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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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      <title>EUVD-2026-359908</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-359908</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-359908</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-359908</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-80183</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-80183</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3, any authenticated user holding role:reader on any project can list every project-scoped role assignment under any domain by passing a domain ID as scope.project.id with include_subtree to the GET /v3/role_assignments endpoint. The domain&amp;#39;s project record has domain_id=null, causing the policy domain_id check to pass for any caller. With include_names, the response discloses the names and home-domain IDs of every user, group, project, and role involved. The literal &amp;#34;default&amp;#34; domain ID works against any deployment created with keystone-manage bootstrap. An attacker can harvest domain IDs from the response and repeat the query to map role assignments across the entire cloud. This is caused by misuse of &amp;#34;None&amp;#34; in&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;list_role_assignments_for_tree.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3, any authenticated user holding role:reader on any project can list every project-scoped role assignment under any domain by passing a domain ID as scope.project.id with include_subtree to the GET /v3/role_assignments endpoint. The domain&amp;#39;s project record has domain_id=null, causing the policy domain_id check to pass for any caller. With include_names, the response discloses the names and home-domain IDs of every user, group, project, and role involved. The literal &amp;#34;default&amp;#34; domain ID works against any deployment created with keystone-manage bootstrap. An attacker can harvest domain IDs from the response and repeat the query to map role assignments across the entire cloud. This is caused by misuse of &amp;#34;None&amp;#34; in&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;list_role_assignments_for_tree.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-80183</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-xmh6-7768-658c</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-xmh6-7768-658c</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3, any authenticated user holding role:reader on any project can list every project-scoped role assignment under any domain by passing a domain ID as scope.project.id with include_subtree to the GET /v3/role_assignments endpoint. The domain&amp;#39;s project record has domain_id=null, causing the policy domain_id check to pass for any caller. With include_names, the response discloses the names and home-domain IDs of every user, group, project, and role involved. The literal &amp;#34;default&amp;#34; domain ID works against any deployment created with keystone-manage bootstrap. An attacker can harvest domain IDs from the response and repeat the query to map role assignments across the entire cloud. This is caused by misuse of &amp;#34;None&amp;#34; in&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;list_role_assignments_for_tree.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3, any authenticated user holding role:reader on any project can list every project-scoped role assignment under any domain by passing a domain ID as scope.project.id with include_subtree to the GET /v3/role_assignments endpoint. The domain&amp;#39;s project record has domain_id=null, causing the policy domain_id check to pass for any caller. With include_names, the response discloses the names and home-domain IDs of every user, group, project, and role involved. The literal &amp;#34;default&amp;#34; domain ID works against any deployment created with keystone-manage bootstrap. An attacker can harvest domain IDs from the response and repeat the query to map role assignments across the entire cloud. This is caused by misuse of &amp;#34;None&amp;#34; in&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;list_role_assignments_for_tree.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-xmh6-7768-658c</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-80183</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-80183</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS: keystone, Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: keystone, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: keystone, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: keystone&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3, any authenticated user holding role:reader on any project can list every project-scoped role assignment under any domain by passing a domain ID as scope.project.id with include_subtree to the GET /v3/role_assignments endpoint. The domain&amp;#39;s project record has domain_id=null, causing the policy domain_id check to pass for any caller. With include_names, the response discloses the names and home-domain IDs of every user, group, project, and role involved. The literal &amp;#34;default&amp;#34; domain ID works against any deployment created with keystone-manage bootstrap. An attacker can harvest domain IDs from the response and repeat the query to map role assignments across the entire cloud. This is caused by misuse of &amp;#34;None&amp;#34; in list_role_assignments_for_tree.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS: keystone, Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: keystone, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: keystone, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: keystone&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3, any authenticated user holding role:reader on any project can list every project-scoped role assignment under any domain by passing a domain ID as scope.project.id with include_subtree to the GET /v3/role_assignments endpoint. The domain&amp;#39;s project record has domain_id=null, causing the policy domain_id check to pass for any caller. With include_names, the response discloses the names and home-domain IDs of every user, group, project, and role involved. The literal &amp;#34;default&amp;#34; domain ID works against any deployment created with keystone-manage bootstrap. An attacker can harvest domain IDs from the response and repeat the query to map role assignments across the entire cloud. This is caused by misuse of &amp;#34;None&amp;#34; in list_role_assignments_for_tree.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-80183</guid>
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