double req put in p9_fd_cancelled&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Syzkaller reports a KASAN issue as below:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xfbd59c0000000021: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI
KASAN: maybe wild-memory-access in range [0xdead000000000108-0xdead00000000010f]
CPU: 0 PID: 5083 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 6.1.134-syzkaller-00037-g855bd1d7d838 #0
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.12.0-1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:__list_del include/linux/list.h:114 [inline]
RIP: 0010:__list_del_entry include/linux/list.h:137 [inline]
RIP: 0010:list_del include/linux/list.h:148 [inline]
RIP: 0010:p9_fd_cancelled+0xe9/0x200 net/9p/trans_fd.c:734&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Call Trace:
 &amp;amp;lt;TASK&amp;amp;gt;
 p9_client_flush+0x351/0x440 net/9p/client.c:614
 p9_client_rpc+0xb6b/0xc70 net/9p/client.c:734
 p9_client_version net/9p/client.c:920 [inline]
 p9_client_create+0xb51/0x1240 net/9p/client.c:1027
 v9fs_session_init+0x1f0/0x18f0 fs/9p/v9fs.c:408
 v9fs_mount+0xba/0xcb0 fs/9p/vfs_super.c:126
 legacy_get_tree+0x108/0x220 fs/fs_context.c:632
 vfs_get_tree+0x8e/0x300 fs/super.c:1573
 do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:3056 [inline]
 path_mount+0x6a6/0x1e90 fs/namespace.c:3386
 do_mount fs/namespace.c:3399 [inline]
 __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3607 [inline]
 __se_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3584 [inline]
 __x64_sys_mount+0x283/0x300 fs/namespace.c:358…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/oesa-2026-3702</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-80527</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-80527</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 193 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ceph: fix hanging __ceph_get_caps() with stale mds_wanted A reader can hang forever in __ceph_get_caps() when the client no longer holds `FILE_RD`, but local cap state still says that the capability is already wanted (via `mds_wanted`). One way to trigger this is through MDS cap revocation.  If another client performs a conflicting operation, the MDS can revoke `FILE_RD` from the reader; the next read then has to reacquire `FILE_RD`.  If the cap update that should request `FILE_RD` never reaches the MDS after `cap-&amp;gt;mds_wanted` was raised, the reader is left holding only non-file caps while local `mds_wanted` still includes the file read caps. In that state, try_get_cap_refs() sees `need &amp;lt;= mds_wanted` and returns 0, so __ceph_get_caps() just waits on `i_cap_wq`.  If the cap update that was supposed to request `FILE_RD never reaches the MDS after `cap-&amp;gt;mds_wanted was` raised, no further request is sent and the waiter can sleep indefinitely until unrelated cap traffic happens to wake it up. The ordering issue is that `cap-&amp;gt;mds_wanted` is updated in __prep_cap() before the `CEPH_MSG_CLIENT_CAPS message` is actually queued for send.  That makes one field serve two different meanings at once: what this client wants, and what the client believes the MDS already knows it wants. A proper fix would be to split those states and track whether a cap update is actually in flight or has been observed by the MDS. However,…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 193 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ceph: fix hanging __ceph_get_caps() with stale mds_wanted A reader can hang forever in __ceph_get_caps() when the client no longer holds `FILE_RD`, but local cap state still says that the capability is already wanted (via `mds_wanted`). One way to trigger this is through MDS cap revocation.  If another client performs a conflicting operation, the MDS can revoke `FILE_RD` from the reader; the next read then has to reacquire `FILE_RD`.  If the cap update that should request `FILE_RD` never reaches the MDS after `cap-&amp;gt;mds_wanted` was raised, the reader is left holding only non-file caps while local `mds_wanted` still includes the file read caps. In that state, try_get_cap_refs() sees `need &amp;lt;= mds_wanted` and returns 0, so __ceph_get_caps() just waits on `i_cap_wq`.  If the cap update that was supposed to request `FILE_RD never reaches the MDS after `cap-&amp;gt;mds_wanted was` raised, no further request is sent and the waiter can sleep indefinitely until unrelated cap traffic happens to wake it up. The ordering issue is that `cap-&amp;gt;mds_wanted` is updated in __prep_cap() before the `CEPH_MSG_CLIENT_CAPS message` is actually queued for send.  That makes one field serve two different meanings at once: what this client wants, and what the client believes the MDS already knows it wants. A proper fix would be to split those states and track whether a cap update is actually in flight or has been observed by the MDS. However,…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-80527</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-3042 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-3042</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen, darunter möglicherweise die Ausführung von beliebigem Code, die Ausweitung von Berechtigungen, die Offenlegung von Informationen, die Manipulation von Daten oder Denial-of-Service-Zustände.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen, darunter möglicherweise die Ausführung von beliebigem Code, die Ausweitung von Berechtigungen, die Offenlegung von Informationen, die Manipulation von Daten oder Denial-of-Service-Zustände.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-3042</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
